scholarly journals A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games

1998 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon P Anderson ◽  
Jacob K Goeree ◽  
Charles A Holt
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Decision Error

scholarly journals Institution Formation in Public Goods Games

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (4) ◽  
pp. 1335-1355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kosfeld ◽  
Akira Okada ◽  
Arno Riedl
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Formation Process ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Institution Formation ◽  
Group Welfare ◽  
Endogenous Formation

Sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in public goods provision. Our theoretical analysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium, including those governing only a subset of players. The experiment confirms that institutions are formed and that it positively affects cooperation and group welfare. However, the data also shows that success is not guaranteed. Players are unwilling to implement equilibrium institutions in which some players have the opportunity to free ride. Our results emphasize the role of fairness in the institution formation process. (JEL C72, D02, H41)

Pool punishment in public goods games: How do sanctioners’ incentives affect us?

2021 ◽  
Vol 185 ◽  
pp. 513-537
Author(s):  
Adriana Alventosa ◽  
Alberto Antonioni ◽  
Penélope Hernández
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Games

Public goods games on random hyperbolic graphs with mixing

2021 ◽  
Vol 144 ◽  
pp. 110720
Author(s):  
Maja Duh ◽  
Marko Gosak ◽  
Matjaž Perc
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Hyperbolic Graphs

Group preferential selection promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (11) ◽  
pp. 1450062 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong-Bin Zhang ◽  
Hong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Role Model ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Square Lattice ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Learning Mechanism ◽  
Preferential Selection ◽  
Cooperative Evolution ◽  
Public Goods Games

We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on the square lattice, focusing on the co-player learning mechanism based on the preferential selection that are brought about by wealthy information of groups where participants collect and search for potential imitators from those groups. We find that co-player learning mechanism based on the choice of weighted group can lead to the promotion of public cooperation by means of the information of wealthy groups that is obtained by participants, and after that the partial choice of public goods groups is enhanced with the tunable preferential parameter. Our results highlight that the learning interactions is not solely confined to the restricted connection among players, but co-players of wealthy groups have the opportunity to be as a role model in the promotion of cooperative evolution. Moreover, we also find the size of learning affects the choice of distant players, cooperators (defectors) having more paths to exploit the phalanx of opponents to survive when the value of preferential parameter is small. Besides, the extinction thresholds of cooperators and defectors for different values of noise are also investigated.

States and Power in Africa by Jeffrey I. Herbst: A Review Essay

2002 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 510-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
James A Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Review Essay ◽  
State Failure ◽  
Contract Enforcement ◽  
Law And Order ◽  
Defense Contract ◽  
Comparative Institutions

Herbst argues that Africa is plagued by “state failure” to provide certain public goods in society, such as law and order, defense, contract enforcement, and infrastructure. Herbst has provided a bold, historically informed theoretical analysis, essential reading for economists interested in comparative institutions and development.

scholarly journals Avoiding or restricting defectors in public goods games?

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (103) ◽  
pp. 20141203 ◽  
Author(s):  
The Anh Han ◽  
Luís Moniz Pereira ◽  
Tom Lenaerts
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Data ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Full Agreement ◽  
Group Interactions ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
The Common ◽  
Strategic Solution

When creating a public good, strategies or mechanisms are required to handle defectors. We first show mathematically and numerically that prior agreements with posterior compensations provide a strategic solution that leads to substantial levels of cooperation in the context of public goods games, results that are corroborated by available experimental data. Notwithstanding this success, one cannot, as with other approaches, fully exclude the presence of defectors, raising the question of how they can be dealt with to avoid the demise of the common good. We show that both avoiding creation of the common good, whenever full agreement is not reached, and limiting the benefit that disagreeing defectors can acquire, using costly restriction mechanisms, are relevant choices. Nonetheless, restriction mechanisms are found the more favourable, especially in larger group interactions. Given decreasing restriction costs, introducing restraining measures to cope with public goods free-riding issues is the ultimate advantageous solution for all participants, rather than avoiding its creation.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document