Science, Technology and Institutional Change in Knowledge Production: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Framework

Author(s):  
Ozgur Aydogmus ◽  
Erkan Gürpinar
Author(s):  
Nick Zangwill

Abstract I give an informal presentation of the evolutionary game theoretic approach to the conventions that constitute linguistic meaning. The aim is to give a philosophical interpretation of the project, which accounts for the role of game theoretic mathematics in explaining linguistic phenomena. I articulate the main virtue of this sort of account, which is its psychological economy, and I point to the casual mechanisms that are the ground of the application of evolutionary game theory to linguistic phenomena. Lastly, I consider the objection that the account cannot explain predication, logic, and compositionality.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 37
Author(s):  
Khaled Fawagreh ◽  
Mohamed Medhat Gaber

To make healthcare available and easily accessible, the Internet of Things (IoT), which paved the way to the construction of smart cities, marked the birth of many smart applications in numerous areas, including healthcare. As a result, smart healthcare applications have been and are being developed to provide, using mobile and electronic technology, higher diagnosis quality of the diseases, better treatment of the patients, and improved quality of lives. Since smart healthcare applications that are mainly concerned with the prediction of healthcare data (like diseases for example) rely on predictive healthcare data analytics, it is imperative for such predictive healthcare data analytics to be as accurate as possible. In this paper, we will exploit supervised machine learning methods in classification and regression to improve the performance of the traditional Random Forest on healthcare datasets, both in terms of accuracy and classification/regression speed, in order to produce an effective and efficient smart healthcare application, which we have termed eGAP. eGAP uses the evolutionary game theoretic approach replicator dynamics to evolve a Random Forest ensemble. Trees of high resemblance in an initial Random Forest are clustered, and then clusters grow and shrink by adding and removing trees using replicator dynamics, according to the predictive accuracy of each subforest represented by a cluster of trees. All clusters have an initial number of trees that is equal to the number of trees in the smallest cluster. Cluster growth is performed using trees that are not initially sampled. The speed and accuracy of the proposed method have been demonstrated by an experimental study on 10 classification and 10 regression medical datasets.


2014 ◽  
Vol 281 (1776) ◽  
pp. 20132661 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Roos ◽  
Michele Gelfand ◽  
Dana Nau ◽  
Ryan Carr

As punishment can be essential to cooperation and norm maintenance but costly to the punisher, many evolutionary game-theoretic studies have explored how direct punishment can evolve in populations. Compared to direct punishment, in which an agent acts to punish another for an interaction in which both parties were involved, the evolution of third-party punishment (3PP) is even more puzzling, because the punishing agent itself was not involved in the original interaction. Despite significant empirical studies of 3PP, little is known about the conditions under which it can evolve. We find that punishment reputation is not, by itself, sufficient for the evolution of 3PP. Drawing on research streams in sociology and psychology, we implement a structured population model and show that high strength-of-ties and low mobility are critical for the evolution of responsible 3PP. Only in such settings of high social-structural constraint are punishers able to induce self-interested agents toward cooperation, making responsible 3PP ultimately beneficial to individuals as well as the collective. Our results illuminate the conditions under which 3PP is evolutionarily adaptive in populations. Responsible 3PP can evolve and induce cooperation in cases where other mechanisms alone fail to do so.


2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (01) ◽  
pp. 38-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Bradley Kar

Interdisciplinary work in the law often starts and stops with the social sciences. To produce a complete understanding of how law, evolutionary game-theoretic insights must, however, supplement these more standard social scientific methods. To illustrate, this article critically examines The Force of Law by Frederick Schauer and The Expressive Powers of Law by Richard McAdams. Combining the methods of analytic jurisprudence and social psychology, Schauer clarifies the need for a philosophically respectable and empirically well-grounded account of the ubiquity of legal sanctions. Drawing primarily on economic and social psychological paradigms, McAdams highlights law's potential to alter human behavior through expressions that coordinate. Still, these contributions generate further puzzles about how law works, which can be addressed using evolutionary game-theoretic resources. Drawing on these resources, this article argues that legal sanctions are ubiquitous to law not only because they can motivate legal compliance, as Schauer suggests, but also because they provide the general evolutionary stability conditions for intrinsic legal motivation. In reaction to McAdams, this article argues that law's expressive powers can function to coordinate human behavior only because humans are naturally and culturally evolved to share a prior background agreement in forms of life. Evolutionary game-theoretic resources can thus be used to develop a unified framework from within which to understand some of the complex interrelationships between legal sanctions, intrinsic legal motivation, and law's coordinating power. Going forward, interdisciplinary studies of how law works should include greater syntheses of contemporary insights from evolutionary game theory.


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