scholarly journals DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MATTER IN THE MARKET RESPONSE TO MERGER ANNOUNCEMENTS? EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S. AND GERMANY

2004 ◽  
pp. 103-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Lowengrub ◽  
Torsten Luedecke ◽  
Michael Melvin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Market Response ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Merger Announcements

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE 19TH CENTURY: EVIDENCE FROM THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO CANAL COMPANY

2009 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Russ ◽  
Gary John Previts ◽  
Edward N. Coffman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
19Th Century ◽  
Annual Report ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Review Committee ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Theoretical Structure ◽  
The 19Th Century ◽  
The U.S

Presenting evidence from a 19th century corporation, the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (C&O), the paper shows that issues of corporate governance have existed since the first corporations were established in the U.S. The C&O used a stockholder review committee to review the annual report of the president and directors. The paper shows how the C&O stockholders used this committee to supplement the corporate governance structure. The corporate governance structure of the C&O is also viewed from a theoretical structure as espoused by Hart [1995].

scholarly journals Corporate Governance of Artificial Intelligence in the Public Interest

Information ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 275
Author(s):  
Peter Cihon ◽  
Jonas Schuett ◽  
Seth D. Baum
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Nonprofit Organizations ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Department Of Defense ◽  
The Public ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Media ◽  
The U.S

Corporations play a major role in artificial intelligence (AI) research, development, and deployment, with profound consequences for society. This paper surveys opportunities to improve how corporations govern their AI activities so as to better advance the public interest. The paper focuses on the roles of and opportunities for a wide range of actors inside the corporation—managers, workers, and investors—and outside the corporation—corporate partners and competitors, industry consortia, nonprofit organizations, the public, the media, and governments. Whereas prior work on multistakeholder AI governance has proposed dedicated institutions to bring together diverse actors and stakeholders, this paper explores the opportunities they have even in the absence of dedicated multistakeholder institutions. The paper illustrates these opportunities with many cases, including the participation of Google in the U.S. Department of Defense Project Maven; the publication of potentially harmful AI research by OpenAI, with input from the Partnership on AI; and the sale of facial recognition technology to law enforcement by corporations including Amazon, IBM, and Microsoft. These and other cases demonstrate the wide range of mechanisms to advance AI corporate governance in the public interest, especially when diverse actors work together.

scholarly journals Creditor-Focused Corporate Governance: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions in Japan

2011 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 1051-1072 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vikas Mehrotra ◽  
Dimitri van Schaik ◽  
Jaap Spronk ◽  
Onno Steenbeek
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Dominant Role ◽  
Sharp Contrast ◽  
Distinctive Features ◽  
Target Firms ◽  
The World ◽  
Main Bank ◽  
The U.S

AbstractMergers in Japan have the dubious distinction of not creating wealth for shareholders of target firms, in sharp contrast to what occurs in much of the rest of the world. Using a sample of 91 mergers from 1982 through 2003 we document several distinctive features of the merger market in Japan: Mergers tend to be countercyclical and appear to be driven chiefly by creditor concerns. In particular, where the merging firms share a common main bank, we find that merger gains are lower. Overall, our results point to a market that is distinctly less shareholder focused than that in the U.S., and a market where creditors play an important, perhaps dominant, role in corporate governance.

Business Intelligence in Corporate Governance and Business Processes Management

2013 ◽  
pp. 249-269
Author(s):  
Alexander Yakovlev
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Business Intelligence ◽  
Cost Reduction ◽  
Business Processes ◽  
Transnational Corporations ◽  
Accurate Information ◽  
Main Field ◽  
Maximum Cost ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
The U.S

Today is the time of transnational corporations and large companies. They bring to their shareholders and owners the major profits, and they are the main sponsors of scientific and technological progress. However, the extensive way of its development is not possible for environmental, marketing, resource, and many other reasons. So, the main field of competition between companies becomes a fight for the client, the individualization of approach to him, and the maximum cost reduction. At the same time, a series of scandals that erupted in the early 2000s with such major corporations as Enron Corporation, WorldCom, Tyco International, Adelphia, and Peregrine Systems has shown that the system of corporate governance, on which depends the welfare of hundreds of thousands of people, requires serious improvements in terms of transparency and openness. In this regard, the U.S. adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, under which management companies legally obliged to prove that his decisions are based on reliable, relevant, credible and accurate information (Devenport & Harris, 2010).

scholarly journals Corporate Governance Principles and Sustainability

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 13-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh Grove ◽  
Maclyn Clouse
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
21St Century ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Financial Analysts ◽  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
International Accounting Standards ◽  
Short Sellers ◽  
The U.S

With 21st century U.S. frauds destroying well over one trillion of market capitalization and now with Valeant’s 2016 market cap destruction of $86 billion, the question must again be asked: where were the gatekeepers (boards of directors, regulators, sell-side financial analysts, and auditors) to protect investors? Many of these frauds were caught only by short sellers, such as Jim Chanos (shorting Enron in 2000 and Valeant in 2014), Andrew Left (shorting Valeant in 2015), and buy-side financial analysts. Sir David Tweedy, the former chair of the International Accounting Standards Board, has commented: “The scandals that we have seen in recent years are often attributed to accounting although, in fact, I think the U.S. cases are corporate governance scandals involving fraud” (Tweedy, 2007). This paper is a case study using the Valeant $86 billion market cap destruction in 2016 to emphasize the timeless nature of such corporate governance scandals. This scandal was even larger than the infamous $78 billion market cap destruction scandal of Enron which occurred 15 years earlier in 2001. These scandals appear here to stay as the new normal so these gatekeepers should be doing everything they can to analyze the ongoing fraud problems. Accordingly, as a case study, this paper develops lessons learned from this $86 billion Valeant scandal to emphasize the importance of sustainable corporate governance principles as a pathway to avoid malpractices in the future.

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