State Neutrality

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerry O'Halloran
Keyword(s):  
2006 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeroen Temperman

AbstractThis article suggests a signicant correlation between the notions of state neutrality and religious freedom. The absence of a considerable degree of state neutrality has a detrimental effect on human rights compliance. Under states which identify themselves strongly with a single religious denomination as well as under states which identify themselves negatively in relation to religion, there is no scope for human rights compliance. Both extreme types of state–religion identication are characterised by repression of all beliefs and manifestations thereof which do not correspond with the state sanctioned view on belief. This may be either the upholding of a specic religious denomination or of militant ideological secularism. Consequently, discrimination and marginalisation rather than compliance with the norms of freedom of religion and the promotion of non-discrimination comprise policy and practice under these regimes. Intermediate forms of state–religion afliation, i.e. types of identication in which the state is not drenched with the excluding ideals of a single denomination or with anti-religious sentiments, allow for a degree of democratic inclusion of religious difference and of religious tolerance. The most substantial scope for full compliance, however, lies in the combination of democratic inclusion of people from different religions and the indispensable political commitment characterised as state neutrality with respect to all people. State neutrality refers to a regime of state–religion identi cation that can best be understood as 'accommodative non-partisanship'.


Author(s):  
Barak Medina

Abstract A central dilemma in human rights law is how to reconcile the government’s duty to respect freedom with its obligation to protect individuals that might be harmed by the exercise of said freedom. Intolerance toward the dissemination of certain illiberal positions may have adverse social and political unintended results. One central concern is that such a policy would create a common culture that does not appreciate the critical importance of a vibrant public discourse. As such, it might enable governments, in terms of popular legitimacy, to curtail speech beyond the limits of justifiable infringements. Recent developments in Israel illustrate this concern. In recent years, normatively legitimate antiracism legislation was unjustifiably expanded by imposing sanctions on expressions that were deemed harmful to national sentiments or questioning the legitimacy of Israel’s Constitutional Identity as a Jewish state. Similarly, laws against the support of terrorism were followed by prohibitions on advocating boycotts against Israel. This Article proposes to halt the sociological slippery-slope trend of curtailing speech far and beyond the permissible scope of such a policy, by implementing rules-based legal doctrines that may foster a stronger public pressure on the government to protect free speech; restricting the scope of “harm-in-one-step” approach; and providing a clearer definition of the requirement of state neutrality in the context of regulating speech.


Author(s):  
Benjamin L. Berger

Abstract Education—and particularly public education—has become a crucible for the relationship between state and religious diversity, a principal site for contemporary debates about the meaning of secularism and the management of religious difference. This is so across a variety of national traditions, and despite wide differences in the historical and “emotional inheritances” surrounding the configuration of law, politics, and religion. Through an exploration of Hannah Arendt’s thought about responsibility and freedom in education, this article works towards a better understanding of why education is such a crucial and fraught field in the modern encounter between religion and law. The article turns to the recent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada to draw out the implications of these ideas, arriving ultimately at a claim about the nature and limits of the concept of state neutrality.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 351-374 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel W. Watters

Critics of the Turkish interpretation of secularism,laiklik, describe it as authoritarian and repressive. Indeed, rather than establish state neutrality toward religion,laiklikhistorically entailed state control of Islam, the religion of the vast majority of the Turkish population, and the exclusion of religion from the public sphere in an effort to control religious belief and identity. Many, including leaders in the ruling AKP, assert, though, that recent reforms herald a move away from this model of control toward a secularism defined by state neutrality toward religion. To determine whether this transformation is actually occurring, I evaluate, based on Turkish language sources, the recent reforms under the AKP using the framework of the secularized state described by the German legal scholar Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde. Because of its significant role in implementing Turkish policies toward religion, I evaluate these reforms by analyzing developments in the programming and messaging of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) under the AKP. I find little evidence thatlaiklikis transitioning to a state neutrality toward religion. Rather, the AKP has coupled a greater presence of religion in the public sphere with expanding state authority in religious programming and messaging. Although these reforms reflect a transformation in Turkish nation-building policies, they maintain the state control of religion that separateslaiklikfrom neutral secularism.


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