Trump Administration Recertifies Iranian Compliance with JCPOA Notwithstanding Increasing Concern with Iranian Behavior

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (4) ◽  
pp. 1056-1062

In July 2015, Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and the European Union adopted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Pursuant to that agreement, Iran committed to limiting the scope and content of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from various nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the other signatories. By law, the U.S. State Department is required to certify Iran's compliance with the agreement every ninety days. The Trump administration first certified Iran's compliance with the agreement in April 2017, albeit reluctantly. In its first certification, the Trump administration expressed ongoing concern about Iran's sponsorship of terrorism, and repeated previous criticism of the JCPOA as “fail[ing] to achieve the objective of a non-nuclear Iran.”

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (3) ◽  
pp. 776-781

Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and the European Union agreed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to limit the scope and content of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from various nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the other signatories. Throughout his campaign, President Donald Trump denounced the JCPOA. He said that, if elected, he would “renegotiate with Iran—right after … enabl[ing] the immediate release of our American prisoners and ask[ing] Congress to impose new sanctions that stop Iran from having the ability to sponsor terrorism around the world.” So far, however, the Trump administration has kept the agreement in place. The United States has continued to acknowledge Iran's compliance with the terms of the JCPOA and has waived various sanctions against Iran in compliance with its own obligations thereunder. Iran, by contrast, has charged the United States with failing to live up to its own JCPOA commitments.


2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-195
Author(s):  
Michael D. Rosenthal

For many years, the United Nations Security Council expressed its concerns about the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear program, doing so in the context of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. With the intent to resolve its concerns, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2231 on July 20, 2015. The Resolution endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that had been concluded on July 14, 2015, by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, and Iran (the E3/EU + 3). Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA are closely intertwined. Their implementation will result in strict limits on Iran’s ability to produce weapongrade nuclear material. On-site verification and monitoring of these limits by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will provide assurance that Iran is observing them. Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA also provide for a step-by-step removal of sanctions imposed on Iran for its past failure to resolve concerns about its nuclear program. Past concerns about “possible military dimensions” to Iran’s nuclear program, while neither misplaced nor necessarily fully assuaged, were put aside, being outweighed by the prospect that the JCPOA offers, “a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.”


2021 ◽  
Vol 115 (1) ◽  
pp. 140-146

The United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on May 8, 2018, and subsequently reimposed a range of unilateral sanctions on Iran. Throughout mid-2020, the Trump administration sought multilateral support for renewed UN sanctions against Iran, but the Security Council rejected those efforts. In response, the administration moved to initiate snapback sanctions under the terms of the JCPOA and UN Security Council Resolution 2231. However, JCPOA participants and the Security Council largely rebuffed the administration's contention that it could activate the snapback mechanism, instead taking the position that U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA means that it is no longer a “participant state” as required to invoke snapback sanctions.


Author(s):  
Bantekas Ilias

This chapter examines Article 40 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which deals with the Conference of States Parties (COSP). The COSP is part of an established tradition whose principal aim is to keep the Convention alive by stimulating actions, collaborations, enforcement, capacity building, and others. The enforcement powers of the COSP are severely limited, if any, and should not therefore be compared to those enjoyed by entities with enforcement powers, such as the UN Security Council or the Council of the European Union. Although the powers and functions of the COSP could be achieved outside the legal person of the COSP on the basis of joint action by CRPD member states, the formal collectivization of member states ensures annual discussions on important and emerging issues affecting disability rights and contributes towards a consistency among a group of equal partners undertaking the same obligations.


Author(s):  
Tzanakopoulos Antonios

There are two principle sources of sanctions regimes applicable to the UK, this chapter shows: those of the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN). The chapter first looks at the EU regime. The EU operates thirty-eight different sanctions regimes as of May 2016. They are of two types: regimes designed to implement UN-mandated sanctions regimes; and the EU’s autonomous sanctions regimes. Current EU policy on sanctions has been continuously updated. As the EU Basic Principles make clear, the EU looks principally to the UN Security Council as the source of sanctions. The UK sanctions regimes, which give effect to UN sanctions regimes, are principally introduced for three purposes: to legislate in the absence of EU competence (for example to introduce financial sanctions against so-called ‘domestic’ terrorists); to give effect to EU regimes (for example to impose penalties for failure to comply with obligations introduced by means of an EU Regulation); and to introduce measures ahead of an EU regime (where by acting unilaterally, the UK can act more speedily) or even independently.


