Turkey’s Burgeoning Defense Technological and Industrial Base and Expeditionary Military Policy

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (Summer 2020) ◽  
pp. 115-130
Author(s):  
Can Kasapoğlu

As the incumbent Turkish administration strives to pursue more aspiring goals in foreign affairs, Turkey’s military policy is fast developing in line with this vision. The nation’s defense technological and industrial base can now produce various conventional weaponry. Of these, without a doubt, Turkey’s drone warfare assets have garnered the utmost attention among the international strategic community. In tandem, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have gradually gained an expeditionary posture with forward deployments across a broad axis, ranging from the Horn of Africa to the Gulf and the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, the military’s doctrinal order of battle has been transforming to address the unfolding hybrid warfare challenges in Ankara’s hinterland. Turkey’s proxy warfare capabilities have also registered an uptrend in this respect. Nevertheless, Ankara will have to deal with certain limitations in key segments, particularly 5th generation aircraft and strategic weapon systems which, together, represent a severe intra-war deterrence gap in Turkey’s defense posture. The Turkish administration will have to address this specific shortfall given the problematic threat landscape at the nation’s Middle Eastern doorstep. This study covers two interrelated strategic topics regarding Turkey’s national military capacity in the 21st century: its defense technological and industrial base (DTIB) and its military policy, both currently characterized by a burgeoning assertiveness.

Istoriya ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (8 (106)) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Nadezhda Belyakova

The research focuses on establishing and personifying the rather shady and marginal group of “Russian female pilgrims” that decided to stay in the Holy Land in 1910—1920’s and caught the attention of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the formation of the state of Israel. In our research, we are introducing previously unpublished documents that give us the opportunity to examine this marginal group of elderly, religious women, who unexpectedly became acting figures in the Soviet-Israeli diplomatic relations and the Soviet struggle for Russian property in Palestine. The interest of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in attaining property that previously belonged to institutions and representatives of the Russian Empire in Palestine naturally sparked the USSR’s keen interest in Russian nuns and female pilgrims in the region. The condition under which these women were granted Soviet citizenship was the recognition of Patriarch Alexius I of Moscow, which in itself is an expression of the new role, played by the Russian Orthodox Church under Stalinist leadership in the international (namely — Middle Eastern) arena. In this research paper we will demonstrate the mechanism of discussion and decision-making within the Soviet institutions, which pertained to the granting of a special kind of citizenship, one that officially forbade the entrance to the USSR. Among the documents published is the list of the female pilgrims, who lived in the Holy Land in 1952 and who were willing to receive Soviet citizenship.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-89
Author(s):  
Demetrios Tsailas

We know that the strategy must create the basic knowledge that links both the ways and the means to achieve the desired political goals and strategic results. This logical method is a continuous thought process that provides strategic intent and informs ways, creating links to strategic planning that lead to the use of means, in military operations. This factor is the element that includes calculating, sleight and creating a logic or chain of results in strategy. In this paper, after considering a strategy distillation, we will analyze the context of hybrid warfare in strategic planning, which is of particular concern to us in Greek-Turkish relations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Özgür Özdamar ◽  
Sercan Canbolat

Political Islam and Islamist organizations have broadly gained strength across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the post-Cold War era. Following the Arab uprisings, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), generally viewed as the world’s largest and most influential Islamist organization, has shaped the wider landscape of MENA politics. This study examines MB leadership by comparing M. Morsi of Egypt, R. Ghannouchi of Tunisia, and K. Meshaal of Gaza as examples of Islamist leaders to explain their political belief systems and predict their foreign-policy behavior. We use the operational code approach, a content-analysis software and statistical tests to conduct the study. Results show that the three leaders’ foreign policy beliefs are analogous to the averages of world leaders. Results also partially support the hypothesis that their foreign-policy propensities are similar to each other. We conclude that despite the conventional portrayal of MB leadership, these leaders use negotiation and cooperation to settle their differences in foreign affairs, and the best way to approach them is to engage in a Rousseauvian assurance game that emphasizes international social cooperation. Results also suggest important implications in terms of mainstream international relations theories.


