Tracing a pathway to success: How competing interest groups influenced the 2013 EU Common Fisheries Policy reform

2017 ◽  
Vol 76 ◽  
pp. 90-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirill Orach ◽  
Maja Schlüter ◽  
Henrik Österblom
Südosteuropa ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 150-174
Author(s):  
Pieter Vanhuysse

Abstract This essay contributes to the development of an analytical political sociology examination of postcommunist policy pathways and applies such an analysis in a reinterpretation of the social policy pathways taken by Hungary and Poland. During the critical historical juncture of the early 1990s, governments in these new democracies used social policies to proactively create new labor market outsiders (rather than merely accommodate or deal with existing outsiders) in an effort to stifle disruptive repertoires of political voice. Microcollective action theory helps to elucidate how the break-up of hitherto relatively homogeneous clusters of threatened workers into newly competing interest groups shaped the nature of distributive conflict in the formative first decade of these new democracies. In this light, we see how the analytical political sociology of postcommunist social policy can advance and modify current, predominantly Western-oriented theories of insider/outsider conflict and welfare retrenchment policy, and can inform future debates about emerging social policy biases in Eastern Europe.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas T. Holyoke ◽  
Heath Brown

What happens after longstanding policies are overthrown in fierce political battles, events scholars refer to as punctuated equilibrium? Do these new policies remain static and unchanging until the next big punctuation, or do they continue to change in explainable and predictable ways? In this article, we develop a model of postpunctuation policy change grounded in theories of boundedly rational decision-making by policymakers. Uncertain about how well the new policy will perform, policymakers learn to rely on competing interest groups for information or, under certain circumstances, look to other political jurisdictions for cues on how their policies ought to be further refined. We test our predictions by studying changes in state charter school laws from 1996 to 2014. We find evidence of policy change, and even convergence, across states suggesting that policies after punctuation do change in ways explained as reactions to political pressures in an environment fraught with uncertainty.


1995 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
KATHERINE BENNETT

Prison litigation concerning the issues of cross-gender searches and visual observation of nude inmates in prisons and jails by opposite-sex officers involves alleged violations of several constitutional rights. Additionally, claims of two competing interest groups, prison employees and inmates, are in conflict. In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley established standards for reviewing alleged violations of inmates' constitutional rights, a ruling that clarified issues somewhat. However, the recent Ninth Circuit case of Jordan v. Gardner (1993) rejected Turner standards and inserted a twist in the direction courts were taking. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 may further complicate the three issues of incidental observation of unclothed inmates by opposite-sex officers, cross-gender routine strip searches/body cavity searches, and cross-gender pat searches/clothed body searches.


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 499-520 ◽  
Author(s):  
HYOUNG-GOO KANG ◽  
THOMAS T. HOLYOKE

AbstractIntense competition can compel lobbyists to exaggerate the benefits the government would see in tax returns and social welfare if agency officials allocate such resources to the lobbyist's members. This incentive to misrepresent grows when information asymmetry exists between lobbyists and government officials. A large body of literature has investigated how interest groups compete and interact, but it disregards the interdependency of interests between competing groups and associated strategic behaviors of other players. Our signaling model of lobbying reveals ways in which agency officials can compel lobbyists for competing interests to lobby truthfully and what the policy implications of this compulsion can be. We also present case-study evidence of how this works in practice.


2013 ◽  
Vol 71 (5) ◽  
pp. 1277-1285 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. L. Catchpole ◽  
J. P. Feekings ◽  
N. Madsen ◽  
A. Palialexis ◽  
V. Vassilopoulou ◽  
...  

Abstract Discards refer to the part of the catch not retained on board during commercial fishing operations, but returned to the sea. The proposed European Union Common Fisheries Policy reform, to be implemented in 2014, sets out a gradual elimination of discards by reducing unwanted catches and ensuring that all catches are landed. To develop successful discard mitigation measures, it is necessary to identify the reasons for discarding. Here, we have developed a simple model that can be applied to data from observer programmes (ObsPs) to establish the contribution of different drivers of discarding behaviour. The analysis makes inferences on the causes of discarding by partitioning discards into four categories based on the length of the fish and the associated regulatory restrictions. The drivers are defined as: fish discarded below the legal minimum landing size; fish for which there is no market and that do not have a minimum landing size; fish for which there are inconsistencies in market and sorting practices; and discards that can be attributed to fishers' responses to quota restrictions. The approach is applied to data generated from ObsPs from five European Member States. All the inferred drivers contribute to the total discard quantity. Their relative contributions vary widely across countries, areas, gears, and species.


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