scholarly journals Pecunia non olet: on the self-selection into (dis)honest earning opportunities

Author(s):  
Kai A. Konrad ◽  
Tim Lohse ◽  
Sven A. Simon

AbstractWe study self-selection into earning money in an honest or dishonest fashion based on individuals’ attitudes toward truthful reporting. We propose a decision-theoretic framework where individuals’ willingness to pay for honest earnings is determined by their (behavioral) lying costs. Our laboratory experiment identifies lying costs as the decisive factor causing self-selection into honest earning opportunities for individuals with high costs and into cheating opportunities for those prepared to misreport. Our experimental setup allows us to recover individual lying costs and their distribution in the population.

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-211
Author(s):  
Ashjan Ajour

Abstract This article explores the body as a site of subjectivity production during a hunger strike in Occupied Palestine. It further explores the former political prisoners’ theory of subjectivity as it emerges through their praxis and philosophy of freedom. Although the body is the principal tool that the hunger strikers use, they don't consider it the decisive factor in attaining their goal. For that they build on the immaterial strength that develops with the deterioration of the body and from which they construct the concept of rouh (soul). This is expressed through the formation of contradictory binaries: body versus soul and body versus mind. The article shows that the hunger strike not only is a political strategy for liberation; it also moves into a spiritualization of the struggle. It uses and problematizes Foucault's “technologies of the self” to theorize the specific formation of subjectivity in the Palestinian hunger strike under colonial conditions, and it contributes to theories of subjectivation. The hunger strikers, in their interaction with the dispossession of the colonial power, invent technologies of resistance to transcend the colonial and carceral constraints on their freedom and create the capacity for the transformation from a submissive subject to a resistant one.


1959 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hilary L. Seal

The theory of ‘temporary selection’ is concerned with the variation, for fixed x, of q[x–t]+t the observed rate of mortality at age x during the t+1th year after the issue of an assurance or annuity contract. The classical view is that—apart from chance variations—q[x–t]+t increases gradually with increasing t until the effects of selection have disappeared after which time q[xx–t]+t is a constant depending on x only.Various reasons have been suggested for the persistence of temporary selection in an observed series of values of q[xx–t]+t. The chief of these are:(1) The continuing effects of an initial selection on the part of the assurance company or by the annuitant (Morgan, 1834);(2) The gradual withdrawal from assurance of healthy lives (Higham, 1851); and(3) Secular improvements in medicals election or in the self-selection of annuitants (Karup, 1903).


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luc Behaghel ◽  
Bruno Crépon ◽  
Thomas Le Barbanchon

We evaluate an experimental program in which the French public employment service anonymized résumés for firms that were hiring. Firms were free to participate or not; participating firms were then randomly assigned to receive either anonymous résumés or name-bearing ones. We find that participating firms become less likely to interview and hire minority candidates when receiving anonymous résumés. We show how these unexpected results can be explained by the self-selection of firms into the program and by the fact that anonymization prevents the attenuation of negative signals when the candidate belongs to a minority. (JEL J15, J68, J71)


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