scholarly journals Evolutionary game theory: Theoretical concepts and applications to microbial communities

2010 ◽  
Vol 389 (20) ◽  
pp. 4265-4298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erwin Frey
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Microbial Communities ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theoretical Concepts

scholarly journals Which games are growing bacterial populations playing?

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (108) ◽  
pp. 20150121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiang-Yi Li ◽  
Cleo Pietschke ◽  
Sebastian Fraune ◽  
Philipp M. Altrock ◽  
Thomas C. G. Bosch ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Population Dynamics ◽  
Microbial Communities ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Community Dynamics ◽  
Growth Parameters ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Frequency Dependent

Microbial communities display complex population dynamics, both in frequency and absolute density. Evolutionary game theory provides a natural approach to analyse and model this complexity by studying the detailed interactions among players, including competition and conflict, cooperation and coexistence. Classic evolutionary game theory models typically assume constant population size, which often does not hold for microbial populations. Here, we explicitly take into account population growth with frequency-dependent growth parameters, as observed in our experimental system. We study the in vitro population dynamics of the two commensal bacteria ( Curvibacter sp. (AEP1.3) and Duganella sp. (C1.2)) that synergistically protect the metazoan host Hydra vulgaris (AEP) from fungal infection. The frequency-dependent, nonlinear growth rates observed in our experiments indicate that the interactions among bacteria in co-culture are beyond the simple case of direct competition or, equivalently, pairwise games. This is in agreement with the synergistic effect of anti-fungal activity observed in vivo . Our analysis provides new insight into the minimal degree of complexity needed to appropriately understand and predict coexistence or extinction events in this kind of microbial community dynamics. Our approach extends the understanding of microbial communities and points to novel experiments.

Interdisciplinary benefits of a theory of cultural evolution centered at the group-level: The emergence of macro-neuroeconomics and social evolutionary game theory

2014 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 264-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias A. Mattei
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Psychology ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Group Level ◽  
New Paradigm ◽  
Scientific Impact ◽  
Theoretical Concepts ◽  
Target Article

AbstractThe theoretical concepts developed in the target article, in which the author proposes a new paradigm of cultural evolution based not on the individuals' characteristics, but rather on more global collective properties described as “group-traits” (which emerge when a group of individuals exhibit both differentiation and organization), may have a broader scientific impact that transcend the boundaries of social and evolutionary psychology, paving the way for the emergence of macro-neuroeconomics and social evolutionary game theory.

scholarly journals ROLSIŠKASIS „TEISINGUMAS“ IR EVOLIUCINĖ LOŠIMŲ TEORIJA: KULTŪRINĖ EVOLIUCIJA IR NATŪRALIOS MAKSIMALAUS MINIMUMO TAISYKLĖS KILMĖ

Problemos ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 80 ◽  
pp. 35-53
Author(s):  
Mantas Radžvilas
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bayesian Decision ◽  
Theoretical Concepts ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Stable Pattern ◽  
Maximin Principle ◽  
Naturalistic Interpretation

Straipsnyje nauju aspektu analizuojama kertinė Johno Rawlso teisingumo teorijos koncepcija – vadinamasis maksimalaus minimumo principas. Aptariami sunkumai, kuriuos kelia šis principas, kai mėginama pateikti natūralistinę J. Rawlso teisingumo teorijos interpretaciją. Atlikta analizė atskleidžia, kad maksimalaus minimumo principas, kurį Rawlsas laikė racionalia ir „teisinga“ elgesio strategija nežinojimo uždangos situacijoje, iš tiesų nesuderinamas su modernios, tikimybių analize grindžiamos racionalių sprendimų teorijos principais. Straipsnyje nagrinėjamos galimybės išspręsti šią problemą pasitelkiant naujausius evoliucinės lošimų teorijos laimėjimus. Jie atveria galimybę suderinti maksimalaus minimumo principą su tam tikru natūraliai kultūrinės evoliucijos būdu įsitvirtinančiu žmogaus socialinio elgesio modeliu.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: maksimalus minimumas, Nasho derybų lošimas, evoliucinė lošimų teorija, evoliuciškai stabili strategija, mokymosi taisyklės.Rawlsian “Justice” and the Evolutionary Theory of Games: Cultural Evolution and the Origins of the Natural Maximin RuleMantas Radžvilas SummaryThis paper is dedicated to the analysis of the maximin principle, which is one of the key theoretical concepts of John Rawls’s theory of justice, and the problem that this principle creates for any attempt to provide a naturalistic interpretation of Rawls’s concept of fairness . Analysis shows that maximin principle is, in fact, incompatible with the Bayesian decision theory. This paper is intended to show that recent breakthroughs in evolutionary game theory could help to reconcile the maximin principle with a certain naturally emerging and evolutionary stable pattern of human social behaviour.Keywords: Maximin principle, Nash bargaining game, Evolutionary Game Theory, Evolutionary Stable Strategy, learning rules.

scholarly journals A Study of Taxi Service Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Mode Choice ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Taxi Service ◽  
Service Mode ◽  
The Impact

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.

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