Epistemic relativism and the problem of the criterion

2011 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 562-570 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard Sankey
2014 ◽  
pp. 83
Author(s):  
Sabino de Juan López

RESUMEN En el artículo se ofrece una reflexión en torno a la educación y valores. Tras una referencia a los diferentes sentidos en que se puede plantear el problema en función de la forma como se puede entender la relación entre los dos sustantivos “educación” y “valores”, la reflexión se centra en algunos problemas relacionados con los valores en cuanto contenidos de la educación. Primeramente se refiere al problema del criterio en función del cual determinar los valores de la educación, concluyendo en que el criterio no podía ser ni de carácter a priori, ni empírico, sino “sintético”. A continuación, se afronta el problema del principio, de la fuente de los valores, o la concreción del criterio de los valores de la educación, entendiendo que éstos deberían ser determinados a partir del sujeto de la educación. Se concluye con la referencia a una exigencia de los valores de la educación, la configuración de una totalidad unitaria e interactiva. Palabras clave: educación, valores, fuente de valores, integración, cultura EDUCATION AND VALUES ABSTRACT The article offers a reflection on education and values. After a reference to the different senses in which one can pose the problem in terms of how you can understand the relationship between the two nouns “education” and “values”, reflection focuses on some problems related to the values in the contents of education. First, it concerns the problem of the criterion against which to determine the values of education, concluding that the criterion could be neither a priori in nature, not empirical, but “synthetic”. Herein, the problem of principle is faced, the source of values, or the realization of the criterion of the values of education, understanding that these should be determined from the subject of education. It concludes with the reference of a requirement of the values in education, setting up a unitary and interactive whole. Key Words: education, values , power values , integration, culture


Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg

Chapter 3 deals with the first issue one faces in the task of articulating the explicit epistemic criteria for belief: the problem of the criterion. It is tempting to suppose that a belief can be normatively proper from the epistemic point of view only if the believer can certify for herself the reliability of every belief-forming process on which she relied. But insisting on this quickly leads to the threat of an infinite regress. This chapter defends a foundationalist response to this problem, according to which we enjoy a default (albeit defeasible) permission to rely on certain cognitive processes in belief-formation. These are processes that satisfy what the author calls the Reliabilist Rationale. Importantly, our permissions here are social: any one of us is permitted to rely on any token process that satisfies this rationale, whether the token process resides in one’s own mind/brain or that of another epistemic subject.


2019 ◽  
pp. 181-208
Author(s):  
Alex Broadbent

This chapter seeks an attitude to medicine that does not commit the error of EBM in committing to an unjustifiably rigid notion of evidence, nor the reaction of Medical Nihilism of adopting EBM’s standards of evidence and then raising the bar even higher. Cosmopolitanism is a position developed by Appiah in the context of ethical disagreement, designed to facilitate conversation without falling into epistemic relativism. The chapter unpacks Cosmopolitanism into four stances: metaphysical, epistemic, moral, and practical. It applies these stances to medicine to yield Medical Cosmopolitanism. On this realist view, medical facts (e.g., whether an intervention works, whether someone is sick) are not dependent on the perceiver. Nonetheless Cosmopolitanism promotes epistemic humility: the attitude that one has limited confidence in one’s medical beliefs (both of efficacy and of the inefficacy of someone else’s favored intervention). And it promotes Primacy of Practice: settle cases first, principles later.


Synthese ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 192 (3) ◽  
pp. 859-876 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin T. Rancourt

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