Factorial Validity of the Theory of Mind Inventory-2 in Typically Developing Children

Author(s):  
Shih-Chieh Lee ◽  
I-Ning Fu ◽  
Meng-Ru Liu ◽  
Tzu-Ying Yu ◽  
Kuan-Lin Chen
2019 ◽  
Vol 09 (01) ◽  
pp. 09-11
Author(s):  
Shrunga Manchanapura Shivalingaiah ◽  
Fathimath Ramseena ◽  
Nafeesath Shareen

Abstract Background and Objective Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability that can be attributed to mental status beliefs, intents, emotions, proficiency, etc., to oneself and to others, and the understanding that others also have intentions, conceptions, desires, and perspectives that are different from one’s own. Daily social life depends on the ability to evaluate the behavior of other people on the basis of their mental state such as their beliefs, intentions, compassions, and goals. This study was conducted to explore the ToM abilities in preschoolers. Methods A total of 36 preschoolers participated in the study. Two stories were narrated to the children, the classic Sally-Anne Task and the Smarty’s Task. In both the tasks, the responses of the children were scored as either true belief or false belief. Results The results of the present study revealed mixed responses among the preschoolers. It was found that 3- to 4-year-old children had more false beliefs for both the tasks when compared with 4- to 5-year-old. Conclusion This study highlights the importance of ToM abilities in typically growing children and other clinical population. It can be concluded that the ToM abilities were improved in typically developing children. Future studies are required to explore the higher levels of embedding of ToM, and also to incorporate it in the clinical population.


Psihologija ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 23-23
Author(s):  
Sanja Simlesa ◽  
Kaja Hacin ◽  
Maja Cepanec ◽  
Jasmina Ivsac-Pavlisa

The ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others, known as the theory of mind (ToM), has been widely researched over the past 40 years, along with its relation to language comprehension. However, a majority of the research on the relation between ToM and language used only verbal tasks assessing false belief understanding as a measure of ToM. Therefore, this study aimed to analyze the relation between language and ToM, using a larger battery of ToM measures, with different language demands. A total of 203 typically developing children between 46 and 68 months of age, with average nonverbal cognitive skills, were assessed using language comprehension and ToM tasks. The language aspect was assessed using the Reynell Developmental Language Scales (Language Comprehension scale A). To assess ToM, verbal and non-verbal tasks were taken from the ToM subtest of the NEPSY-II. Results indicated a significant correlation between language comprehension and verbal and non-verbal ToM measures. Hierarchical regression showed that language comprehension was a significant predictor for children's performance on both verbal and non-verbal ToM tasks. Specifically, language comprehension affected ToM, regardless of the language demands of the ToM tasks. However, language comprehension was a stronger predictor for verbal than non-verbal ToM tasks. The results of this study contribute to the view that the relation between language and ToM is fundamental and exceeds the features of specific tasks.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 305-316
Author(s):  
Alev Gİrli

Theory of mind (ToM) has been applied in an attempt to explain the social impairments that characterize children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). However, an examination of several Turkish ToM studies revealed that ToM belief tests often have been used inappropriately to assess typically developing (TD) children and those adult versions of the Eyes Test and other ToM tests have been used inappropriately to assess adults with psychiatric disorders. Among the studies examined, none had used advanced ToM tests such as the Eyes Test and the Strange Stories Test to compare TD children and children with autism. The objective of this study was to examine the ToM levels attained by children with autism and TD children between the ages of 7 and 13 years, using the advanced ToM Strange Stories and Eyes tests. Compared with ASD children, TD children achieved higher scores on the Eyes and Strange Stories tests.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diana Alkire ◽  
Kathryn A. McNaughton ◽  
Heather Yarger ◽  
Deena Shariq ◽  
Elizabeth Redcay

