Saadia on “what is in the hearts of people when they reach the limits of endurance in a trial”

This chapter addresses Saadia’s theodicies in his Doctrines and Beliefs, a treatise of Jewish theology, and his seminal commentary on the Book of Job whose aim, I argue, is not to investigate the theological problem of evil but to give a phenomenology of people’s mental reactions to suffering. On Saadia’s radically naturalistic interpretation of Job, according to which Job’s human adversary Satan challenges his piety—that Job is pious only because he is prosperous—Job is made to suffer to justify his piety. But Job’s reaction to this suffering manifests the ambiguity, isolation, and uncertainty of one who suffers without understanding why.

Cognitive investigations in Kantian perspective: towards new synthesis

This is a review of the book Mozg - kultura - socium. Kantianskaya programma v cognitivnykh issledovaniyakh by Bazhanov V.A. The author`s main aim is a reconsideration of some fundamental principles of epistemology and philosophy of science in the light of state-of-the-art advancements of neurosciences. According to the author of the book, social and cultural revolution in neurosciences has been crucially modifying the initial Kantian program of consciousness research and the modes of linguistic representation of its results. In particular, in epistemology the universal concept of transcendental subject has been altered with regard to neurobiological and social data, which concern some preconditions of cognitive activity. In philosophy of science such a shift of research perspective allows to implement a naturalistic interpretation of natural sciences, clarifies the problem of empirical foundations of mathematics and sheds a new light on the problem of apriori elements of mathematical thought. The analysis of evolutionary and neurobiological preconditions of logical thought leads to the sort of revival of psychologism program in logic, which enables author to put forward an original interpretation of the problem of plurality of logical systems. Finally, some topics of social sciences as well as problems of genesis of art, ethical and religious systems, can acquire new interpretation with respect to modern investigations in cognitive science.

Economic Mind: From Attribution Error to Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

I argue in this text that the economic mind is a culturally hegemonic, naturalistic interpretation of the behavior produced by the revolutionary nature of the economic and technical developments of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Despite persistent criticism, people fulfilled the predictions of the economic model of a human being for so long that they committed an attribution error and took it to be the adequate vision of human nature. Neoclassical economic theory played a significant, even if involuntary, role in the spread of this illusion. I also claim that the concept of economic mind—as the dominant interpretation of human nature—currently functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy, reproducing behaviors that would have a chance to change (refuting the theory developed on their basis), were it not for the popularity of this concept as commonsensical definition of human nature.

Naturalizing Darwall’s Second Person Standpoint

In this paper, we take Darwall’s analytical project of the second-person standpoint as the starting point for a naturalistic project about our moral psychology. In his project, Darwall contends that our moral notions constitutively imply the perspective of second-personal interaction, i.e. the interaction of two mutually recognized agents who make and acknowledge claims on one another. This allows him to explain the distinctive purported authority of morality. Yet a naturalized interpretation of it has potential as an account of our moral psychology. We propose a naturalistic interpretation of Darwall’s work to address some of the main issues about our moral psychology. First, we explain why moral norms motivate us; namely, because of these second-personal relations. We provide a naturalized version of this solution. Second, we articulate how intersubjective interactions take place effectively; grounding duties to particular other subjects, and being related to distinctive moral emotions. Third, we address the question of the limits of the moral community, proposing that it comprises all agents capable of second-personal interactions. Finally, we explain the emergence of community norms through intersubjective interaction. Since all group members can adopt alternatively the second-personal stance to each other, demands are sanctioned and recognized in a triangulation process which explains the emergence of group norms.

Aristotle’s Naturalistic Interpretation of Odyssey 12

This final chapter considers the textual evidence for Aristotle’s (possible or probable) discussions of three episodes in Odyssey 12, namely, concerning the Sirens, the ambrosia-bearing doves, and the Cattle of the Sun. All three have historically been treated allegorically. Further, as some contemporary scholars take the fragments on these doves and cattle to be evidence for Aristotle interpreting Homer allegorically, this is an appropriate place to return to the issue of whether Aristotle ever employs allegorical interpretation, and as such it serves as an appropriate conclusion to the volume. The essential nature of what Aristotle is doing in his Homeric Problems is to defend Homer (where possible) according to rational principles of literary criticism, but without relying on allegorical interpretation.

Prodicus (fl. late 5th century BC)

Prodicus was a Greek Sophist from the island of Ceos; he was active in Athens. He served his city as ambassador and also became prominent as a professional educator. He taught natural philosophy, ethics, and of course rhetoric, but he is best known as an authority on correct language, specializing in fine verbal distinctions. Prodicus’ greatest influence was due to his naturalistic interpretation of the traditional Greek gods; as a result, he later figured on the short list of famous atheists.