Habitat characteristics and animal management factors associated with habitat use by bottlenose dolphins in zoological environments

The way an animal uses its habitat can serve as an indicator of habitat appropriateness for the species and individuals. Bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus and Tursiops aduncus) in accredited zoos and aquariums experience a range of habitat types and management programs that provide opportunities for dolphins to engage in species-appropriate behaviors and potentially influence their individual and group welfare. Data in the present study were collected as part of a larger study titled “Towards understanding the welfare of cetaceans in zoos and aquariums” (colloquially called the Cetacean Welfare Study). Non-invasive bio-logging devices (Movement Tags) recorded the diving behavior and vertical habitat movements of 60 bottlenose dolphins at 31 zoos and aquariums that were accredited by the Alliance for Marine Mammal Parks and Aquariums and/or the Association of Zoos & Aquariums. Bottlenose dolphins wore a Movement Tag one day per week for two five-week data collection periods. Demographic variables, environmental enrichment programs, training programs, and habitat characteristics were associated with habitat usage. Longer dive durations and use of the bottom third of the habitat were associated with higher enrichment program index values. Dolphins receiving new enrichment on a monthly/weekly schedule also used the bottom third of the habitat more often than those receiving new enrichment on a yearly/year+ schedule. Dolphins that were managed in a group that was split into smaller subgroups during the day and were reunited into one group at night spent less time in the top third of the habitat than those who remained in a single group with consistent members at all times. Dolphins that were managed as subgroups with rotating members but were never united as one group spent less time in the bottom third of the habitat than those who remained in a single group with consistent members at all times. Taken together, the results suggested that management practices, such as enrichment and training programs, played a greater role in how dolphins interacted with their environment relative to the physical characteristics of the habitat.

Velocity obstacle–based conflict resolution and recovery method

ABSTRACT Considering the shortcomings of current methods for real-time resolution of two-aircraft flight conflicts, a geometric optimal conflict resolution and recovery method based on the velocity obstacle method for two aircraft and a cooperative conflict resolution method for multiple aircraft are proposed. The conflict type was determined according to the relative position and velocity of the aircraft, and a corresponding conflict mitigation strategy was selected. A resolution manoeuvre and a recovery manoeuvre were performed. On the basis of a two-aircraft conflict resolution model, a multi-aircraft cooperative conflict resolution game was constructed to identify an optimal solution for maximising group welfare. The solution and recovery method is simple and effective, and no new flight conflicts are introduced during track recovery. For multi-aircraft conflict resolution, an equilibrium point that maximises the welfare function of the group was identified, and thus, an optimal strategy for multi-aircraft conflict resolution was obtained.

The Needs of the Many Do Not Outweigh the Needs of the Few: The Limits of Individual Sacrifice across Diverse Cultures

A long tradition of research in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) countries has investigated how people weigh individual welfare versus group welfare in their moral judgments. Relatively less research has investigated the generalizability of results across non-WEIRD populations. In the current study, we ask participants across nine diverse cultures (Bali, Costa Rica, France, Guatemala, Japan, Madagascar, Mongolia, Serbia, and the USA) to make a series of moral judgments regarding both third-party sacrifice for group welfare and first-person sacrifice for group welfare. In addition to finding some amount of cross-cultural variation on most of our questions, we also find two cross-culturally consistent judgments: (1) when individuals are in equivalent situations, overall welfare should be maximized, and (2) harm to individuals should be taken into account, and some types of individual harm can trump overall group welfare. We end by discussing the specific pattern of variable and consistent features in the context of evolutionary theories of the evolution of morality.

Institution Formation in Public Goods Games

Sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in public goods provision. Our theoretical analysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium, including those governing only a subset of players. The experiment confirms that institutions are formed and that it positively affects cooperation and group welfare. However, the data also shows that success is not guaranteed. Players are unwilling to implement equilibrium institutions in which some players have the opportunity to free ride. Our results emphasize the role of fairness in the institution formation process. (JEL C72, D02, H41)

THE POSSIBILITY OF GROUP WELFARE FUNCTIONS

This paper gives a brief overview of the well-known impossibility-possibility theorem in constructing a social welfare function from individual functions. The Analytic Hierarchy Process uses a fundamental scale of absolute numbers to represent judgments about dominance in paired comparisons. It is shown that it is possible to derive such a function in two ways. One is from the synthesized functions of the judgments of each of the individuals. The other is obtained by first combining corresponding pairwise comparison judgments made by all the individuals, thus obtaining a matrix of combined judgments for the group and then deriving a welfare function for the group. With consistency the four conditions imposed by Arrow are satisfied. With inconsistency, an additional condition is needed.

The Long-Run Advantages of Centralization for Collective Action: A Comment on Bendor and Mookherjee

Institutional design can affect the logic of ongoing collective action in groups with heterogeneous members. This article corrects a mathematical error in a seminal article by Bendor and Mookherjee (1987) and shows how the amended result strengthens the case for centralized monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. In solving their original model, Bendor and Mookherjee neglected that groups under centralized control will become increasingly talented over time, as headquarters detects and replaces untalented members. Expected improvements in the talent of the group should heighten the incentive for its members to work and curtail the incidence of costly free riding, as well as reduce the average per-worker cost of production. These gains in efficiency will not materialize in decentralized regimes, where the fraction of talented members will remain constant over time. Depending on the effectiveness of monitoring in the centralized group and the level of patience and talent in society as a whole, centralized regimes can produce greater group welfare than decentralized ones, even when decentralized institutions operate flawlessly.

When Self-interest is Self-Defeating: The Public Goods Experiment as a Teaching Tool

This simple classroom experiment demonstrates many of the behavioral phenomena associated with the voluntary provision of a public good. The mechanics of the game are explained in detail and complete instructions are provided, as well as suggestions for follow-up lectures. Influences such as anonymous voting, persuasion, returns to free-riding, and duration of association can be explored in connection with concepts of incentives, individual rationality and group welfare. A number of variations and extensions can be used to incorporate prisoners' dilemmas, incentive compatible mechanisms, negative externalities, and Coasian bargaining.