Effects of government subsidies on green technology investment and green marketing coordination of supply chain under Cap-and-trade mechanism

2021 ◽  
pp. 105426
Author(s):  
Zhimin Li ◽  
Yanchun Pan ◽  
Wen Yang ◽  
Jianhua Ma ◽  
Ming Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Green Marketing ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Technology Investment

scholarly journals Dynamic Adjustment Mechanism and Differential Game Model Construction of Mask Emergency Supply Chain Cooperation Based on COVID-19 Outbreak

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1115
Author(s):  
Shufan Zhu ◽  
Kefan Xie ◽  
Ping Gui
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Production Technology ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Dynamic Adjustment ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Technology Investment ◽  
The Impact

Incorporating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the mask supply chain into our framework and taking mask output as a state variable, our study introduces the differential game to study the long-term dynamic cooperation of a two-echelon supply chain composed of the supplier and the manufacturer under government subsidies. The study elaborates that government subsidies can provide more effective incentives for supply chain members to cooperate in the production of masks compared with the situation of no government subsidies. A relatively low wholesale price can effectively increase the profits of supply chain members and the supply chain system. The joint contract of two-way cost-sharing contract and transfer payment contract can promote production technology investment efforts of the supply chain members, the optimum trajectory of mask production, and total profit to reach the best state as the centralized decision scenario within a certain range. Meanwhile, it is determined that the profits of supply chain members in the joint contract can be Pareto improvement compared with decentralized decision scenario. With the increase of production technology investment cost coefficients and output self-decay rate, mask outputs have shown a downward trend in the joint contract decision model. On the contrary, mask outputs would rise with growing sensitivity of mask output to production technology investment effort and increasing sensitivity of mask demand to mask output.

Supply chain coordination with green technology under cap-and-trade regulation

2017 ◽  
Vol 183 ◽  
pp. 433-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoping Xu ◽  
Ping He ◽  
Hao Xu ◽  
Quanpeng Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Trade Regulation

scholarly journals Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Model with Subsidy on Green Supply Chain Technology Investment

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (16) ◽  
pp. 4403 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haixiang Wu ◽  
Bing Xu ◽  
Ding Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Variational Inequality ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Raw Materials ◽  
Investment Decision ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Network ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Technology Investment

The green supply chain (GSC) can effectively reduce the waste of resources and avoid environmental pollution. For a closed-loop supply chain network consisting of multiple manufacturers, multiple retailers, and multiple consumer and recycling markets, we assume that retailers are responsible for the recycling of used products, manufacturers use raw materials to produce new products and recycled products for remanufacturing, and government departments subsidize all manufacturers and retailers for GSC technology investment. Then, the equilibrium conditions of manufacturers, retailers, demand markets, and recycling markets are obtained by using the variational inequality method, complementarity theorem, and Nash equilibrium theory, and the variational inequality model of the closed-loop supply chain network multiphase equilibrium is established. Based on numerical simulation, the optimal technology investment decision of green supply chain under different government subsidy rates, and the influence of market structure and enterprise cost asymmetry on the equilibrium solution of supply chain network are analyzed. The results show that government subsidies can effectively promote enterprises to upgrade their level of GSC technology investment. The intensification of enterprise competition and the asymmetry of enterprise costs will affect the composition of enterprise profits and the allocation of profits between enterprises, and the former will weaken the effect of government subsidies.

scholarly journals A Duopoly Manufacturers’ Game Model Considering Green Technology Investment under a Cap-and-Trade System

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 705 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi Zheng ◽  
Gaoxun Zhang ◽  
Weiwei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Green Technology ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Technology Investment

scholarly journals Green Product Design and Pricing Decisions in a Risk-Averse Supply Chain under Alternative Power Structures

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Tiantian Xu ◽  
Jizhou Zhan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Design ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Sustainable Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Technology Investment ◽  
Green Product Design

