Formal semantics of natural language

Lingua ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 45 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 355-374
2014 ◽  
pp. 439-472
Author(s):  
John F. Sowa

Existential graphs (EGs) are a simple, readable, and expressive graphic notation for logic. Conceptual graphs (CGs) combine a logical foundation based on EGs with features of the semantic networks used in artificial intelligence and computational linguistics. CG design principles address logical, linguistic, and cognitive requirements: a formal semantics defined by the ISO standard for Common Logic; the flexibility to support the expressiveness, context dependencies, and metalevel commentary of natural language; and cognitively realistic operations for reasoning by induction, deduction, abduction, and analogy. To accommodate the vagueness and ambiguities of natural language, informal heuristics can supplement the formal semantics. With sufficient background knowledge and a clarifying dialog, informal graphs can be refined to any degree of precision. Peirce claimed that the rules for reasoning with EGs generate “a moving picture of the action of the mind in thought.” Some philosophers and psychologists agree: Peirce's diagrams and rules are a good candidate for a natural logic that reflects the neural processes that support thought and language. They are psychologically realistic and computationally efficient.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 289-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucas Champollion

Distributivity in natural language occurs in sentences such as John and Mary (each) took a deep breath, when a predicate that is combined with a plurality-denoting expression is understood as holding of each of the members of that plurality. Language provides ways to express distributivity overtly, with words such as English each, but also covertly, when no one word can be regarded as contributing it. Both overt and covert distributivity occur in a wide variety of constructions. This article reviews and synthesizes influential approaches to distributivity in formal semantics and includes pointers to some more recent approaches. Theories of distributivity can be distinguished on the basis of how they answer a number of interrelated questions: To what extent can distributivity be attributed to what we know about the world, as opposed to the meanings of words or silent operators? What is the relationship between distributivity and plurality? Does distributivity always reach down to the singular individuals in a plurality? If not, under what circumstances is distributivity over subgroups possible, and what is its relation to distributivity over individuals?


2014 ◽  
pp. 297-323
Author(s):  
Paolo Arcaini ◽  
Angelo Gargantini ◽  
Elvinia Riccobene ◽  
Patrizia Scandurra

Domain Specific Languages (DSLs) are often defined in terms of metamodels capturing the abstract syntax of the language. For a complete definition of a DSL, both syntactic and semantic aspects of the language have to be specified. Metamodeling environments support syntactic definition issues, but they do not provide any help in defining the semantics of metamodels, which is usually given in natural language. In this chapter, the authors present an approach to formally define the semantics of metamodel-based languages. It is based on a translational technique that hooks to the language metamodel its precise and executable semantics expressed in terms of the Abstract State Machine formal method. The chapter also shows how different techniques can be used for formal analysis of models (i.e., instance of the language metamodel). The authors exemplify the use of their approach on a language for Petri nets.


2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (8) ◽  
pp. 34-46
Author(s):  
Petr S. Kusliy

The article discusses the reasons why modern formal semantics of natural language is an integral part of a larger philosophical research program for the study of the nature of intentionality. The purpose of this article is to show how research in the field of formal semantics of natural language became the implementation of a large philosophical research program that is focused on the nature of intentional objects, which since the time of F. Brentano have been considered an integral part of mental phenomena. Mental phenomena are opposed to physical phenomena due to their inherent intentionality (being focused on an object). In modern philosophy, it is commonly considered that the comprehension of the nature of intentionality is the key to understanding the nature of consciousness, and, consequently, the nature of man. The article shows that formal semantics represents the structure of the meaning of linguistic expressions, with the help of which human thought is formed, which is one of the main objects of intentional consciousness. In formal semantics, this representation is carried out in a rigorous, systematic, and empirically verifiable way on the basis of natural languages, that is, on those symbolic systems that real people use in real practice to shape their thoughts. The research is based on the works of G. Frege, who laid the foundation for the formal-semantic methodology. Thus, the answer is given to the question of why modern formal linguistics, which originates in the analytical philosophy of the 20th century, is a philosophically significant discipline. This response is a reaction to the objections of skeptics who believe that modern analytic philosophy cannot be considered a direction that has any serious philosophical significance.


2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 78-98
Author(s):  
Ekaterina V. Vostrikova ◽  
Petr S. Kusliy ◽  

The authors explore Carnap’s (1931) famous critique of Heidegger’s metaphysics and argue that, from the perspective of contemporary formal semantics of natural language, Carnap’s criticism is not convincing. Moreover, they provide direct empirical objections to Carnap’s criticism. In particular, using empirical evidence from languages like Russian that have negative concord, they show that Heidegger cannot be accused of assigning illegitimate logical forms to his sentences about Nothing because terms like “Nothing” can be used non-quantificationally and the fact that it is not clear how their reference is established cannot be the reason why the corresponding sentences are ungrammatical (as Carnap seemed to suggest). The authors also critically discuss the view that natural language is insensitive to meaninglessness or contradiction. With reference to the work of J. Gajewsky, they show that this view is not true either. As a result of this investigation, they arrive at a position that an appeal to ungrammaticality like the one proposed by Carnap does not provide legitimate evidence against metaphysics. This conclusion relates to some recent criticism of the so-called non-analytical philosophers that can be traced back to Carnap’s paper.


1976 ◽  
Vol 26 (105) ◽  
pp. 382
Author(s):  
Thomas Baldwin ◽  
E. L. Keenan

2015 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Cooper ◽  
Simon Dobnik ◽  
Shalom Lappin ◽  
Staffan Larsson

Type theory has played an important role in specifying the formal connection between syntactic structure and semantic interpretation within the history of formal semantics. In recent years rich type theories developed for the semantics of programming languages have become influential in the semantics of natural language. The use of probabilistic reasoning to model human learning and cognition has become an increasingly important part of cognitive science. In this paper we offer a probabilistic formulation of a rich type theory, Type Theory with Records (TTR), and we illustrate how this framework can be used to approach the problem of semantic learning. Our probabilistic version of TTR is intended to provide an interface between the cognitive process of classifying situations according to the types that they instantiate, and the compositional semantics of natural language.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 30-39
Author(s):  
Petr Kusliy

The paper is a reply to Alexander Nikiforov’s discussion of the notion of progress and a critical evaluation of that discussion. The author accepts Nikiforov’s arguments about the relativity of the denotation of the term “progress” but rejects his attempts to explain the term’s meaning by an appeal to a positive develop-ment in a concrete, albeit abstract, realm. The author argues that even though “progress” is an evaluative predicate whose denotation heavily depends on context, this does not mean that its semantics lacks an objective component. Building on some literature from formal semantics of natural language, the author outlines an approach to the semantics of “progress” that would not have the shortcomings of the approach suggested by Nikiforov.


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