Author(s):  
VIKTOR POTOČNIK

Povzetek Od 90. let prejšnjega stoletja je v opremljanju z oklepno tehniko v oboroženih silah zaznati spremembe. Obseg tankovskih zmogljivosti se je zmanjšal, hkrati pa se povečujejo zmogljivosti tako imenovanega lahkega oklepa in oklepne zaščite v enotah bojne podpore in enotah zagotovitve bojnega delovanja. Dejansko se je delež oklepa na bojišču povečal. V doktrinarnem smislu Nato ne namenja veliko pozornosti protioklepnemu boju, v Vojaški doktrini SV (2006) pa protioklepnega boja sploh ne najdemo. V članku je opredeljen protioklepni boj v doktrinarnem smislu in analizirane so protioklepne zmogljivosti sodobnih vojsk. Na podlagi tega je predstavljenih nekaj ugotovitev in priporočil o stanju protioklepnega boja v SV. Ključne besede: Protioklepni boj, protioklepni oborožitveni sistemi, Slovenska vojska, koeficient bojne učinkovitosti. Abstract Since the 1990's, several changes have occurred in armoured formations. The scope of tank capabilities has been reduced considerably, while at the same time the presence of light armour and armour in combat support and combat service support units has increased. The percentage of armour in the battlefield has thus increased considerably. Nevertheless, doctrine-wise anti-armour combat is not a high priority for NATO and it is not even mentioned in the Slovenian Armed Forces doctrine (2006). The article deals with anti-armour combat from a doctrine perspective, and provides an analysis of anti-armour capabilities of modern armed forces. Building on this, it puts forward some conclusions and recommendations for the Slovenian Armed Forces. Key words: Anti-armour doctrine, anti-armour weapon systems, Slovenian Armed Forces, combat effectiveness coefficient.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-64
Author(s):  
Supotnitskiy M.V. Kovtun V.A.

The Iraqis became the first nation to use chemical weapons on the modern battlefield during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). There are no general reviews and research available on this issue in Russian. It also puts the Russian researchers in an unequal position in comparison with their Western and Middle Eastern colleagues, who have such information from a wide range of sources. This lack of knowledge limits our ability to understand the secret mechanisms that trigger modern chemical wars in the Middle East. The analysis in the present study is based on different Western sources, UN and CIA materials. The article shows that Iraq – a third world country with the population of 16,3 million people in 1980-ies and relatively low educational level – could start its chemical weapons program only due to the Western aid and assistance (supplies of the precursors, technologies and technical documentation, education of specialists, diplomatic support ect). Only due to this assistance the Iraqi`s chemical weapons program could become successful. The industrial production of chemical agents and chemical munitions of various tactical purposes was established by the Iraqis in less than 10 years. By the end of the 1980-ies, the Iraqi chemists laid the foundations of the future research in the sphere of toxic chemicals. The industrial base for the production of CW have also been established. For Russia, the success of the Iraq`s chemical weapons program is a warning. It means that technically backward, but oil rich quasi-state can acquire chemical weapons in a few years with the clandestine support of the same «sponsors», and use it both for provocations and for conducting combat operations in the regions, vital for Russia`s interests.


Asian Survey ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 43 (6) ◽  
pp. 971-988 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renato Cruz De Castro

Abstract This article contends that the Philippine-U.S. post-9/11 security relationship is characterized by temporary and limited American troop deployment aimed at developing the Armed Forces of the Philippines' counterterrorism capability and fostering interoperability between the Philippine and American armed forces. The article concludes that the post-9/11 alliance is significantly different from the two countries' security relationship during the Cold War.


2009 ◽  
pp. 565-590
Author(s):  
Raffaella Nigro

- In the well-known Lozano case, an Italian intelligence agent, Mr Nicola Calipari, remained killed in 2005 by an American soldier, Mr Mario Luis Lozano, while entering a US checkpoint on the way to the Baghdad airport soon after securing the release of an Italian journalist from Iraqi kidnappers. In the ensuing case, Italian courts addressed a number of sensitive questions, including that of jurisdiction over national troops involved, directly or indirectly, in so-called "humanitarian missions" abroad. Italian courts did have jurisdiction over the killing under Italian domestic law. Indeed, the murder of Mr Calipari can be regarded as a "political crime" under Article 8 of the Italian penal code. On such a premise, the question is whether Article 8 was superseded by a customary international law rule under Article 10 of the Italian Constitution aimed at excluding jurisdiction over Mr Lozano. State practice suggests that neither a customary rule on the exclusive jurisdiction of the sending State (as claimed by the Court of Assise of Rome in 2007) nor a customary rule on Mr Lozano's functional immunity (as claimed by the Court of Cassation in 2008) are established in customary international law. Rather, State practice reveals that a number of States are likely to recognize immunity from jurisdiction to the armed forces only in certain specific circumstances. Moreover, such immunity is quite different from the functional immunity traditionally enjoyed by diplomatic and consular agents, as well as from the immunities enjoyed by other high-ranking State officials, such as the Head of State, the Head of Government and the Minister for Foreign Affairs.


