Group norms moderate the effect of identification on ingroup bias

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sami Çoksan ◽  
Banu Cingöz-Ulu
Keyword(s):  
Ingroup Bias ◽  
Group Norms

Working Hard to Achieve Self-Defining Group Goals: A Social Identity Analysis

2000 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 191-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelly S. Fielding ◽  
Michael A. Hogg
Keyword(s):  
Social Identity ◽  
Group Identification ◽  
Group Norms ◽  
Identity Threat ◽  
Traditional Research ◽  
Identity Model ◽  
Group Goals ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Substantial Effort

Summary: A social identity model of effort exertion in groups is presented. In contrast to most traditional research on productivity and performance motivation, the model is assumed to apply to groups of all sizes and nature, and to all membership contingent norms that specify group behaviors and goals. It is proposed that group identification renders behavior group-normative and encourages people to behave in line with group norms. The effect should be strengthened among people who most need consensual identity validation from fellow members, and in intergroup contexts where there is inescapable identity threat from an outgroup. Together these processes should encourage people to exert substantial effort on behalf of their group.

Experimental evidence of contagious stretching and ingroup bias in budgerigars (Melopsittacus undulatus).

2017 ◽  
Vol 131 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew C. Gallup ◽  
Janine Militello ◽  
Lexington Swartwood ◽  
Serena Sackett
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Ingroup Bias ◽  
Melopsittacus Undulatus

An Experimental Investigation of Self-Serving Biases in an Auditing Trust Game: The Effect of Group Affiliation

2002 ◽  
Vol 77 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald R. King
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Investigation ◽  
Social Pressure ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Group Norms ◽  
Group Affiliation

I report the results of an experiment designed to investigate the influence of noncredible communications and group affiliation on auditors' formation of self-serving bias. I find that manager-subjects use noncredible communications to induce auditors to develop an unwarranted trust of managers (i.e., a biased judgment). However, the bias is neutralized when auditor-subjects belong to groups that create social pressure to conform to group norms. Thus, my finding calls into question the Bazerman et al. (1997) conclusion that auditors cannot conduct impartial audits due to self-serving biases resulting from repeated interactions between auditors and their clients.

Antecedents and Consequences of Gossip in Work Groups

2019 ◽  
pp. 416-434
Author(s):  
Bianca Beersma ◽  
Gerben A. van Kleef ◽  
Maria T. M. Dijkstra
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Work Groups ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Group Norms ◽  
Group Effectiveness ◽  
Interpersonal Aggression ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Antecedents And Consequences

This chapter provides an overview of the antecedents and consequences of gossip in work groups. First, the chapter reviews the different motives for gossip in work groups (i.e., bonding, entertainment, emotional venting, information exchange, maintenance of group norms/social order, and interpersonal aggression) and links each motive to psychological theory. Second, the chapter reviews the different types of influence that gossip can have on various indicators of group effectiveness. Reflecting on the motives underlying gossip in work groups, as well as on its outcomes, it argues that future research should start integrating the diverse insights provided by earlier research on both gossip motives and outcomes, and it provides a number of suggestions for doing so.

CHOICE ARCHITECTURE IN SHAKESPEARE’S PUBLIC MEETINGS: NUDGE THEORY AND RICHARD III, CORIOLANUS, AND JULIUS CAESAR

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ceri Sullivan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Early Modern ◽  
Behavioural Economics ◽  
The Political ◽  
Julius Caesar ◽  
Choice Architecture ◽  
Group Norms ◽  
Richard Iii ◽  
Public Meetings

Abstract The political and dramatic intentions behind the use of appeals to the early modern public (on and off stage) have already been examined by Shakespeareans. This article points out the technical workings of such appeals by using two new areas of research on decision-making: the ethnography of public meetings and behavioural economics on how to influence choosers. These theories can illuminate the strategies used by the tribunes in handling the citizens of Coriolanus, by Antony in dealing with the plebeians in Julius Caesar, and by Buckingham and Richard when gathering support from the Londoners in Richard III. Using six common psychological biases (anchor-and-adjust, availability, representativeness, priming, arousal, and group norms), Shakespeare’s politicians prompt their hearers to change their minds: a celebrity warrior is recast as a wily tyrant, an execution as a murder, and a regent as the legitimate king.

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