2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dr.Sc. Bejtush Gashi

Here we have studied the international circumstances that have affected the deployment of the EULEX Mission in Kosovo. The EULEX mission is the European Union Mission for the Rule of Law in Kosovo. Its main goal is to advise, assist and support the Kosovo authorities in issues of the rule of law, especially in the field of police, judiciary and customs performance. Also this mission has the responsibility to develop and further strengthen the independent multi-ethnic justice system in Kosovo, by ensuring that the rule of law institutions are not politically influenced and that they meet the known international standards and best European practices. This mission was foreseen to be deployed to Kosovo, based on the Ahtissari Comprehensive Status Proposal for Kosovo, but due to its non-approval by the UN Security Council, its full implementation was delayed until December 2008. EULEX acts within the framework of Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council and under a single chain of command in Brussels. EULEX officials have supported Kosovo Police, the Judiciary system and Kosovo Customs, through MMA actions for achieving objectives and goals that are foreseen by the program strategy of EULEX. But in terms of efficiency, EULEX has only achieved modest results. In the northern part of Kosovo, EULEX has failed, as a result of its ambivalent mandate and incoherence of EU Foreign and Security Policy.


Author(s):  
Tzanakopoulos Antonios

This chapter examines the European Union (EU) from the perspective of public international law. Financial crime, this chapter argues, is an international phenomenon that requires international solutions. This recognition has resulted in states cooperating on a number of different levels in order to streamline their responses to international financial crime. This chapter deals with the EU in two guises: as an independent source of international obligation for its member states, imposing discreet international obligations on them, which may even function so as to turn non-binding recommendations of international bodies into hard law, and as a peculiar entity interposing itself between international obligations from other sources (such as international treaties or UN Security Council binding resolutions) and domestic implementation of these obligations. The fact that some EU law has a more remote international source (such as a UN Security Council Resolution) may affect the degree and nature of the judicial scrutiny to which this body of law may be subject. The chapter looks first at sanctions and next at money laundering, both from the perspective of the EU.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-264
Author(s):  
Christopher Valerio Jovan

Abstract In 2015, Iran with the P5 + 1 countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, Britain and the United States, as well as the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) agreed on a JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) which deals with Iran's nuclear program. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 2015 (JCPOA) is a controversial agreement. First, the JCPOA's status in international law is debated and is not considered as an international treaty. In the midst of the uncertainty over the status of the JCPOA, on May 8 2018, the United States unilaterally declared that it was withdrawing from the JCPOA. Even though the JCPOA has been endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). Thus, other JCPOA participating countries view the withdrawal of the United States as an act that is against international law. This article aims to determine whether the JCPOA is an international treaty and whether the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA is justified under international law. Keywords: JCPOA, UN Security Council Resolution, Withdrawal   Abstrak Pada tahun 2015, Iran dengan negara-negara P5+1 (China, Prancis, Jerman, Rusia, Inggris dan Amerika Serikat, serta Perwakilan Tinggi Uni Eropa untuk Urusan Luar Negeri dan Kebijakan Keamanan) menyepakati JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) mengenai pembatasan program nuklir Iran. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 2015 (JCPOA) merupakan perjanjian yang mengundang kontroversi. Pertama, status JCPOA mendapat perdebatan karena dianggap bukan perjanjian internasional. Kemudian pada 8 Mei 2018, Amerika Serikat secara sepihak menyatakan menarik diri dari JCPOA. Padahal JCPOA telah dimasukkan ke dalam Resolusi Dewan Keamanan PBB 2231 (2015). Sehingga peserta JCPOA lainnya menganggap tindakan Amerika Serikat sebagai perbuatan yang bertentangan dengan hukum internasional. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui apakah JCPOA merupakan suatu perjanjian internasional dan apakah penarikan diri Amerika Serikat dari JCPOA dapat dibenarkan berdasarkan hukum internasional. Kata kunci: JCPOA, Penarikan Diri, Resolusi Dewan Keamanan PBB


2020 ◽  
Vol 254 ◽  
pp. R54-R66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Dullien ◽  
Sabine Stephan ◽  
Thomas Theobald

Under the Trump administration, a transatlantic trade conflict has been escalating step by step. First, it was about tariffs on steel and aluminium, then about retaliation for the French digital tax, which is suspended until the end of the year. Most recently, the US administration threatened the European Union with tariffs on cars and car parts because of Canadian seafood being subject to lower import duties. As simulations with NiGEM show, a further escalation of the transatlantic trade conflict has the potential to slow down economic growth significantly in the countries involved. This is a considerable risk given the fact that the countries have to cope with the enormous negative effects of the pandemic shock. Furthermore, the damage caused by the trade conflict depends on the extent to which the affected countries use fiscal policy to stabilise their economies.


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