scholarly journals United States Joins with Allies, Including NATO, to Attribute Malicious Cyber Activities to China

2021 ◽  
Vol 115 (4) ◽  
pp. 715-721

In July, the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and other allies attributed a variety of malicious cyber activities, including the Microsoft Exchange hack, to China. This joint attribution builds on commitments made in June summits with NATO, the G7, the EU, and the United Kingdom, and is consistent with the Biden administration's multilateral approach to confronting cybersecurity threats and China more generally. Still, critics question whether the administration's efforts will succeed in altering the behavior of states that pose cybersecurity threats to the United States.

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-14
Author(s):  
Donald L. Buresh

This paper evaluates the effect of the Estonian cyber incident on Estonia, Russia, the United States, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, also known as NATO. The paper employs the Valeriano and Maness criteria for evaluating a cyber incident critically. The article asks how did the Estonian cyber incident come to pass, what were the foreign policy and international relationship effects, what was the impact on Estonia, and how did Estonia react to the attack. The essay concludes that the Estonian cyber incident was a catalyst, prompting the nations listed herein to address the effects of cyber-attacks, and then search for acceptable solutions.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 825-832

With the development of certain administrative frictions (concerning coal quotas, occupation costs, and the scrap metal treaty) between the western occupying powers and the German Federal Republic, early indications were that if the talk of “contractual agreements” did materialize it would reserve, for the occupying powers, wide controls over important areas of west Germany's internal and external affairs. In Washington, however, a general modification of approach was noted during the September discussions between the United States Secretary of State (Acheson), the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary (Morrison), and the French Foreign Minister (Schuman), preparatory to the Ottawa meetings of the North Atlantic Council.


Author(s):  
Janusz Bugajski

The term Western Balkan is both geographic and political. It was initially employed by US and European policymakers to describe the part of the Balkan Peninsula that remained outside of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) since the early 1990s. It included all seven states that were formed during the collapse of Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia) together with Albania, which was emerging from international isolation. During the 1990s, several of these emerging countries had experienced wars generated by nationalist politicians to establish “ethnically pure” territories and to restore or enlarge national statehood during the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Following the EU’s Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003, commitments were made to include all the Western Balkan states in the European Union, and since that time Slovenia (in 2004) and Croatia (in 2013) have become EU members. NATO also underscored its commitments to integrating the region, and Slovenia (in 2004), Croatia (in 2009), Albania (in 2009), and Montenegro (in 2017) all entered the alliance. The remaining states have experienced persistent problems in qualifying for EU and NATO entry. In many cases, reforms remain incomplete and some states confront prolonged disputes over governmental powers, administrative borders, and even their sovereign status. Incomplete, conflicted, or contested states present serious challenges for the region’s institutional absorption into both NATO and the EU.


World Affairs ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 183 (3) ◽  
pp. 256-269
Author(s):  
Pavlo Klimkin ◽  
Andreas Umland

Among various geopolitical repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic are redefinitions of the short-term priorities of many international organizations. Among others, the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are becoming absorbed by new internal challenges, and are thus even less interested in further enlargement than before. Against this background, Kyiv, Tbilisi, and Chisinau, as well as their Western friends, need to seek new paths to increase the three countries’ security, resilience, and growth before their accession to the West’s major organizations. Above all, an alternative way to decrease Ukraine’s current institutional isolation is to develop more intense bilateral relations with friendly states across the globe, including Germany and the United States. In Eastern Europe, moreover, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova should attempt to create new multilateral networks with post-communist member countries of NATO as well as the EU, and try to become part of such structures as the Three Seas Initiative or Bucharest Nine group.


1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 362-369

The Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;Being parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed at Washington on April 4, 1949;Considering their reciprocal pledges under Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty separately and jointly with the other parties, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack;


