scholarly journals Knowledge is closed under analytic content

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Z. Elgin
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Closure ◽  
Preface Paradox ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
Relevant Notion ◽  
The Preface Paradox

AbstractI am concerned with epistemic closure—the phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowledge. In particular, I defend a version of the closure principle in terms of analyticity; if an agent S knows that p is true and that q is an analytic part of p, then S knows that q. After targeting the relevant notion of analyticity, I argue that this principle accommodates intuitive cases and possesses the theoretical resources to avoid the preface paradox.

scholarly journals Justification and the knowledge-connection

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaakko Hirvelä
Keyword(s):  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Preface Paradox ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
Formal Properties ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
The Preface Paradox ◽  
Multi Premise Closure

AbstractI will present a novel account of justification in terms of knowledge on which one is justified in believing p just in case one could know that p. My main aim is to unravel some of the formal properties that justification has in virtue of its connection to knowledge. Assuming that safety is at least a necessary condition for knowledge, I show that justification (1) doesn’t iterate trivially; (2) isn’t a luminous condition; (3) is closed under a certain kind of multi-premise closure principle, but; (4) surprisingly one can nevertheless believe with justification a set of claims that’s jointly inconsistent. This last feature allows for a rather satisfying solution to the preface paradox. Finally, I contrast my account with other knowledge-first accounts of justification.

scholarly journals Multi-Peer Disagreement and the Preface Paradox

Ratio ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Boyce ◽  
Allan Hazlett
Keyword(s):  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Preface Paradox ◽  
The Preface Paradox

scholarly journals Safety, the Preface Paradox and Possible Worlds Semantics

Axiomathes ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 347-361
Author(s):  
Michael J. Shaffer
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Preface Paradox ◽  
The Preface Paradox

Full Belief and Loose Speech

2019 ◽  
Vol 128 (3) ◽  
pp. 255-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Moss
Keyword(s):  
Rational Beliefs ◽  
Preface Paradox ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Full Belief ◽  
The Preface Paradox ◽  
Probabilistic Theories ◽  
The Way

This paper defends an account of full belief, including an account of its relationship to credence. Along the way, I address several familiar and difficult questions about belief. Does fully believing a proposition require having maximal confidence in it? Are rational beliefs closed under entailment, or does the preface paradox show that rational agents can believe inconsistent propositions? Does whether you believe a proposition depend partly on your practical interests? My account of belief resolves the tension between conflicting answers to these questions that have been defended in the literature. In addition, my account complements fruitful probabilistic theories of assertion and knowledge.

Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox

2015 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 549-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Worsnip
Keyword(s):  
Preface Paradox ◽  
The Preface Paradox

scholarly journals The preface paradox dissolved

Theoria ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 53 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 121-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN N. WILLIAMS
Keyword(s):  
Preface Paradox ◽  
The Preface Paradox

scholarly journals An Open and Shut Case: Epistemic Closure in the Manifest Image

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Closure ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Inferential Knowledge ◽  
The Status ◽  
Relative Version ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
Manifest Image

The epistemic closure principle says that knowledge is closed under known entailment. The closure principle is deeply implicated in numerous core debates in contemporary epistemology. Closure’s opponents claim that there are good theoretical reasons to abandon it. Closure’s proponents claim that it is a defining feature of ordinary thought and talk and, thus, abandoning it is radically revisionary. But evidence for these claims about ordinary practice has thus far been anecdotal. In this paper, I report five studies on the status of epistemic closure in ordinary practice. Despite decades of widespread assumptions to the contrary in philosophy, ordinary practice is ambivalent about closure. Ordinary practice does not endorse an unqualified version of the epistemic closure principle, although it might endorse a source-relative version of the principle. In particular, whereas inferential knowledge is not viewed as closed under known entailment, perceptual knowledge might be.

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