scholarly journals Justification and the knowledge-connection

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaakko Hirvelä
Keyword(s):  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Preface Paradox ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
Formal Properties ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
The Preface Paradox ◽  
Multi Premise Closure

AbstractI will present a novel account of justification in terms of knowledge on which one is justified in believing p just in case one could know that p. My main aim is to unravel some of the formal properties that justification has in virtue of its connection to knowledge. Assuming that safety is at least a necessary condition for knowledge, I show that justification (1) doesn’t iterate trivially; (2) isn’t a luminous condition; (3) is closed under a certain kind of multi-premise closure principle, but; (4) surprisingly one can nevertheless believe with justification a set of claims that’s jointly inconsistent. This last feature allows for a rather satisfying solution to the preface paradox. Finally, I contrast my account with other knowledge-first accounts of justification.

scholarly journals Knowledge is closed under analytic content

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Z. Elgin
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Closure ◽  
Preface Paradox ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
Relevant Notion ◽  
The Preface Paradox

AbstractI am concerned with epistemic closure—the phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowledge. In particular, I defend a version of the closure principle in terms of analyticity; if an agent S knows that p is true and that q is an analytic part of p, then S knows that q. After targeting the relevant notion of analyticity, I argue that this principle accommodates intuitive cases and possesses the theoretical resources to avoid the preface paradox.

What Is an Institution?

2007 ◽  
pp. 5-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Searle
Keyword(s):  
Physical Structure ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Institutional Facts ◽  
Institutional Fact ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Creation ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Typical Point

The author claims that an institution is any collectively accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enable us to create institutional facts. These rules typically have the form of X counts as Y in C, where an object, person, or state of affairs X is assigned a special status, the Y status, such that the new status enables the person or object to perform functions that it could not perform solely in virtue of its physical structure, but requires as a necessary condition the assignment of the status. The creation of an institutional fact is, thus, the collective assignment of a status function. The typical point of the creation of institutional facts by assigning status functions is to create deontic powers. So typically when we assign a status function Y to some object or person X we have created a situation in which we accept that a person S who stands in the appropriate relation to X is such that (S has power (S does A)). The whole analysis then gives us a systematic set of relationships between collective intentionality, the assignment of function, the assignment of status functions, constitutive rules, institutional facts, and deontic powers.

scholarly journals Multi-Peer Disagreement and the Preface Paradox

Ratio ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Boyce ◽  
Allan Hazlett
Keyword(s):  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Preface Paradox ◽  
The Preface Paradox

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin E. H. Smith
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
The Body ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
General Overview ◽  
History Of ◽  
European Thought ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Conceptual Relationship

This Introduction takes a broadly focused, global, and comparative view of the concept of embodiment, focusing particularly on some of the ways it has been interpreted outside of the history of European thought. It also provides a general overview of the central concerns and questions of the volume as a whole, such as: What is the historical and conceptual relationship between the idea of embodiment and the idea of subjecthood? Am I who I am principally in virtue of the fact that I have the body I have? Relatedly, what is the relationship of embodiment to being and to individuality? Is embodiment a necessary condition of being? Of being an individual? What are the theological dimensions of embodiment? To what extent has the concept of embodiment been deployed in the history of philosophy to contrast the created world with the state of existence enjoyed by God? What are the normative dimensions of theories of embodiment? To what extent is the problem of embodiment a distinctly western preoccupation?

scholarly journals Safety, the Preface Paradox and Possible Worlds Semantics

Axiomathes ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 347-361
Author(s):  
Michael J. Shaffer
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Preface Paradox ◽  
The Preface Paradox

Full Belief and Loose Speech

2019 ◽  
Vol 128 (3) ◽  
pp. 255-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Moss
Keyword(s):  
Rational Beliefs ◽  
Preface Paradox ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Full Belief ◽  
The Preface Paradox ◽  
Probabilistic Theories ◽  
The Way

This paper defends an account of full belief, including an account of its relationship to credence. Along the way, I address several familiar and difficult questions about belief. Does fully believing a proposition require having maximal confidence in it? Are rational beliefs closed under entailment, or does the preface paradox show that rational agents can believe inconsistent propositions? Does whether you believe a proposition depend partly on your practical interests? My account of belief resolves the tension between conflicting answers to these questions that have been defended in the literature. In addition, my account complements fruitful probabilistic theories of assertion and knowledge.

scholarly journals An Augmented Buck-Passing Account of Reasons and Value: Scanlon and Crisp on What Stops the Buck

Utilitas ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 490-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
PHILIP COOK
Keyword(s):  
Dual Role ◽  
Formal Property ◽  
Formal Properties ◽  
Buck Passing ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Wrong Kind Of Reasons

Roger Crisp has inspired two important criticisms of Scanlon's buck-passing account of value. I defend buck-passing from the wrong kind of reasons criticism, and the reasons and the good objection. I support Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen's dual role of reasons in refuting the wrong kind of reasons criticism, even where its authors claim it fails. Crisp's reasons and the good objection contends that the property of goodness is buck-passing in virtue of its formality. I argue that Crisp conflates general and formal properties, and that Scanlon is ambiguous about whether the formal property of a reason can stop the buck. Drawing from Wallace, I respond to Crisp's reasons and the good objection by developing an augmented buck-passing account of reasons and value, where the buck is passed consistently from the formal properties of both to the substantive properties of considerations and evaluative attitudes. I end by describing two unresolved problems for buck-passers.

Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox

2015 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 549-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Worsnip
Keyword(s):  
Preface Paradox ◽  
The Preface Paradox

scholarly journals The preface paradox dissolved

Theoria ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 53 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 121-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN N. WILLIAMS
Keyword(s):  
Preface Paradox ◽  
The Preface Paradox
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