Author(s):  
Thorkild Kjærgaard

Thorkild Kjærgaard: The Peace in Kiel, Greenland, and the North Atlantic, 1814–2014 At the peace conference in Kiel (North Germany) in January 1814, the Danish-Norwegian North Atlantic Empire that controlled an enormous area of land and water, including not only Denmark (with Schleswig-Holstein) and Norway but also Iceland, the Faroe Islands and the huge, thinly populated ice-covered island of Greenland, was dissolved by the victorious powers of the Napoleonic wars. Norway was given to Sweden as compensation for Finland, which Sweden — now in the victorious coalition — had lost to Russia in 1809. Rather surprisingly, the Kingdom of Denmark — now, without Norway, Europe’s smallest independent country — was entrusted with Greenland, Iceland and the Faroe Islands, although these three North Atlantic areas since early medieval times had been a part of the Kingdom of Norway. Without question, this was a major historical injustice. For Denmark, the outcome of the 1814 conference in Kiel was twofold: it was reduced to a very small country and it became — and still is — a polar nation, which it had not been before. The article discusses three aspects of this complex. Firstly: What happened in Kiel? Why were the three North Atlantic territories taken from Norway and given to Denmark? Was it, as it has been claimed by a majority of historians, the merit of sly Danish diplomats or was it — as the author believes — the will of the United Kingdom that was imposed on two small countries, Sweden and Denmark? Secondly, it is discussed how Denmark dealt with its new role as a polar nation. It turns out that Denmark initially was a rather hesitant, not to say, unwilling polar nation. Gradually, however, the extraordinary qualities of the North Atlantic islands, especially Greenland, were recognized. Since the end of the 19th century, Greenland has been a major subject of Danish art and literature, just as it has been a decisive dimension of Danish scientific research. The last section of the article deals with the significance of Greenland for Danish security and foreign policy. It is shown how the suffocating dependency on Great Britain after 1814 gradually was reduced thanks to a rapprochement to the new world power, the United States, which very early on showed interest in Greenland, which is, geographically, a part of the North American continent. The close alliance with the United States has saved Greenland for Denmark, just as it has been extremely helpful for Denmark in number of critical situations since 1814, but it also has its price. The price is that Denmark always follows US and never questions US actions. Relatively, Denmark, one of President Bush’s “willing nations,” has had more casualties on the American battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan than any other of the United States’ allied nations. The Danish soldiers who have been killed on Middle East or Central Asiatic battlefields since 2001 have died for Greenland.


Author(s):  
MARKO MAHNIČ

Povzetek Namen članka je spodbuditi razmislek o tem, ali so ovire za skladno delovanje Evropske unije in Organizacije severnoatlantske pogodbe na področju skupne varnosti in obrambe le tehnične narave ali gre za razlike na nekaterih drugih ravneh v politiki, dvostranskih odnosih in nacionalnih ambicijah nekaterih držav, ki so članice ene ali druge organizacije. V obeh primerih se postavlja vprašanje, ali lahko Slovenija kot država, ki 1. julija 2021 prevzame predsedovanje Svetu Evropske unije, v šestih mesecih predsedovanja prispeva k premostitvi kakšne izmed teh ovir. Ključne besede EU, Nato, Slovenija, predsedovanje Svetu EU. Abstract The aim of this article is to entice the reader to consider whether the obstacles in the way of cohesion between the European Union’s common security and defence efforts and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Organization are truly of a technical nature, or whether there are differences on other levels, in the politics, bilateral relations and national ambitions of certain members of the same organization? Whatever the case may be, the question before us is whether Slovenia can contribute to surmounting any of these obstacles during its six-month presidency of the Council of the European Union, starting on 1st July. Key words EU, NATO, Slovenia, Presidency of the Council of the EU.


Politeja ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (6(75)) ◽  
pp. 51-74
Author(s):  
Józef Fiszer

The study is devoted to Poland’s accession to NATO and the European Union (EU) and describes Germany’s stance on Poland’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations after 1989, which, despite various assessments, was not explicit and enthusiastic. However, it evolved gradually and was determined by a difficult internal situation after the reunification of Germany and its new geopolitics and geoeconomics. For Germany that reunified on 3 October 1990, an issue of greater importance than Polish accession to NATO and the EU was the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of the former GDR and normalization of relations with neighbors, particularly with France, Poland, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Both France and the United Kingdom, as well as the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent, the United States initially were afraid of a reunified Germany and opposed Polish membership in Euro-Atlantic structures. At the time, hopes and fears were rife about the future of Europe. A common question was being asked in Paris, London, Moscow, Washington, and Warsaw – would reunified Germany remain a European state, or would Europe become German? Should Germany stay in NATO or leave after the reunification? There were questions also about Moscow’s policy towards reunified Germany and its position on Poland’s accession to Euro-Atlantic structures. Unfortunately, for a long time, it was negative. Today, thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany, we can see that the black scenarios that were outlined in 1989-1990 did not actually come true. Despite the fears, those events opened the way for Poland to “return to Europe” and to gain membership in Euro-Atlantic structures, i.e., NATO and the European Union (EU). The path was not at all simple and it was not easy for Poland to make it through. In the study the author analyses subjective and objective difficulties related to Poland's accession to NATO and the EU and describes the evolution and role of Germany in this process.


1991 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 333-335
Author(s):  
N. Ward

In 1987 a special meeting of IALA held at Trinity House in London expressed a common purpose to enhance and expand existing Loran-C coverage in North-West Europe and the North Atlantic. After two years of negotiation, agreement was finally reached in January of this year to proceed with the project. The countries involved are Canada, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom, with cooperation from the United States and Denmark. They will re-equip six existing United States Coast Guard stations and use two French stations together with four new transmitters to provide four chains, covering the whole of NW Europe and most of the North Atlantic.


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 363-365

On April 4, 1949 the North Atlantic security alliance treaty was signed in Washington by representatives of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. When ratified by Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the treaty would come into force.


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