The structure of language and its axiomatic-logical nature

Author(s):  
Dioneia Motta Monte-Serrat ◽  
Carlo Cattani
Keyword(s):  
1990 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne D. Blizard

The two statements “Two different objects cannot occupy the same place at the same time” and “An object cannot be in two different places at the same time” are axioms of our everyday understanding of objects, space and time. We develop a first-order theory OST (Objects, Space and Time) in which formal equivalents of these two statements are taken as axioms. Using the theory OST, we uncover other fundamental principles of objects, space and time. We attempt to understand the logical nature of these principles, to investigate their formal consequences, and to identify logical alternatives to them. For easy reference, all of the nonlogical axioms of OST are listed together at the end of §2. In §3, we introduce two possible extensions of OST.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
William A. Kretzschmar

Abstract In the history of linguistics there have been crucial moments when those of us interested in language have essentially changed the way we study our subject. We stand now at such a moment. In this presentation I will review the history of linguistics in order to highlight some past important changes in the field, and then turn to where we stand now. Some things that we thought we knew have turned out not to be true, like the systematic, logical nature of languages. Other things that we had not suspected, like a universal underlying emergent pattern for all the features of a language, are now evident. This emergent pattern is fractal, that is, we can observe the same distributional pattern in frequency profiles for linguistic variants at every level of scale in our analysis. We also have hints that time, as the persistence of a preference for particular variants of features, is a much more important part of our language than we had previously believed. We need to explore the new realities of language as we now understand them, chief among them the idea that patterned variation, not logical system, is the central factor in human speech. In order to account for what we now understand, we need to get used to new methods of study and presentation, and place new emphasis on different communities and groups of speakers. Because the underlying pattern of language is fractal, we need to examine the habits of every group of speakers at every location for themselves, as opposed to our previous emphasis on overall grammars. We need to make our studies much more local, as opposed to global. We do still want to make grammars and to understand language in global terms, but such generalizations need to follow from what we can now see as the pattern of language as it is actually used.


Target ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chunshen Zhu

Abstract Our study adopts a broadened concept of modification and discusses textual functions of modification in translating between Chinese and English. Our attention is firstly on information distribution realized by elaboration of a basic transitivity pattern through modifying a noun- or verb-head, and on matching in translation the textual effect thus created. We also illustrate some differences in using function words in the two languages, and analyze how they may affect translation. The logical nature of modification enables us to identify and observe internal modifiers within the meaning structure of a word, as against sentence and word modifiers as external modifiers. Consequently, the article argues for the importance of word and sentence translation in the practice and process of textual translating.


2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 482-503 ◽  
Author(s):  
OWEN GRIFFITHS ◽  
A.C. PASEAU

AbstractThe isomorphism invariance criterion of logical nature has much to commend it. It can be philosophically motivated by the thought that logic is distinctively general or topic neutral. It is capable of precise set-theoretic formulation. And it delivers an extension of ‘logical constant’ which respects the intuitively clear cases. Despite its attractions, the criterion has recently come under attack. Critics such as Feferman, MacFarlane and Bonnay argue that the criterion overgenerates by incorrectly judging mathematical notions as logical. We consider five possible precisifications of the overgeneration argument and find them all unconvincing.


Etyka ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 51-78
Author(s):  
Jerzy Wróblewski

Conceptions deducing the rules of behaviour from nature (doctrines of nature) are analysed on the basis of a model involving three assumptions: the existence of nature, the deductibility of rules from nature, and natural rules as a criterion of valuation. Three basic constructions of nature are distinguished: „real nature” (nature in a descriptive naturalistic approach), two kinds of „ethical nature” (nature approached by description with a selection of characteristics based on ethical valuation, nature characterized in an ethical way), „logical nature” (natural characteristics as „significant” for a class of referents in a given language).


2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 403-416
Author(s):  
Richard Pottier

Semiotic square and the interpretation of myths. Greimas’ semiotic square is built upon the hypothesis that the concept of elementary structure of signification is operational only if subjected to a logical interpretation and formulation. However, Greimas’ commentaries on that model are questionable. On the one hand, he asserts that logical nature of the connection between any two terms, s1 and s2, is undetermined; on the other hand, he provides the relations s1 – non s1, s2 – non s2, s1 – non s2 and s2 – non s1 with a logical status. Now, since these two statements are inconsistent, a choice must be made: either these four relations have a logical significance, and then the semiotic square is a logical square, so that s1 – s2 has to be interpreted as an incompatibility relation; or s1 – s2 has no logical meaning, and then not only the status of the other relations given in the model is not logical either, but also the simple fact of applying negation to the terms s1 and s2 is meaningless. That dilemma follows from an argument, that Greimas has laid down as a principle, under which linguistic communication depends on the existence of a deep level (or immanent level) of the significance, that is supposed to precede its manifestation in speech. If, conversely, we assume that significance is produced at discursive level, and that consequently the patterning of linguistic codes relies on what could be called a semantic sedimentation process, which comes out from linguistic activity, there is no more dilemma. Such a thesis, which implies that the elementary structure of signification must be seen as the schematization by the describer of speakers’ mental activity, leads to a point of view inversion. Nevertheless, the two conditions which, according to Greimas, are required for catching the meaning are still relevant, except that, contrary to Greimas’ opinion, they now apply at the speech level: two discursive units can be opposed if they simultaneously include a common feature which join them, and a distinguishing feature which disjoin them. In order to illustrate that point, an analysis of two short amerindian myths, which Lévi-Strauss has already investigated, will be undertaken, and finally specific problems related to the interpretation of that kind of narratives will be outlined.


1860 ◽  
Vol 6 (32) ◽  
pp. 101-119
Author(s):  
W. G. Davies

Nature of these contributions. What characterizes these contributions is that they are mainly of a logical nature. Placing ourselves on logic as a stand-point, we have endeavoured to take a comprehensive view of the domain around; and have not rested satisfied with merely examining mental processes in their results, but from logic have penetrated wherever we could into the psychology of logic. The consequence has been that the logic and the psychology have not always harmonized. We have had occasion indeed in several cases to reject the ordinary doctrines of logical science, and modify them in such a manner as our psychological researches seemed to us to direct; and we cannot conceive, though the contrary opinion is held by high authorities, that the laws of thought can be fully determined otherwise than by following the method we have here observed, that is, tracing every mental process to its source by a searching and exhaustive analysis. How far we have succeeded in carrying out this undertaking it is not for us to decide. All we dare hope is that we have done enough to justify our plan of inquiry; and that we have contributed in however trifling a degree towards the advancement of that noblest of sciences—the science of mind, and especially that noblest portion of it which affords an answer to the long asked question:—What is Truth?


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