A moderate self-interest preference promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game

2021 ◽  
pp. 126649
Author(s):  
Chun-Xiao Jia ◽  
Run-Ran Liu
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Self Interest

scholarly journals Altruism Design in Networked Public Goods Games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sixie Yu ◽  
David Kempe ◽  
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Acting Out ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Algorithmic Question ◽  
Conventional Models ◽  
Individual Self

Many collective decision-making settings feature a strategic tension between agents acting out of individual self-interest and promoting a common good. These include wearing face masks during a pandemic, voting, and vaccination. Networked public goods games capture this tension, with networks encoding strategic interdependence among agents. Conventional models of public goods games posit solely individual self-interest as a motivation, even though altruistic motivations have long been known to play a significant role in agents' decisions. We introduce a novel extension of public goods games to account for altruistic motivations by adding a term in the utility function that incorporates the perceived benefits an agent obtains from the welfare of others, mediated by an altruism graph. Most importantly, we view altruism not as immutable, but rather as a lever for promoting the common good. Our central algorithmic question then revolves around the computational complexity of modifying the altruism network to achieve desired public goods game investment profiles. We first show that the problem can be solved using linear programming when a principal can fractionally modify the altruism network. While the problem becomes in general intractable if the principal's actions are all-or-nothing, we exhibit several tractable special cases.

Public Service, Public Goods, and the Common Good

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerardo Sanchis Muñoz
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Human Person ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
International Agencies ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Common ◽  
Appointed Officials

The proper provision of public goods by a well-functioning, impartial government is not the only thing necessary for attaining the common good, but it is essential. The economic view of the human person as a rational, self-interested maximizer has become pervasive in analyzing government dysfunction and is employed by international agencies to generate proposals to realign the economic incentives of government officials. But this mindset assumes and encourages self-interest and undermines idoneidad (suitability)—which includes integrity, motivation, and competence—as the most fundamental characteristic that must be demanded of both elected and appointed officials at all levels of government. The failure of public institutions in Argentina is employed as a telling example of such problems.

Inter-group selection of strategy promotes cooperation in public goods game

2021 ◽  
pp. 126292
Author(s):  
Jianwei Wang ◽  
Wenshu Xu ◽  
Wei Chen ◽  
Fengyuan Yu ◽  
Jialu He
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Selection ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Selection Of

scholarly journals Bringing tax avoiders to light: moral framing and shaming in a public goods experiment

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Stefanos A. Tsikas
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Social Contagion ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Social Sanctions ◽  
Moral Framing ◽  
Public Goods Experiment

Abstract With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.

scholarly journals Punishment Strategies across Societies: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Ramzi Suleiman ◽  
Yuval Samid
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Strong Predictor ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
The World ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Cost

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods.

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