Successful social interactions are assumed to depend on theory of mind (ToM)—the ability to represent others’ mental states—yet most studies of the relation between ToM and social-interactive success rely on non-interactive tasks that do not adequately capture the spontaneous engagement of ToM, a crucial component of everyday social interactions. We addressed this gap by establishing a novel observational rating scale to measure the spontaneous use of ToM (or lack thereof) within naturalistic conversations (conversational ToM, or cToM). In 50 age- and gender-matched dyads of autistic and typically developing children aged 8–16, we assessed cToM during 5-minute, unstructured conversations. We found that ratings on the cToM Negative scale, reflecting ToM-related violations of conversational norms, were negatively associated with two forms of non-interactive ToM: visual-affective and spontaneous. In contrast, the cToM Positive scale, reflecting explicit mental state language and perspective-taking, was not associated with these non-interactive ToM abilities. Furthermore, autistic participants were rated higher than typically developing participants on cToM Negative, but the two groups were rated similarly on cToM Positive. Together, these findings provide insight into multiple aspects of ToM in conversation and reveal a nuanced picture of the relative strengths and difficulties among autistic individuals.


2003 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 236-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elaine R. Silliman ◽  
Sylvia F. Diehl ◽  
Ruth Huntley Bahr ◽  
Theresa Hnath-Chisolm ◽  
Catherine Bouchard Zenko ◽  
...  

Purpose: A hallmark of autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) is disruption in theory-of-mind development, including the understanding of false beliefs. Previous studies have typically assessed the development of first- and second-order false belief concepts in ASD, with tasks primarily emphasizing physical causality and logical inferencing. The present study investigated how preadolescents and adolescents with ASD performed on false belief tasks that included social inferencing of psychological states as well as logical inferencing of physical states. Method: Two categories of tasks were administered: four traditional logical inferencing tasks and four social inferencing tasks specifically developed for this study. In addition, a prompt hierarchy was included to ascertain if performance on both task types improved. Participants were 45 children and adolescents primarily selected from three urban school districts: 15 adolescents with a previous diagnosis of ASD (ASD group); 15 typically developing children matched for age, gender, and ethnicity (CA group); and 15 typically developing children matched for language age, gender, and ethnicity (LA group). Results: Three findings were pertinent. First, the CA group performed at higher levels than did the LA group and the ASD group on both task sets. Second, although the CA and the LA groups performed equally well on both the logical and the social inferencing tasks, the ASD group performed better on the social inferencing tasks. Finally, the prompt hierarchy significantly improved overall task performance for the ASD and LA groups. Clinical Implications: These findings indicate that task type, variations in vocabulary ability, and the provision of support influenced performance on the false belief tasks.


SLEEP ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 40 (suppl_1) ◽  
pp. A21-A21
Author(s):  
R Tesfaye ◽  
A Brown ◽  
S Drouin ◽  
E Kim ◽  
R Gruber

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 393-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serena LECCE ◽  
Luca RONCHI ◽  
Paola DEL SETTE ◽  
Luca BISCHETTI ◽  
Valentina BAMBINI

AbstractWe investigated the association between individual differences in metaphor understanding and Theory of Mind (ToM) in typically developing children. We distinguished between two types of metaphors and created a Physical and Mental Metaphors task, echoing a similar distinction for ToM. Nine-year-olds scored lower than older age-groups in ToM as well as in the interpretation of mental, but not physical, metaphors. Moreover, nine-year-olds (but not older children) who are better in ToM are also better in interpreting mental, but not physical, metaphors. This suggests that the link between metaphor and ToM is stronger when metaphorical interpretation involves mental aspects, and it is more evident in early rather than later childhood.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Hope Lincoln ◽  
Cora M. Mukerji ◽  
David Dodell-Feder ◽  
Arianna Riccio ◽  
Christine I. Hooker

Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to think about the perspectives, beliefs, and feelings of another, develops throughout childhood and adolescence and is an important skill for social interactions. This study examines neural activity in typically developing children during a novel ToM task – the Movie Mentalizing Task– and tests its relations to ToM behavioral performance and social functioning. In this fMRI task, children ages 8–13years (N=25) watched a brief movie clip and were asked to predict a character’s mental state after a social interaction. Engaging in the Movie Mentalizing Task activated the ToM neural network. Moreover, greater neural activity in the ToM network, including the superior temporal gyrus and inferior frontal gyrus, was associated with better behavioral performance on independent ToM tasks and was related to better social functioning, though these results do not survive correction for multiple comparisons. Results offer a new affective theory of mind task for children in the scanner that robustly recruits activity in theory of mind regions.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document