Motivated by the prevailing green product design and the different supply chain power structures, this paper aims to analyse the role of power relationship and risk-aversion in economic and environmental performance of sustainable supply chain. Three game theory models, including the manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) model, retailer Stackelberg (RS) model, and vertical Nash (VN) model, are developed to study the pricing and greenness level decisions in a two-echelon sustainable supply chain, where one risk-averse manufacturer sells green products through one risk-averse retailer. This paper shows that when selling through a more risk-averse retailer, the risk-averse manufacturer prefers to provide a product with a higher level of greenness and achieve a greater utility regardless of the power structure. A manufacturer as a follower may have stronger motivation to increase the product’s level of greenness than one in a more balanced supply chain when the green technology investment coefficient is sufficiently low. With regard to the power structure, the channel leadership is not necessary to for the manufacturer to achieve higher utility, which depends on the green technology investment coefficient, greenness level sensitivity, and players’ risk aversion.

scholarly journals Pricing and Coordination Strategies in a Dual Channel Supply Chain with Green Production under Cap and Trade Regulation

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (21) ◽  
pp. 12232
Author(s):  
Ata Allah Taleizadeh ◽  
Milad Shahriari ◽  
Shib Sankar Sana
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Environmental Benefits ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Trade Regulation ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Green Production ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

In this paper, we consider a two level dual channel green supply chain consisting of a retailer and a manufacturer with a separate sales channel for the manufacturer. The manufacturer uses green technology in its production and is required to produce in accordance with the cap and trade regulation. Using game theory, we compare cases where members decide to compete or cooperate with each other in terms of pricing and production. Our main contributions are studying the dual channel supply chain model where a manufacturer is regulated by the cap and trade system, using green production and also on their decision as to whether to compete or cooperate with a value-adding retailer. We also investigated the impact of green production on lowering the amount of carbon emissions produced. In the present study, supply chain members are advised to cooperate with each other in order to achieve the environmental benefits of the cap and trade system and, to avoid market failure, we further recommend that manufacturers should invest in green technologies for their production.

Effects of allowance allocation rules on green technology investment and product pricing under the cap-and-trade mechanism

Energy Policy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 139 ◽  
pp. 111333
Author(s):  
Wen Yang ◽  
Yanchun Pan ◽  
Jianhua Ma ◽  
Tianyue Yang ◽  
Xiao Ke
Keyword(s):  
Green Technology ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Allocation Rules ◽  
Technology Investment ◽  
Product Pricing ◽  
Allowance Allocation

scholarly journals The Implications of Vertical Strategic Interaction on Green Technology Investment in a Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (18) ◽  
pp. 7441
Author(s):  
Simeng Wang ◽  
Yongsheng Cheng ◽  
Xiaoxian Zhang ◽  
Chenchen Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Green Technologies ◽  
Double Marginalization ◽  
Technology Investment ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Right

Numerous studies on supply chains have indicated that vertical strategic interactions usually involve the classical double marginalization problem, leading to a downward distortion in profitability. However, at present, the implications of vertical strategic interactions for green technology investment in a supply chain are not all that clear. In particular, such a vertical interaction not only can translate into profits between different parties, but usually also involves differentiated environmental performance. A question which arises is: who is the right undertaker for green technology investment in a supply chain, the supplier or retailer? To answer this question, we highlight the implications of vertical strategic interaction for green technology investment in a supply chain. To fill this gap, using a game-theoretic approach, we formulate two models: (a) Model M, in which an upstream manufacturer adopts technologies to meet consumer demand; and (b) Model R, where a retailer integrates environmental concerns into their supply chain decisions. We find that the retailer, who is closer to the customer, is the more effective undertaker for green technology investment, as this not only creates higher profitability for both parties, but also achieves a more sustainable scheme for our environment. When green technologies are invested in by the manufacturer, the double marginalization effect not only may downward-distort their economic performance but can also reduce the equilibrium of product greenness.

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