scholarly journals Pricing Decisions on Online Channel Entry for Complementary Products in a Dominant Retailer Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (12) ◽  
pp. 5007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiongqiong Gu ◽  
Xiaodong Yang ◽  
Bin Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
The Other ◽  
Complementary Products ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Stackelberg Model ◽  
Dominant Retailer ◽  
Marketing Actions ◽  
Offline Channels

This study considered the supply chain that two manufacturers sell green complementary products to a dominant offline retailer. We investigated whether a manufacturer (the integrated manufacturer) should add an online channel and examined how it affects channel members’ decisions and profits. We formulated the power structure as the retailer-Stackelberg model and analyzed the pricing decisions for the supply chain. The results demonstrate that the integrated manufacturer prefers not to add the online channel when online and offline market bases are comparable and the level of complementarity is moderate. The integrated manufacturer gains more power at the expense of the offline retailer and the other manufacturer (the traditional manufacturer) when the complementarity between the offline and online channel is the same as offline channels with the addition of a new online channel; furthermore, the retailer earns less, while the traditional manufacturer’s profit hinges on the complementarity between the online and offline channels. It is beneficial for the offline retailer to balance the online and offline market bases of product 1 by improving the sales environment of the physical store. The integrated manufacturer can benefit from varying their marketing actions to decrease the degree of complementarity between the retail and online channels for the two products, while the traditional manufacturer can be better off from the online channel introduction by taking steps to increase the complementarity of the two products between the offline channels.

scholarly journals Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Reverse Supply Chains Considering Fairness Concern

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (9) ◽  
pp. 1657 ◽  
Author(s):  
Di Wu ◽  
Juhong Chen ◽  
Ruyu Yan ◽  
Ruijun Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Transfer Price ◽  
Internet Technology ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
Offline Channels

The fierce competition in the recycling industry and the rapid development of internet technology has prompted recycling centers to develop a dual-channel reverse supply chain with both offline and online recycling channels. After the introduction of online channels, recycling centers and third-party recyclers (TPR) have paid attention to the division of profits in supply chain systems and the behavior of fairness concerns. Therefore, it is necessary to help recycling enterprises make pricing decisions in consideration of fairness concerns. This paper is aimed at answering the following two main questions: (1) When the recycling center or TPR have fairness concerns, how does the optimal pricing and revenue of supply chain members change when both sides are neutral? (2) When the fairness concern coefficient changes, how does the overall revenue of the supply chain system change? How should supply chain members adjust their pricing decisions to maximize their own profits? In order to solve the above problems, Stackelberg game models were made from three aspects: both sides are neutral, only the TPR has fairness concerns, and only the recycling center has fairness concerns. Based on the results of the example analyses for the model, we found that when only the TPR has fairness concerns, the profit of the recycling center and the transfer price of offline channels will decrease, while the profit of TPR is the opposite. Furthermore, when only a recycling center has fairness concerns, it will lead to the reduction of not only the recycling price and transfer price of offline channels, but also the profits of the entire supply chain system. Specially, whether it is for a recycling center or TPR, a lower level of fairness concern coefficient has a stronger impact on pricing and revenue than at high levels.

scholarly journals Strategic Integration Decision under Supply Chain Competition in the Presence of Online Channel

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 58
Author(s):  
Subrata Saha ◽  
Izabela Nielsen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Strategic Integration ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Substitutable Products ◽  
Product Pricing ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Strategic Cooperation ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Vertical Level

This study explores the pricing decisions of substitutable products for two competing supply chains in the presence of an online channel. Each supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and an exclusive retailer and one of the manufacturers distributes products through the online channel. We examine optimal decisions under five scenarios to explore how the strategic cooperation between two manufacturers at the upstream horizontal level or with the retailer at the vertical level affects product pricing decisions and the performance of two supply chains? The results reveal that decisions for cooperation with competing manufacturers and opening an online channel are correlated. In the absence of an online channel, cooperation with their respective retailer can lead to a higher supply chain profit. However, if a manufacturer opens an online channel, then cooperation with competing manufacturers can lead to a higher supply chain profit. Under the vertical integration, total supply chain profit might be lower compared to a scenario where members in each supply chain remain independent. Consumers also need to pay more for products.

scholarly journals Joint Green Marketing Decision-Making of Green Supply Chain Considering Power Structure and Corporate Social Responsibility

Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 564
Author(s):  
Jialiang Huang ◽  
Xiaoxia Wang ◽  
Yuxi Luo ◽  
Liying Yu ◽  
Ziyuan Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Green Marketing ◽  
The Other ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Corporate Social

In order to explore the impact of a manufacturer’s or retailer’s undertaking corporate social responsibility (CSR) and different power structures on their joint green marketing decisions and profits in the green supply chain, this paper establishes green supply chain optimization models under six different decision-making scenarios according to two different CSR bearers and three different power structures. Based on the main assumptions of a linear product demand function and CSR measured by consumer surplus, this paper solves the equilibrium solutions of the manufacturer and the retailer through game theory. The results show that: First, the difference in the degree of CSR undertaken by manufacturers and retailers leads to a difference in the ranking of optimal strategies of both parties under the three power structures. Second, under the same power structure, compared with undertaking CSR by oneself, when the other party undertakes CSR, the level of the product’s green degree, the level of green promotion, the party’s own profit, and the profit of the other party are all higher. Third, regardless of the power structure, manufacturers and retailers undertaking CSR is conducive to improving the level of product greenness, increasing green promotion, lowering the retail price, increasing consumers’ willingness to buy green products, and ultimately helping to increase the profits of manufacturers and retailers.

scholarly journals Pricing decisions for complementary products in a fuzzy dual-channel supply chain

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 343-364
Author(s):  
Lisha Wang ◽  
◽  
Huaming Song ◽  
Ding Zhang ◽  
Hui Yang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Complementary Products ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

scholarly journals The Implication of Channel Discrepancy in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Zhenyang Pi ◽  
Weiguo Fang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
The Other ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Induction Method ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper studies the implication of channel discrepancy between the retail and direct channels in a dual-channel supply chain consisting of one common retailer and two manufacturers in which the manufacturers may have different market powers. Each manufacturer provides a substitutable product and opens an online channel to customers directly. We develop an analytical model to derive the optimal pricing strategies by using game theory and the backward induction method, and we examine related properties under three market power structures while considering channel discrepancy, including the Nash equilibrium, the Manufacturers leader Stackelberg, and the M1 leader Stackelberg models (denoted as the N, MS, and M1S models, respectively). Numerical simulations are examined to reveal and verify the effect of channel discrepancy on optimal prices, demands, and profits. We find that a higher level of channel discrepancy induces higher prices, demands, and profits for each member in both channels, while this kind of stimulating impact for the leader manufacturer who obtains a higher level of channel discrepancy will be more significant than it is for the other members in the three models. In addition, the profit of the supply chain in the N model is always higher than it is in the MS model, while it may be higher or lower than it is in the M1S model depending on the level of channel discrepancy.

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