Hot factors for a cold topic: Examining the role of task-value, attention allocation, and engagement on conceptual change

2015 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
pp. 62-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suzanne H. Jones ◽  
Marcus L. Johnson ◽  
Brett D. Campbell
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Change ◽  
Task Value ◽  
Attention Allocation

scholarly journals Gaze as a Window to the Process of Novel Adjective Mapping

Languages ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 33
Author(s):  
Hanako Yoshida ◽  
Aakash Patel ◽  
Joseph Burling
Keyword(s):  
Learning Task ◽  
Target Object ◽  
Attention Allocation ◽  
Correct Item ◽  
New Words ◽  
Knowledge Account ◽  
Category Knowledge ◽  
Children's Attention ◽  
Performance Results

This study evaluated two explanations for how learning of novel adjectives is facilitated when all the objects are from the same category (e.g., exemplar and testing objects are all CUPS) and the object category is a known to the children. One explanation (the category knowledge account) focuses on early knowledge of syntax–meaning correspondence, and another (the attentional account) focuses on the role of repeated perceptual properties. The first account presumes implicit understanding that all the objects belong to the same category, and the second account presumes only that redundant perceptual experiences minimize distraction from irrelevant features and thus guide children’s attention directly to the correct item. The present study tests the two accounts by documenting moment-to-moment attention allocation (e.g., looking at experimenter’s face, exemplar object, target object) during a novel adjective learning task with 50 3-year-olds. The results suggest that children’s attention was guided directly to the correct item during the adjective mapping and that such direct attention allocation to the correct item predicted children’s adjective mapping performance. Results are discussed in relation to their implication for children’s active looking as the determinant of process for mapping new words to their meanings.

scholarly journals Metacognitive Development and Conceptual Change in Children

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 745-763
Author(s):  
Joulia Smortchkova ◽  
Nicholas Shea
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Change ◽  
Conceptual Development ◽  
Developmental Psychology ◽  
Older Children ◽  
Major Focus ◽  
Mathematical Concepts ◽  
Metacognitive Development ◽  
New Concepts ◽  
The Way

AbstractThere has been little investigation to date of the way metacognition is involved in conceptual change. It has been recognised that analytic metacognition is important to the way older children (c. 8–12 years) acquire more sophisticated scientific and mathematical concepts at school. But there has been barely any examination of the role of metacognition in earlier stages of concept acquisition, at the ages that have been the major focus of the developmental psychology of concepts. The growing evidence that even young children have a capacity for procedural metacognition raises the question of whether and how these abilities are involved in conceptual development. More specifically, are there developmental changes in metacognitive abilities that have a wholescale effect on the way children acquire new concepts and replace existing concepts? We show that there is already evidence of at least one plausible example of such a link and argue that these connections deserve to be investigated systematically.

Empiricism, Perception and Conceptual Change

1973 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. A. Hooker
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Change ◽  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
World Line ◽  
Scientific Change ◽  
The World ◽  
History Of ◽  
The One ◽  
Level Of Experience ◽  
Conceptual Revolution

In recent times it has become fashionable to emphasize the role of conceptual change in the (philosopher's) history of science. To judge from recent writers (Feyerabend 5-9, Kuhn 18), every significant theoretical change in science is first and foremost a revolution in scientific concepts—a conceptual revolution. According to this view, every level of experience is affected by each fundamental theoretical change: physical theory, experimental practice and even perceptual experience. The Aristotelian patrician who watched the sun sink beneath the horizon not only had different beliefs (theory) about the phenomenon but actually saw something different from the Newtonian gentleman who saw the horizon rise above his eye-sun line, and the Einsteinian professional who saw the sun's varying geometrical relations to the world light-geodesics on which successive temporal stages of his eye world-line lay. Moreover, such is the completeness of the conceptual-experiential shifts undergone in a fundamental scientific change that it is impossible to meaningfully discuss the one theory within the confines of the other or, indeed, to provide any systematic, cumulative comparison of successive theories.

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