scholarly journals On the endogeneity of Cournot–Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation

2005 ◽  
Vol 120 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Romano ◽  
Huseyin Yildirim
Keyword(s):  
Nash And Stackelberg Equilibria

STACKELBERG LEADERSHIP IN A MARKETING CHANNEL

2001 ◽  
Vol 03 (01) ◽  
pp. 13-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEFFEN JØRGENSEN ◽  
SIMON-PIERRE SIGUÉ ◽  
GEORGES ZACCOUR
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Model ◽  
Marketing Channel ◽  
Advertising Rate ◽  
On Demand ◽  
Stackelberg Leadership ◽  
Carry Over ◽  
Nash And Stackelberg Equilibria ◽  
Carry Over Effect

This paper provides an answer to the question who should, if any, lead a marketing channel? We consider a channel consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer where each player controls his advertising rate and margin. Supposing that advertising has a carry over effect on demand, we adopt a dynamic model. Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are characterised and outcomes compared with an efficient coordinated solution. Our findings suggest that manufacturer's leadership reduces inefficiency in a channel and is more beneficial to the consumer.

scholarly journals Dynamic signaling games with quadratic criteria under Nash and Stackelberg equilibria

Automatica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 115 ◽  
pp. 108883 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serkan Sarıtaş ◽  
Serdar Yüksel ◽  
Sinan Gezici
Keyword(s):  
Signaling Games ◽  
Nash And Stackelberg Equilibria ◽  
Quadratic Criteria

scholarly journals OPTIMAL TARIFFS ON EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES: THE CASE OF QUANTITY-SETTING

2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (04) ◽  
pp. 1240004 ◽  
Author(s):  
KENJI FUJIWARA ◽  
NGO VAN LONG
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Exhaustible Resources ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Exhaustible Resource ◽  
The World ◽  
Dynamic Game Model ◽  
Nash And Stackelberg Equilibria ◽  
Optimal Tariffs

Constructing a dynamic game model of trade of an exhaustible resource, this paper compares feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. We consider two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the importing country, and leadership by the exporting country. We numerically show that as compared to the Nash equilibrium, both countries are better off if the importing country is a leader, but that the follower is worse off if the exporting country is a leader. Consequently, the world welfare is highest under the importing country's leadership and lowest under the exporting country's leadership.

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