Res Publica ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-20
Author(s):  
Guido Provoost

Studying the Belgian military and foreign policy from 1934 till 1937, one can conclude to the following working hypotheses. The conflict between the King (and His entourage) and the Cabinet about the competency over military policy and military command has had a large influence on the acute phase of the Question Royale 1940-1950.The policy of independence of 1936 which has been imputed later on to the King and for which He has been blamed, is rather contained in the military and foreign policy of the successive Belgian governments from 1930 on, inspired by Paul Hymans, minister of foreign affairs at that time.


Author(s):  
Rafa Martínez ◽  
Fernando J. Padilla Angulo

During the transition from ancien régime to liberalism that took place in Spain during the first third of the 19th century, the military became a prominent political actor. Many soldiers were members of the country’s first liberal parliament, which in 1812 passed one of the world’s oldest liberal charters, the so-called Constitution of Cádiz. Furthermore, the armed forces fought against the Napoleonic Army’s occupation and, once the Bourbon monarchy was restored, often took arms against the established power. Nineteenth-century Spain was prey to instability due to the struggle between conservative, progressive, liberal, monarchical, and republican factions. It was also a century full of missed opportunities by governments, constitutions, and political regimes, in which the military always played an active role, often a paramount one. Army and navy officers became ministers and heads of government during the central decades of the 19th century, often after a coup. This changed with the establishment of a parliamentary monarchy based on a bipartisan system known as the Restoration (1874–1923). The armed forces were kept away from politics. They focused on their professional activities, thus developing a corporate attitude and an ideological cohesion around a predominantly conservative political stance. Ruling the empire gave the armed forces a huge sphere of influence. Only chief officers were appointed as governors of the Spanish territories in America, Africa, and Asia throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. This went unchanged until 1976, when Spain withdrew from Western Sahara, deemed the country’s last colony. The power accumulated in the overseas territories was often used by the governors to build a political career in metropolitan Spain. Following the end of the Restoration in 1923, the armed forces engaged with the political struggle in full again. After a military-led dictatorship, a frustrated republic, and a fratricidal civil war, a dictatorship was established in 1939 that lasted for almost 40 years: the Francoist regime. Francisco Franco leaned on the military as a repressive force and a legitimacy source for a regime established as a result of a war. After the dictator passed away in 1975, Spain underwent a transition to democracy which was accepted by the armed forces somehow reluctantly, as the coup attempt of 1981 made clear. At that time, the military was the institution that Spanish society trusted the least. It was considered a poorly trained and equipped force. Even its troops’ volume and budget were regarded as excessive. However, the armed forces have undergone an intense process of modernization since the end of 1980s. They have become fully professional, their budget and numbers have been reduced, and they have successfully taken part in European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and United Nations (UN)-led international missions. In the early 21st century, the armed forces are Spain’s second-best valued institution. Far from its formerly interventionist role throughout the 19th century and a good deal of the 20th, Spain’s armed forces in the 21st century have become a state tool and a public administration controlled by democratically elected governments.


Author(s):  
Derek Lutterbeck

Coup-proofing—that is, measures aimed at preventing military coups and ensuring military loyalty—has been a key feature of civil–military relations in Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) states. Just as the MENA region has been one of the most coup-prone regions in the world, coup-proofing has been an essential instrument of regime survival in Arab countries. The most commonly found coup-proofing strategies in the region include (a) so-called “communal coup-proofing,” involving the appointment of individuals to key positions within the military based on family, ethnic, or religious ties; (b) providing the military with corporate and/or private benefits in order to ensure its loyalty; (c) creating parallel military forces in addition to the regular military, so as to “counter-balance” the latter; (d) monitoring of the military through a vast internal security and intelligence apparatus; and (e) promoting professionalism, and thus political neutrality, within the military. The experiences of the “Arab Spring,” however, have shown that not all of these strategies are equally effective in ensuring military loyalty during times of popular upheavals and regime crises. A common finding in this context has been that communal coup-proofing (or militaries based on “patrimonialism”) creates the strongest bonds been the armed forces and their regimes, as evidenced by the forceful suppression of the popular uprising by the military in countries such as Syria, or by parts of the military in Libya and Yemen. By contrast, where coup-proofing has been based on the provision of material benefits to the military or on counterbalancing, as in Tunisia or Egypt, the armed forces have refrained from suppressing the popular uprising, ultimately leading to the downfall of these countries’ long-standing leaders. A further lesson that can be drawn from the Arab Spring in terms of coup-proofing is that students of both military coups and coup-proofing should dedicate (much) more attention to the increasingly important role played by the internal security apparatus in MENA countries.


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