On the role of empirical industrial organization in competition policy

2011 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Davis
2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrei Shleifer

The 2014 John Bates Clark Medal of the American Economic Association was awarded to Matthew Gentzkow of the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. The citation recognized Matt's “fundamental contributions to our understanding of the economic forces driving the creation of media products, the changing nature and role of media in the digital environment, and the effect of media on education and civic engagement.” In addition to his work on the media, Matt has made a number of significant contributions to empirical industrial organization more broadly, as well as to applied economic theory. In this essay, I highlight some of these contributions.


2004 ◽  
pp. 121-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva

The chapter of “Institutional Economics” textbook is devoted to the development of business-groups as a specific feature of industrial organization in the Russian economy. The main determinants of forming and functioning of business-groups such as allocation of property rights in Soviet enterprises, networks of directors and executive authorities in the Soviet economic system as well as import of new institutes and inefficient state enforcement are in the center of analysis. Origins, structure, organization and management within the groups and the role of shareholding and informal control rights are considered.


2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-600
Author(s):  
Naomi R. Lamoreaux ◽  
Laura Phillips Sawyer

Scholars have long recognized that the states’ authority to charter corporations bolstered their antitrust powers in ways that were not available to the federal government. Our paper contributes to this literature by focusing attention on the relevance for competition policy of lawsuits brought by minority shareholders against their own companies, especially lawsuits challenging voting trusts. Historically judges had been reluctant to intervene in corporations’ internal affairs and had been wary of the potential for opportunism in shareholders’ derivative suits. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, they had begun to revise their views and see shareholders as useful allies in the struggle against monopoly. Although the balance between judges’ suspicion of and support for shareholders’ activism shifted back and forth over time, in the end the lawsuits provoked state legislatures to strengthen antitrust policy by making devices like voting trusts unsuitable for purposes of economic concentration.


2008 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Glen O. Robinson ◽  
Dennis L. Weisman

This paper explores the role of the essential facilities doctrine in circumscribing the scope of network sharing obligations in telecommunications. Among other things it argues that a proper application of the doctrine of essential facilities should recognize the prominence of dynamic over static efficiency in promoting consumer welfare. Regulators may be averse to recognizing these tradeoffs because unlike the behavior of prices the welfare losses from foregone innovation may be unobservable to the regulators' constituency. Moreover, an emphasis on dynamic efficiency requires the short-term regulator to take the "long view" – fostering the competitive process rather than emulating the competitive outcome.


2001 ◽  
Vol 19 (5) ◽  
pp. 795-821 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B. Audretsch ◽  
George van Leeuwen ◽  
Bert Menkveld ◽  
Roy Thurik

Author(s):  
Jan Wouters ◽  
Michal Ovádek

This chapter assesses the role of fundamental rights in EU competition enforcement. EU competition policy comprises a number of limbs, each with its own peculiarities and rules but together contributing to the objective of protecting (relatively) undistorted competition in the Union's internal market. The key reason why EU competition policy is an interesting and important case study from the point of view of fundamental rights application is enforcement. Unlike in other areas, the EU, in particular the European Commission, wields considerable powers when it comes to the protection of undistorted competition in the internal market. Although the extent of the enforcement powers and their potential impact on fundamental rights differs between the various aspects of competition policy, the field as a whole embodies supranational authority as almost none other. This is so despite the fact that in enforcing competition law the Commission cooperates closely with national competition authorities (NCAs) as part of the European Competition Network (ECN) and that the majority of decisions applying EU antitrust rules are taken by the NCAs.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 44-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Berry ◽  
Martin Gaynor ◽  
Fiona Scott Morton

This article considers the recent literature on firm markups in light of both new and classic work in the field of industrial organization. We detail the shortcomings of papers that rely on discredited approaches from the “structure-conduct-performance” literature. In contrast, papers based on production function estimation have made useful progress in measuring broad trends in markups. However, industries are so heterogeneous that careful industry-specific studies are also required, and sorely needed. Examples of such studies illustrate differing explanations for rising markups, including endogenous increases in fixed costs associated with lower marginal costs. In some industries there is evidence of price increases driven by mergers. To fully understand markups, we must eventually recover the key economic primitives of demand, marginal cost, and fixed and sunk costs. We end by discussing the various aspects of antitrust enforcement that may be of increasing importance regardless of the cause of increased markups.


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