Stagnation in U.S.-Africa Military Policy after U.S. Servicemembers’ Deaths in Niger

Orbis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naunihal Singh
Keyword(s):  
Military Policy

Turkey’s Burgeoning Defense Technological and Industrial Base and Expeditionary Military Policy

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (Summer 2020) ◽  
pp. 115-130
Author(s):  
Can Kasapoğlu
Keyword(s):  
21St Century ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Military Policy ◽  
Horn Of Africa ◽  
Hybrid Warfare ◽  
Industrial Base ◽  
Weapon Systems ◽  
Drone Warfare

As the incumbent Turkish administration strives to pursue more aspiring goals in foreign affairs, Turkey’s military policy is fast developing in line with this vision. The nation’s defense technological and industrial base can now produce various conventional weaponry. Of these, without a doubt, Turkey’s drone warfare assets have garnered the utmost attention among the international strategic community. In tandem, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have gradually gained an expeditionary posture with forward deployments across a broad axis, ranging from the Horn of Africa to the Gulf and the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, the military’s doctrinal order of battle has been transforming to address the unfolding hybrid warfare challenges in Ankara’s hinterland. Turkey’s proxy warfare capabilities have also registered an uptrend in this respect. Nevertheless, Ankara will have to deal with certain limitations in key segments, particularly 5th generation aircraft and strategic weapon systems which, together, represent a severe intra-war deterrence gap in Turkey’s defense posture. The Turkish administration will have to address this specific shortfall given the problematic threat landscape at the nation’s Middle Eastern doorstep. This study covers two interrelated strategic topics regarding Turkey’s national military capacity in the 21st century: its defense technological and industrial base (DTIB) and its military policy, both currently characterized by a burgeoning assertiveness.

Preparing for War

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David G. Morgan-Owen
Keyword(s):  
Grand Strategy ◽  
Military Policy ◽  
Complementary Approach ◽  
Regular Army ◽  
Political Intervention ◽  
The Government

The period 1904–6 proved to be a fateful one for the CID. The government successfully divorced the Regular Army from its defensive duties and re-orientated it towards operations overseas—the necessary first step to producing a more coherent, complementary approach to imperial defence. Yet despite this change in military policy, the CID failed to become a forum in which the two services could debate and co-operate in the interests of producing a cohesive grand strategy. Political intervention thus merely changed the parameters within which quasi-independent naval and military strategies continued to compete, intersect, and diverge—to the detriment of overall British readiness for war.

Conclusion

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David G. Morgan-Owen
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Late Nineteenth Century ◽  
Military Policy ◽  
Late Nineteenth ◽  
Subsequent Failure

This chapter reflects upon the evolution and formation of strategy in Britain from the late nineteenth century down to 1914. It examines the activities of both services and their shortcomings, but argues that a lack of political direction was the primary cause of the unsatisfactory situation that pertained in 1914. It does so on the grounds that—for all his faults—between 1903 and 1905 Balfour showcased that the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) could have played the co-ordinating role its progenitors conceived it to fulfil: that of directing British strategy. The Liberal government’s subsequent failure to capitalize upon this foundation led to the deterioration in the overall coherence of British strategy, as inconsistent and contradictory political direction facilitated the kind of organic, chaotic interaction between naval and military policy that the CID have been conceived to remedy.

scholarly journals Biden Administration Relies on Constitutional Authority and Unwilling or Unable Theory of Self-Defense for Airstrikes in Syria

2021 ◽  
Vol 115 (3) ◽  
pp. 567-572
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Force ◽  
Legal Authority ◽  
Military Policy ◽  
Presidential Approval ◽  
War Powers ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Drone Strikes ◽  
Individual Self

On February 25, 2021, the United States conducted a strike targeting Iranian-backed militia group facilities in Syria. The strike, which came in response to a February 15, 2021 attack on U.S. interests in Iraq, marked the Biden administration's first known exercise of executive war powers. As domestic authority for the strike, President Joseph Biden, Jr. cited his authority under Article II of the U.S. Constitution and did not rely on the 2001 or 2002 Authorizations for the Use of Military Force (AUMFs). For international legal authority, Biden relied on individual self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, stating that Syria was “unwilling or unable” to prevent further attacks on the United States by these non-state actors within its territory. The strikes garnered mixed reactions from Congress, where efforts are underway to repeal or reform extant AUMFs as well as the War Powers Resolution (WPR). The Biden administration is also undertaking a review of current U.S. military policy on the use of force, and during this process, it has prohibited drone strikes outside of conventional battlefields, absent presidential approval.

Spies in Ancient Greece

1998 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. Richmond
Keyword(s):  
Ancient Greece ◽  
Strategic Plan ◽  
Ancient World ◽  
Military Policy ◽  
Modern Times ◽  
Independent States ◽  
The Mediterranean

This paper is written to give some account of the part played by secret agents against foreign states. Only in the most incidental way will it mention secret agents who tried to detect internal dissent and conspiracy. Plato thought that all Greek states were in a permanent state of war, declared or undeclared. Even in modern times no two independent states have totally identical interests, and when negotiating about clashes of interests, in peacetime just as in war, any government will seek a position in which it can keep its own secrets and discern those of the opposing side. We know very little of Greek spying in time of peace. When diplomacy failed, Greek states could have recourse to war to attain their objectives. War requires some strategic plan of intended operations. In modern conditions many experts must have a hand in devising the plan, and it must be prepared well in advance. In the ancient world things were simpler. One wonders how many Carthaginians knew, or had to know, that Hannibal intended to march round the Mediterranean and attack Italy. Certainly he took the Romans by surprise. The execution of the plan is best entrusted so far as possible to a single commander, even in modern times. We know next to nothing about how military policy was determined in peacetime, but we have a little more information about conditions in times of war.

A New Paradigm for Military Policy: Socioeconomics

1993 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 511-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia M. Shields
Keyword(s):  
Military Policy ◽  
New Paradigm

The development of Soviet military policy in the 1990s

1990 ◽  
Vol 135 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-16
Author(s):  
Christopher Donnelly
Keyword(s):  
Military Policy

Will the Rise of China Transform the International System?

2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (Fall 2021) ◽  
pp. 231-258
Author(s):  
Kemal İnat ◽  
Melih Yıldız
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Political System ◽  
International System ◽  
Military Policy ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Global Status ◽  
Chinese Policy ◽  
Rise Of China ◽  
The Rise Of China ◽  
The U.S

In this article, the rise of China is discussed in the light of economic and military data, and what the challenge from China means for the global leadership of the U.S. is analyzed. Changes in the indicators of the U.S. and China’s economic and military power over the last 30-40 years are examined and an answer is sought for the following question: What will the consequences of China’s rise be in terms of the international political system? To answer this question, similar ‘rise and challenge’ precedents are discussed to contextualize and analyze and the present challenge China poses. This article concludes that while improving its global status, China has been taking the previous cases’ failed challenges into consideration. China, which does not want to repeat the mistakes made by Germany and the Soviet Union, is hesitant to pursue an aggressive military policy and tries to limit its rivalry with the U.S. in the economic area. While Chinese policy of avoiding direct conflict and focusing on economic development has made it the biggest economic rival of the U.S, the rise of China initiates the discussions about the end of the U.S. and West-led international system.

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