scholarly journals Fiscal rules and creative accounting: Evidence from Japanese municipalities

Author(s):  
Haruaki Hirota ◽  
Hideo Yunoue
2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-41
Author(s):  
Dominik Maltritz ◽  
Sebastian Wüste

AbstractWe search for drivers of fiscal deficits in Europe using a data panel containing annual data of 27 EU countries in the years 1991–2012. Our special focus is on the influence of fiscal rules as well as on fiscal councils, i. e. institutions that may help to reduce deficits and enforce fiscal rules by advising governments. We distinguish between internal fiscal rules and external rules that result from EMU membership. In addition, we consider the impact of “creative accounting”, i. e. measures that help to circumvent fiscal rules, which we approximate by so called stock-flow-adjustments. We especially analyze the interactive influence of the mentioned variables on the budget balance.


Author(s):  
İlter Ünlükaplan ◽  
Volkan Yurdadoğ ◽  
Ebru Canıkalp

An anonymous idea is observed in the public finance literature that includes where fiscal rules, i.e numerical rules on the fiscal indicators, are strict and stringent, policy executives will have incentives to recourse to creative accounting implementations to overcome these numerical limits. Creative accounting is applied for demonstrating economic, especially fiscal indicators better than the originals to reach the necessary fiscal limit, even if they are primarily conducted by private firms. Many countries applied these illusory implementations to hide their reported budget deficits especially in the last global crisis period. With this manner, creative accounting violates the basic principles of governance in public finance. In this context, governments should have to establish statistical classification structure and government accounting system that aims to prevent creative accounting. With this dimension, fiscal transparency will prevent from creative accounting implementations. In this study, the relationship between fiscal rules and creative accounting on the public finance administration level will be determined and fiscal transparency suggestions that prevent these frauds in the economies will be evaluated. As a result, the practice of good governance in public finance should be implemented to provide financial transparency. In addition, the reforms about transparency in the legislation should be consider as an important proposal.


2014 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 707-716 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Alt ◽  
David Dreyer Lassen ◽  
Joachim Wehner

This article analyzes the political origins of differences in adherence to the fiscal framework of the European Union (EU). It shows how incentives to use fiscal policy for electoral purposes and limited budget transparency at the national level, combined with the need to respond to fiscal rules at the supranational level, interact to systematically undermine the Economic and Monetary Union through the employment of fiscal gimmicks or creative accounting. It also explains in detail how national accounts were manipulated to produce electoral cycles that were under the radar of the EU budget surveillance system, and concludes with new perspectives on the changes to (and challenges for) euro area fiscal rules.


2000 ◽  
Vol 00 (172) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gian-Maria Milesi-Ferretti ◽  

2006 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Burgtorf

AbstractStrict fiscal rules do not necessarily hinder structural reforms, but consolidation efforts may also be required in the short term. The paper focuses on the treatment of implicit (pension) liabilities in the Stability and Growth Pact and the underlying accounting framework. The possible integration of implicit debt in the statistical system might (in theory) create positive incentives, but, in practice, is likely to worsen the outcome because of creative accounting or even manipulation. Attention is drawn to the need for reliable fiscal indicators to support longterm sustainability.


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