scholarly journals The role of political institutions for the effectiveness of central bank independence

2012 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 286-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Hielscher ◽  
Gunther Markwardt
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Central Bank Independence

Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions

2014 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Bodea ◽  
Raymond Hicks
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Money Demand ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Price Stability ◽  
Inflation Expectations ◽  
The Past ◽  
Political Interference ◽  
Yearly Data

AbstractDespite mixed empirical evidence, in the past two decades central bank independence (CBI) has been on the rise under the assumption that it ensures price stability. Using an encompassing theoretical approach and new yearly data for de jure CBI (seventy-eight countries, 1973–2008), we reexamine this relationship, distinguishing the role of printing less money (discipline) from the public's beliefs about the central bank's likely actions (credibility). Democracies differ from dictatorships in the likelihood of political interference and changes to the law because of the presence of political opposition and the freedom to expose government actions. CBI in democracies should be directly reflected in lower money supply growth. Besides being more disciplinarian, it also ensures a more robust money demand by reducing inflation expectations and, therefore, inflation. Empirical results are robust and support a discipline effect conditioned by political institutions, as well as a credibility effect.

scholarly journals Central Bank Independence, Financial Instability and Politics: New Evidence for OECD and Non-OECD Countries

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (7) ◽  
pp. 179
Author(s):  
Pistoresi B. ◽  
Cavicchioli M. ◽  
Brevini G.
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Financial Instability ◽  
Omitted Variables ◽  
Institutional Variables ◽  
New Evidence ◽  
Bank Money

This paper analyses the determinants of a new index of central bank independence, recently provided by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014), using a large database of economic, political and institutional variables. Our sample includes data for 31 OECD and 49 non-OECD economies and covers the period 1998-2010. To this aim, we implement factorial and regression analysis to synthesize information and overcome limitations such as omitted variables, multicollinearity and overfitting. The results confirm the role of the IMF loans program to guide all the economies in their choice of more independent central banks. Financial instability, recession and low inflation work in the opposite direction with governments relying extensively on central bank money to finance public expenditure and central banks’ political and operational autonomy is inevitably undermined. Finally, only for non-OECD economies, the degree of central bank independence responds to various measures of strength of political institutions and party political instability.

Financial globalization and institutions in Africa: the case of foreign direct investment, central bank independence and political institutions

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 931-953
Author(s):  
Abel Mawuko Agoba ◽  
Elikplimi Agbloyor ◽  
Afua Agyapomaa Gyeke-Dako ◽  
Mac-Clara Acquah
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Direct Investment ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Direct Investment ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Financial Globalization ◽  
Turnover Rates ◽  
Fdi Inflows ◽  
Central Bank Governor ◽  
The Impact

AbstractIn this paper, we examine the bi-directional relationship between financial globalization (proxied by foreign direct investment (FDI) flows) and economic institutions (proxied by central bank independence (CBI)) taking into consideration the role of political institutions. We test our argument on a sample of 48 African countries (1970–2012) using a two-step System Generalized Methods of Moments, with collapsed instruments and Windmeijer robust standard errors. Using two proxies for CBI, the study finds that while legal CBI does not have a significant impact on FDI, high central bank governor turnover rates have a significantly negative impact on FDI inflows. However, higher levels of political institutions significantly enhance the impact of legal CBI on FDI inflows, and dampen the impact of high central bank governor turnover rates on FDI inflows. The study also shows that, higher FDI inflows have a significantly positive impact on both legal and de facto CBI. This impact is accelerated in countries characterized by higher levels of political institutions.

scholarly journals On the impossibility of central bank independence: four decades of time- (and intellectual) inconsistency

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A Hartwell
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Institutional Analysis ◽  
Financial System ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Time Inconsistency ◽  
Fortieth Anniversary

Abstract The intellectual justification for modern central banking, time-inconsistency, celebrated its fortieth anniversary in 2017 alongside the Cambridge Journal of Economics. However, the key progeny of the time-inconsistency literature, central bank independence, has fundamental flaws that have been thus far neglected in mainstream research. In the first instance, the argument for independence relies on a utilitarian rather than institutional analysis, one that neglects the genesis of central banks and their relation to other institutions within a country. Second, central bank independence neglects the complex interdependencies of the global monetary and financial system. Applying an institutional lens to the concept of central bank independence, I conclude that ‘independence’ fails under the reality of globalization as much as it does in a domestic context. With central banks reliant on all manner of political institutions, they are never really independent operationally or in terms of policy.

Political institutions and central bank independence revisited

2011 ◽  
Vol 18 (7) ◽  
pp. 679-682 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Pistoresi ◽  
F. Salsano ◽  
D. Ferrari
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Central Bank Independence

scholarly journals Role of Central Bank Independence in Banking and Financial Stability Ensuring

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Dudchenko
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Stage Of Development ◽  
Banking Stability ◽  
The Impact

This paper is devoted to defining the role of the central bank in ensuring banking and financial stability. The main purpose of the study is to assess the direction and strength of the impact of central bank independence in terms of its individual aspects on the parameters of banking and financial stability for different groups of countries. Systematization of literature sources and the results of existing empirical research has shown that the expected effects of increasing the independence of the central bank are to improve banking and financial stability. For the study, a sample of statistical data for 10 developed and 10 developing countries for the period 1991-2012 was formed. The methodological basis of the study were the tools of panel regression modeling with fixed effects with Stata software use. The article presents the results of empirical analysis, which showed that the independence of the central bank is an important factor in ensuring banking stability. At the same time, the impact on financial stability has not been conclusively confirmed. The study empirically confirms and theoretically proves that the stage of development of the country determines the strength of such influence. Thus, developed countries generally show closer links between central bank independence and banking and financial stability, which in most cases are directly dependent, while developing countries have less lasting effects. The results of the analysis of the links between certain aspects of central bank independence and the level of banking and financial stability are of great practical value. The results of the study create a scientific basis for substantiating the sequence of actions aimed at strengthening the independence of the central bank. Thus, in developing countries, the focus should be on defining and prioritizing central bank goals, while developed countries should take a deeper approach to this issue and ensure the independence of monetary policy and financial independence of the central bank. Keywords: central bank, independence, banking stability, financial stability, Z-score, non-performing loans, capitalization, developed countries, developing countries, panel data.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document