Consignment supply chain cooperation for complementary products under online to offline business mode

Author(s):  
Zhisong Chen ◽  
Shong-Iee Ivan Su
2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitali Sarkar ◽  
Sun Hur ◽  
Biswajit Sarkar

Recently, a major trend is going to redesign a production system by controlling or making variable the production rate within some fixed interval to maintain the optimal level. This strategy is more effective when the holding cost is time-dependent as it is interrelated with holding duration of products and rate of production. An effort is made to make a supply chain model (SCM) to show the joint effect of variable production rate and time-varying holding cost for specific type of complementary products, where those products are made by two different manufacturers and a common retailer makes them bundle and sells bundles to end customers. Demand of each product is specified by stochastic reservation prices with a known potential market size. Those players of the SCM are considered with unequal power. Stackelberg game approach is employed to obtain global optimum solution of the model. An illustrative numerical example, graphical representation, and managerial insights are given to illustrate the model. Results prove that variable production rate and time-dependent holding cost save more than existing literature.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 343-364
Author(s):  
Lisha Wang ◽  
◽  
Huaming Song ◽  
Ding Zhang ◽  
Hui Yang ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (12) ◽  
pp. 5007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiongqiong Gu ◽  
Xiaodong Yang ◽  
Bin Liu

This study considered the supply chain that two manufacturers sell green complementary products to a dominant offline retailer. We investigated whether a manufacturer (the integrated manufacturer) should add an online channel and examined how it affects channel members’ decisions and profits. We formulated the power structure as the retailer-Stackelberg model and analyzed the pricing decisions for the supply chain. The results demonstrate that the integrated manufacturer prefers not to add the online channel when online and offline market bases are comparable and the level of complementarity is moderate. The integrated manufacturer gains more power at the expense of the offline retailer and the other manufacturer (the traditional manufacturer) when the complementarity between the offline and online channel is the same as offline channels with the addition of a new online channel; furthermore, the retailer earns less, while the traditional manufacturer’s profit hinges on the complementarity between the online and offline channels. It is beneficial for the offline retailer to balance the online and offline market bases of product 1 by improving the sales environment of the physical store. The integrated manufacturer can benefit from varying their marketing actions to decrease the degree of complementarity between the retail and online channels for the two products, while the traditional manufacturer can be better off from the online channel introduction by taking steps to increase the complementarity of the two products between the offline channels.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haiyan Shan ◽  
Chen Zhang ◽  
Guo Wei

Retailers usually sell complementary products jointly with a discounted price to attract more consumers. However, the difference of complementary degree between products leads to the diversity of pricing. In parallel, with the development of green supply chains, the extra cost of manufacturers to conduct ecological product design makes the pricing of complementary products further complicated. Thus, it is important to clarify the pricing strategy for complementary products in a green supply chain. Based on the Stackelberg games between two manufacturers and a retailer, this paper constructs three pricing models to simultaneously analyze the changes in the optimal profits of supply chain members and the optimal green manufacturing degree of complementary products. The results demonstrate that: (i) In most cases, two manufacturers prefer the pure bundling pricing strategy, but the strategy preference of the retailer is complex. (ii) The green manufacturing is mutually beneficial for complementary manufacturers and worth advocating. (iii) The increasing sensitivity of consumers to the green manufacturing level of one product will also be detrimental to the improvement of the optimal green manufacturing level of its complementary products.


2010 ◽  
Vol 40-41 ◽  
pp. 438-442
Author(s):  
Xin Wang ◽  
Jing Sun

Electronic contract platform based on electronic signature technology effectively compensates for the defects of traditional paper contract, reduces the human, material and financial expenditure and improves working efficiency, which has become a new profit growth point of the enterprises. It meets the needs of fast-paced business mode and promotes supply chain operations. Comprehensive research on operation model foe Electronic contract services platform is discussed in this paper.


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