scholarly journals Large deviations principle for discrete-time mean-field games

2021 ◽  
Vol 157 ◽  
pp. 105042
Author(s):  
Naci Saldi
Author(s):  
Joseph Frédéric Bonnans ◽  
Pierre Lavigne ◽  
Laurent Pfeiffer

We propose and investigate a discrete-time mean field game model involving risk-averse agents. The model under study is a coupled system of dynamic programming equations with a Kolmogorov equation. The agents' risk aversion is modeled by composite risk measures. The existence of a solution to the coupled system is obtained with a fixed point approach. The corresponding feedback control allows to construct an approximate Nash equilibrium for a related dynamic game with finitely many players.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-101
Author(s):  
Juan Pablo Maldonado López

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Akwasi Opoku ◽  
Godwin Osabutey

This paper studies large deviations properties of vectors of empirical means and measures generated as follows. Consider a sequence X1,X2,…,Xn of independent and identically distributed random variables partitioned into d-subgroups with sizes n1,…,nd. Further, consider a d-dimensional vector mn whose coordinates are made up of the empirical means of the subgroups. We prove the following. (1) The sequence of vector of empirical means mn satisfies large deviations principle with rate n and rate function I, when the sequence X1,X2,…,Xn is Rl valued, with l≥1. (2) Similar large deviations results hold for the corresponding sequence of vector of empirical measures Ln if Xi’s, i=1,2,…,n, take on finitely many values. (3) The rate functions for the above large deviations principles are convex combinations of the corresponding rate functions arising from the large deviations principles of the coordinates of mn and Ln. The probability distributions used in the convex combinations are given by α=(α1,…,αd)=limn→∞1/n(n1,…,nd). These results are consequently used to derive variational formula for the thermodynamic limit for the pressure of multipopulation Curie-Weiss (I. Gallo and P. Contucci (2008), and I. Gallo (2009)) and mean-field Pott’s models, via a version of Varadhan’s integral lemma for an equicontinuous family of functions. These multipopulation models serve as a paradigm for decision-making context where social interaction and other socioeconomic attributes of individuals play a crucial role.


2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 1596-1620
Author(s):  
Naci Saldi ◽  
Tamer Başar ◽  
Maxim Raginsky

In this paper, we study a class of discrete-time mean-field games under the infinite-horizon risk-sensitive optimality criterion. Risk sensitivity is introduced for each agent (player) via an exponential utility function. In this game model, each agent is coupled with the rest of the population through the empirical distribution of the states, which affects both the agent’s individual cost and its state dynamics. Under mild assumptions, we establish the existence of a mean-field equilibrium in the infinite-population limit as the number of agents (N) goes to infinity, and we then show that the policy obtained from the mean-field equilibrium constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium when N is sufficiently large.


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