Optimal bundling and pricing decisions for complementary products in a two-layer supply chain

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (6) ◽  
pp. 732-752 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lin Pan ◽  
Shuiyin Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Complementary Products ◽  
Pricing Decisions

scholarly journals Pricing decisions for complementary products in a fuzzy dual-channel supply chain

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 343-364
Author(s):  
Lisha Wang ◽  
◽  
Huaming Song ◽  
Ding Zhang ◽  
Hui Yang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Complementary Products ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions on Online Channel Entry for Complementary Products in a Dominant Retailer Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (12) ◽  
pp. 5007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiongqiong Gu ◽  
Xiaodong Yang ◽  
Bin Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
The Other ◽  
Complementary Products ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Stackelberg Model ◽  
Dominant Retailer ◽  
Marketing Actions ◽  
Offline Channels

This study considered the supply chain that two manufacturers sell green complementary products to a dominant offline retailer. We investigated whether a manufacturer (the integrated manufacturer) should add an online channel and examined how it affects channel members’ decisions and profits. We formulated the power structure as the retailer-Stackelberg model and analyzed the pricing decisions for the supply chain. The results demonstrate that the integrated manufacturer prefers not to add the online channel when online and offline market bases are comparable and the level of complementarity is moderate. The integrated manufacturer gains more power at the expense of the offline retailer and the other manufacturer (the traditional manufacturer) when the complementarity between the offline and online channel is the same as offline channels with the addition of a new online channel; furthermore, the retailer earns less, while the traditional manufacturer’s profit hinges on the complementarity between the online and offline channels. It is beneficial for the offline retailer to balance the online and offline market bases of product 1 by improving the sales environment of the physical store. The integrated manufacturer can benefit from varying their marketing actions to decrease the degree of complementarity between the retail and online channels for the two products, while the traditional manufacturer can be better off from the online channel introduction by taking steps to increase the complementarity of the two products between the offline channels.

scholarly journals Joint Innovation Investment and Pricing Decisions in Retail Supply Chains with Customer Value

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1309
Author(s):  
Jiali Qu ◽  
Benyong Hu ◽  
Chao Meng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Customer Value ◽  
Business Models ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Game Equilibrium

In the retail industry, customer value has become the key to maintaining competitive advantages. In the era of new retail, customer value is not only affected by the product price, but it is also closely related to innovations, such as value-added services and unique business models. In this paper, we study the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a retailer–supplier supply chain based on revenue sharing contracts and customer value. We first find that, in the non-cooperative game, equilibrium only exists in the supplier Stackelberg game. However, revenue sharing contracts cannot coordinate the supply chain in the non-cooperative game. By considering supply chain members’ bargaining power, we find that there exists a unique equilibrium for the Nash bargaining product. In addition, revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the optimal consumer surplus. When the supply chain is coordinated, supply chain profit is allocated to the supply chain members based on their bargaining powers.

scholarly journals The Impact of Food Quality Information Services on Food Supply Chain Pricing Decisions and Coordination Mechanisms Based on the O2O E-Commerce Mode

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoqiu Yu ◽  
Xiaoxue Ren
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Food Quality ◽  
Food Supply ◽  
Food Processing ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Information Service ◽  
Quality Information ◽  
Food Supply Chain ◽  
Quantity Discount ◽  
Pricing Decisions

This paper considers the price conflict problem between the online channel of a food processing factory and the offline channel of the food retailers in food supply chains by analyzing the pricing decisions and coordination mechanisms between the food processing factory and food retailers under the influence of a food quality information service. First, the Stackelberg game method and the Bertrand game method are used to optimize the pricing decisions with the goal of maximizing the profits of the food processing factory and retailer. The analysis shows that the food quality information service level is positively correlated with the price of the factory’s own channel, and the influence of the food quality information service level on the price of the food processing factory’s or the food retailer’s own channel is stronger than its influence on the price of a competitor’s channel. Second, the food supply chain members’ pricing decisions are analyzed using the case analysis method by considering practical problems in the food supply chain. The results indicate that the food processing factory should use the Stackelberg game to make pricing decisions. However, it is optimal for the food retailer to make pricing decisions under the Bertrand game, and the total profit of the food supply chain is optimized under centralized decision making. Finally, we use both the quantitative discount mechanism and the Stackelberg game method to analyze the profits obtained by the food processing factory and retailer. The results indicate that the food processing factory should implement a quantitative discount mechanism when the quantity discount coefficient is greater than 0.4, and the retailer should implement a quantity discount mechanism when the quantity discount coefficient is in the range of 0.25 to 0.4.

scholarly journals Retail Services and Pricing Decisions in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Remanufacturing

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 2373-2396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhen-Zheng Zhang ◽  
Zong-Jun Wang ◽  
Li-Wen Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Retail Services
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