United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 & Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-195
Author(s):  
Michael D. Rosenthal
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Proper Solution ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Energy Agency ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Comprehensive Plan ◽  
The United Nations

For many years, the United Nations Security Council expressed its concerns about the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear program, doing so in the context of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. With the intent to resolve its concerns, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2231 on July 20, 2015. The Resolution endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that had been concluded on July 14, 2015, by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, and Iran (the E3/EU + 3). Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA are closely intertwined. Their implementation will result in strict limits on Iran’s ability to produce weapongrade nuclear material. On-site verification and monitoring of these limits by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will provide assurance that Iran is observing them. Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA also provide for a step-by-step removal of sanctions imposed on Iran for its past failure to resolve concerns about its nuclear program. Past concerns about “possible military dimensions” to Iran’s nuclear program, while neither misplaced nor necessarily fully assuaged, were put aside, being outweighed by the prospect that the JCPOA offers, “a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.”

scholarly journals States, firms, and security: How private actors implement sanctions, lessons learned from the Netherlands

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Francesco Giumelli ◽  
Michal Onderco
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
United Nations ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
For Profit ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Private Actors

Abstract While the current practice of the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and the United States leans towards imposing only targeted sanctions in most of the cases, private actors often complain about inability to process financial transactions, ship goods, or deliver services in countries where sanctions targets are located. The impact of sanctions often ends up being widespread and indiscriminate because sanctions are implemented by for-profit actors. This article investigates how for-profit actors relate to the imposition of sanctions, how they reflect them in their decisions, and how they interact with the public authorities. The findings of our research show that for-profit actors, with the possible exception of the largest multinationals, do not engage with public authorities before the imposition of sanctions. The behaviour of for-profit actors in the implementation phase is in line with the assumption of firms and business as profit-maximisers. Weighting the profits from business against the costs of (non-)compliance and make the decisions that in their view maximise their profit. Indeed, de-risking seems to be the most common approach by the companies due to the uncertainties produced by the multiple and overlapping sanctions regimes imposed by the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States.

Estados Unidos-Brasil: da transição de presidentes à diferença de atuação na América Latina

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Virgílio Caixeta Arraes
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Sporting Events ◽  
Final Phase ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
America Latina

The article deals with the final phase of Lula da Silva’s foreign policy toward the United States (2009-2010). The topics dealt with are Dilma Rousseff’s candidacy to the Brazilian presidency; the Brazilian borders considering US presence in Colombia; Brazil’s permanent membership to the United Nations Security Council; hosting of international sporting events under the auspices of ‘playful diplomacy’; attempt to reach a diplomatic understanding of Iran’s nuclear program and Haiti’s earthquake.

scholarly journals National Identity and New Zealand’s Actions on the United Nations Security Council: 1993-94 and 2015-16

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Kate Breach
Keyword(s):  
National Identity ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
International Relations ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Political Elite ◽  
Material Interests ◽  
The United Nations

<p>To win its seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in both 1993-94 and 2015-16, New Zealand campaigned using the same prime pillar; its ability to act independently on the world’s prime authority for maintenance of international peace and security. With the substantial change in New Zealand’s international relationships between the two UNSC tenures, most particularly with the United States of America and China, many commentators have questioned whether New Zealand still acts independently in international affairs. Employing analytic eclecticism, this thesis applied a combined analytical framework to assess the drive behind New Zealand’s actions during both its 1993-94 and 2015-16 UNSC tenures, allowing both traditional international relations theories of neo-realism and neo-liberalism and the constructivist lens of national identity to be combined for greater explanatory power for the state’s actions in the contemporary era of complex international interdependencies. This research determined that most of New Zealand’s actions aligned with pursuit of its interests, as a small state, as ensured through multilateralism under the lens of institutional neo-liberalism. However, a number of actions taken, and strong positions held, by New Zealand on the UNSC in both periods did not align with the state’s pursuit of material interests under traditional international relations theories. By first establishing the popularly internalised national identity characteristics (or content) during each UNSC tenure period, defined as residing in public opinion, this thesis argues that a ‘win-set’ of national identity content relative prioritisation during each period enabled, and arguably drove, New Zealand’s political elite to take actions or hold positions not aligned with those of powerful states on which the small country’s material interests depended. It is argued that New Zealand’s actions on the UNSC in 2015-16 reinforced the social construction of New Zealand’s internationally regarded national identity content as an independent advocate for the global good, which was strongly established during its 1993-94 tenure.</p>

scholarly journals Overcoming Opposition at the UNSC: Regional Multilateralism as a Form of Collective Pressure

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-281
Author(s):  
Stefano Recchia
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Iraq War ◽  
Democratic Republic ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Republic Of The Congo ◽  
The United Nations

Abstract Research suggests that military interveners often seek endorsements from regional international organizations (IOs), in addition to approval from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to reassure international and domestic audiences. Toward that end, interveners should seek the endorsement of continent-wide regional IOs with the broadest and most diverse membership, which are most likely to be independent. In practice, however, interveners often seek endorsements from subregional IOs with narrow membership and aggregate preferences similar to their own. This should weaken the reassurance/legitimation effect significantly. I argue that such narrower regional endorsements are sought not so much to reassure skeptical audiences, as to pressure reluctant UNSC members to approve the intervention by putting those members’ relations with regional partners at stake. To illustrate this argument and probe its plausibility, I reconstruct France's successful efforts to obtain UNSC approval for its interventions in Côte d'Ivoire (2002–2003) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2003) at a time when the United States was hesitant to support France because of the two countries’ falling-out over the Iraq War. For evidence I rely on original interviews with senior French and US officials.

Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy

1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 516-535 ◽  
Author(s):  
Burns H. Weston
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Military Force ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Rule Making

In his recent book The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, Thomas Franck defines “legitimacy” as it applies to the rules applicable among states. “Legitimacy,” he writes, “is a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.In adopting Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990, implicitly authorizing the use of force against Iraq in response to Iraq’s August 2, 1990 invasion and subsequent occupation of Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council made light of fundamental UN Charter precepts and thereby flirted precariously with “generally accepted principles of right process.” It eschewed direct UN responsibility and accountability for the military force that ultimately was deployed, favoring, instead, a delegated, essentially unilateralist determination and orchestration of world policy, coordinated and controlled almost exclusively by the United States. And, in so doing, it encouraged a too-hasty retreat from the preeminently peaceful and humanitarian purposes and principles of the United Nations. As a consequence, it set a dubious precedent, both for the United Nations as it stands today and for the “new world order” that is claimed for tomorrow.

scholarly journals National Identity and New Zealand’s Actions on the United Nations Security Council: 1993-94 and 2015-16

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Kate Breach
Keyword(s):  
National Identity ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
International Relations ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Political Elite ◽  
Material Interests ◽  
The United Nations

<p>To win its seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in both 1993-94 and 2015-16, New Zealand campaigned using the same prime pillar; its ability to act independently on the world’s prime authority for maintenance of international peace and security. With the substantial change in New Zealand’s international relationships between the two UNSC tenures, most particularly with the United States of America and China, many commentators have questioned whether New Zealand still acts independently in international affairs. Employing analytic eclecticism, this thesis applied a combined analytical framework to assess the drive behind New Zealand’s actions during both its 1993-94 and 2015-16 UNSC tenures, allowing both traditional international relations theories of neo-realism and neo-liberalism and the constructivist lens of national identity to be combined for greater explanatory power for the state’s actions in the contemporary era of complex international interdependencies. This research determined that most of New Zealand’s actions aligned with pursuit of its interests, as a small state, as ensured through multilateralism under the lens of institutional neo-liberalism. However, a number of actions taken, and strong positions held, by New Zealand on the UNSC in both periods did not align with the state’s pursuit of material interests under traditional international relations theories. By first establishing the popularly internalised national identity characteristics (or content) during each UNSC tenure period, defined as residing in public opinion, this thesis argues that a ‘win-set’ of national identity content relative prioritisation during each period enabled, and arguably drove, New Zealand’s political elite to take actions or hold positions not aligned with those of powerful states on which the small country’s material interests depended. It is argued that New Zealand’s actions on the UNSC in 2015-16 reinforced the social construction of New Zealand’s internationally regarded national identity content as an independent advocate for the global good, which was strongly established during its 1993-94 tenure.</p>

scholarly journals Pengapusan Hak Veto Dalam Rangka Reformasi Dewan Keamanan Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 210-234
Author(s):  
Dewi Afrilianti ◽  
Budi Ardianto ◽  
Dony Yusra Pebrianto
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Research Method ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
National Interests ◽  
Original Intent ◽  
Permanent Member ◽  
The United Nations

This study aims to find out what is the reason the veto is considered irrelevant to the Security Council in realizing world security and peace in connection with the plan of veto power in the framework of reform of the United Nations Security Council because the use of veto rights by the five permanent member states of the Security Council, especially the United States has been used with no limits. The research method used is normative type with statutory, conceptual, and case approach. The results of this study show that the security council's veto power in practice has deviated from its original intent. The reform efforts of the United Nations Security Council have many obstacles but the main obstacles that greatly hinder the reform efforts are the arrogant, selfish, and willless nature of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council who are veto holders to continue to maintain their hegemony and national interests. Keywords:  United Nations; Right; Veto;

scholarly journals Introduction

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 275-277
Author(s):  
Joy Gordon
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
United Nations ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Political Regime ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Weapons Proliferation ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Political Interests ◽  
The United Nations

It is hard to imagine a threat to international security or a tension within U.S. foreign policy that does not involve the imposition of economic sanctions. The United Nations Security Council has fourteen sanctions regimes currently in place, and all member states of the United Nations are obligated to participate in their enforcement. The United States has some thirty sanctions programs, which target a range of countries, companies, organizations, and individuals, and many of these are autonomous sanctions that are independent of the measures required by the United Nations. Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and others also have autonomous sanctions regimes, spanning a broad range of contexts and purpose. Most well-known are those concerning weapons proliferation, terrorism, and human rights violations; but sanctions are also imposed in such contexts as money laundering, corruption, and drug trafficking. States may also impose sanctions as a means to achieve foreign policy goals: to pressure a foreign state to bend to the sanctioner's will, to punish those who represent a threat to the sanctioner's economic or political interests, or to seek the end of a political regime toward which the sanctioner is hostile, to give but a few examples.

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