Existence, really? Tacit disagreements about “existence” in disputes about group minds and corporate agents

Synthese ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Himmelreich
Keyword(s):  
Group Minds

The Concept of the Individual and Its Scope

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ursula Renz
Keyword(s):  
Strict Sense ◽  
Physical Concept ◽  
Individual Group ◽  
Group Minds ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Individual

This chapter discusses the implications of Spinoza’s concept of individual bodies, as introduced in the definition of individuum in the physical digression. It begins by showing that this definition allows for an extremely wide application of the term; accordingly, very different sorts of physical entities can be described as Spinozistic individuals. Given the quite distinct use of the terms divisibilis and indivisibilis in his metaphysics, however, the chapter argues that the physical concept of individuality is not universally applied in the Ethics but reserved for physical or natural-philosophical considerations. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the problem of collective individuals. It is argued that, while societies or states are described as individual bodies, they do not constitute individual group minds in the strict sense of the term for Spinoza. This in turn indicates that minds are not individuated in the same way as bodies.

The Problem of Other (Group) Minds (Response to Schwitzgebel)

Philosophia ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 1099-1112
Author(s):  
Orli Dahan
Keyword(s):  
Group Minds

Group Minds and Explanatory Simplicity

2015 ◽  
Vol 76 ◽  
pp. 3-19
Author(s):  
Mark Sprevak ◽  
David Statham
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Group Level ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Group Minds

AbstractThis paper explores the claim that explanation of a group's behaviour in term of individual mental states is, in principle, superior to explanation of that behaviour in terms of group mental states. We focus on the supposition that individual-level explanation is superior because it is simpler than group-level explanation. In this paper, we consider three different simplicity metrics. We argue that on none of those metrics does individual-level explanation achieve greater simplicity than a group-level alternative. We conclude that an argument against group minds should not lay weight on concerns of explanatory simplicity.

Minding One's Cognitive Systems: When Does a Group of Minds Constitute a Single Cognitive Unit?

Episteme ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 177-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Rupert
Keyword(s):  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Cognitive Systems ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Tentative Conclusion ◽  
Group Minds ◽  
The Social ◽  
Group Mind ◽  
Number Of Authors

The possibility of group minds or group mental states has been considered by a number of authors addressing issues in social epistemology and related areas (Goldman 2004, Pettit 2003, Gilbert 2004, Hutchins 1995). An appeal to group minds might, in the end, do indispensable explanatory work in the social or cognitive sciences. I am skeptical, though, and this essay lays out some of the reasons for my skepticism. The concerns raised herein constitute challenges to the advocates of group minds (or group mental states), challenges that might be overcome as theoretical and empirical work proceeds. Nevertheless, these hurdles are, I think, genuine and substantive, so much so that my tentative conclusion will not be optimistic. If a group mind is supposed to be a single mental system having two or more minds as proper parts, the prospects for group minds seem dim–or so I will argue.

scholarly journals Extended self

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 63-85
Author(s):  
Miljana Milojevic
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
The Self ◽  
Careful Examination ◽  
Extended Self ◽  
Demarcation Line ◽  
Psychological Continuity ◽  
Group Minds ◽  
Extended Mind Thesis

In this paper I aim to show that in the debate about the nature of the self one concept, the concept of the cognitive self, has a theoretical primacy over other conceptual alternatives because of its connection with the concept of a person in the debate about personal identity. Consequently, I will offer a defence of the hypothesis that the Extended Mind thesis implies the Extended Cognitive Self thesis if we additionally assume Parfit?s Psychological criterium of personal identity. After I consider several counterarguments to the claim that the Extended Mind implies the Extended Self, I will offer their criticism and show that they either distort the original Extended Mind thesis or introduce hardly defensible metaphysical assumptions. To one such assumption, that claims that one mind can contain another, I will pay special attention. By careful examination it will be shown that such assumption can be kept only if the relation between the mereologically connected minds is such that prevents psychological continuity between them, while it has to be abandoned if there is a psychological continuity between such minds because it would produce numerous problems such as the problem of too many thinkers, the proliferation of minds, the concept of the person would become useless, etc. Also, these considerations will lead us to the clear demarcation line between those approaches that claim the possibility of group minds and those that claim that there are extended minds. Their key difference will be in taking contrary stances towards the relation of psychological continuity when it comes to different wide minds and their biological constituents. This will be one of the main results of this paper, together with the defence of the Extended Cognitive Self thesis.

scholarly journals Group Minds and the Case of Wikipedia

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon DeDeo
Keyword(s):  
Group Minds

Reality

2019 ◽  
pp. 92-117
Author(s):  
Paul Thagard
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Social Constructivism ◽  
Natural Philosophy ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Philosophical Method ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Naturalistic Approach ◽  
Group Minds

Following a naturalistic approach to metaphysics, this chapter argues that materialism and scientific realism are much more plausible than their major alternatives: idealism and social constructivism. The appropriate philosophical method is to use inference to the best explanation of evidence rather than thought experiments and a priori speculation. Natural philosophy legitimately accepts the existence of objects, properties, relations, changes, events, processes, mechanisms, groups, space, and time. All of these concepts and hypotheses are subject to revision as science and philosophy generate more evidence and alternatives. However, skepticism is appropriate concerning the existence of other entities such as souls, gods, spirits, facts, and group minds. If evidence and inference to the best explanation support the existence of an entity, then we are justified in concluding that it exists.

Group Minds and the Problem of the First Belief

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arto Laitinen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Group Minds
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