Punitive Processes? Judging in Thai Lower Criminal Courts

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Duncan McCARGO

Abstract This article examines how Thai courts of the first instance deal with run-of-the-mill criminal cases. How do judges deal with criminal trials of a rather routine nature, often involving defendants from ethnic minorities and reflecting the particular conditions in the provinces concerned? Drawing on participant observation and interview research conducted mainly in two provinces in different regions of the country, the article examines the challenges faced by judges and court officials in dealing with heavy caseloads in a highly bureaucratized system where acquittal rates are extremely low. How far do such cases shed light on how judging is carried out in the majority of Thai courts? What kind of challenges do Thai judges face in adjudicating minor but often messy cases in order to fulfil societal expectations in line with their own understandings of justice?

2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-99
Author(s):  
Zhiyuan Guo

Psychiatric evaluation is widely used in criminal cases to screen people with mental disorder because insanity can either exempt the offender from criminal responsibility or mitigate his/her criminal punishment. The operation of psychiatric evaluation in China used to carry a typical characteristic of civil law tradition, but recent reforms have strengthened the procedural safeguards for psychiatric evaluation and stressed the requirement of its presentation and examination in criminal trials. This article will explore how psychiatric evaluation is conducted, and how the expert opinion is presented and examined as evidence in criminal trials in China. Part I will give a historical overview of psychiatric evaluation in China's criminal cases. Part II will introduce the current legislation on psychiatric evaluation in China. Part III will explore problems with current legislation and practice. In this part, high-profile cases will be cited to illustrate loopholes in the psychiatric evaluation law and practical problems with the operation of evaluation. Potential solutions to these loopholes or problems will also be explored. Part IV will focus on the presentation and examination of psychiatrists’ expert opinion in criminal trials. Although expert witnesses are also required to testify before the court in China, very few of them take the stand in practice. This part will discuss why reforms kept failing and what should be done to bring expert witnesses to court. Psychiatrists are important expert witnesses; the discussion of live psychiatrists will shed light on the appearance of all the expert witnesses in Chinese criminal trials.


Author(s):  
Ochilov Samariddin Kamoliddinovich ◽  

This scientific article is intended to shed light on the theoretical aspects of the prevention of offenses of persons on probation, to identify existing problems in this area and to develop scientific and theoretical proposals for their solution. The legal foundations and scientific and theoretical description of probation, social significance, the circle of persons subject to probation, prevention of offenses of those sentenced to imprisonment, mitigation of punishment, parole. The indicators of criminal cases considered by the country's criminal courts, the number and types of crimes committed by convicts, their causes, statistics of persons released from places of detention and replaced by milder sentences have been studied. In order to increase the effectiveness of the prevention of offenses by persons on probation, the need to study the social status of a person undergoing probation, identify and eliminate his mental and physical problems is emphasized.


Why did Roman prosecutors typically accuse the defendant of multiple crimina, when in most standing criminal courts the punishment imposed on a guilty defendant was the same (typically “capital,” that is, a kind of exile), no matter how many charges were proven? The answer lies not in a failure to distinguish between legal charges leveled at the defendant and defamation of his character, but rather in a rhetorical strategy that made sense in light of what was legally necessary to obtain a conviction. The greater the number of charges, the more likely the jurors would be persuaded that the defendant had in some way violated the statute according to which the trial was being conducted. It is true that prosecutors typically argued that the defendant’s prior conduct made it plausible that he had committed the crimes with which he was charged, but in a way that, as much as possible, made his guilt on these particular charges seem likely, and defense patroni attempted to undermine the charges and the character defamation. This answer to the apparent contradiction between multiple charges and unitary punishment favors a moderate formalism over legal realism as the way to interpret Roman criminal trials.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
George P. Fletcher

This engaging and accessible book focuses on high-profile criminal trials and examines the strategy of the lawyers, the reasons for conviction or acquittal, as well as the social importance of these famous cases.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Armin Alimardani ◽  
Jason Chin

Recent research has detailed the use of neuroscience in several jurisdictions, but Australia remains a notable omission. To fill this substantial void we performed a systematic review of neuroscience in Australian criminal cases. The first section of this article reports the results of our review by detailing the purposes for which neuroscience is admitted into Australian criminal courts. We found that neuroscience is being admitted pre-trial (as evidence of fitness to stand trial), at trial (to support the defence of insanity and substantial impairment of the mind), and during sentencing. In the second section, we evaluate these applications. We generally found that courts admit neuroscience cautiously, and to supplement more well-established forms of evidence. Still, we found some instances in which the court seemed to misunderstand the neuroscience. These cases ranged from interpreting neuroscience as “objective” evidence to admitting neuroscience when the same non-neuroscientific psychiatric evidence would be inadmissible for being common sense. Furthermore, in some cases, neuroscientific evidence presents a double-edged sword; it may serve to either aggravate or mitigate a sentence. Thus, the decision about whether or not to tender this evidence is risky.


Bioethica ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Γεωργία-Μάρθα Γκότση (Georgia-Martha Gkotsi)

In recent years, an explosion of interest in neuroscience has led to the development of "Neuro-law," a new multidisciplinary field of knowledge whose aim is to examine the impact and role of neuroscientific findings in legal proceedings. Neuroscientific evidence is increasingly being used in US and European courts in criminal trials, as part of psychiatric testimony, nourishing the debate about the legal implications of brain research in psychiatric-legal settings.In this paper, we aim to examine the impact of Neuroscientific evidence in the assessment of criminal responsibility. We start with a brief historical survey of the relation between brain sciences and criminal law. We then present two criminal cases in the context of which neuroimaging techniques were introduced as evidence of diminished responsibility or irresponsibility and continue with a presentation of some significant limitations and difficulties that neuroscience faces in the assessment of penal responsibility. These limitations are scientific, legal but also of philosophical and conceptual nature.We conclude that addressing moral or legal responsibility might depend on scientific data, but requires entry to very different conceptual domains. The legal system cannot delegate to another field, scientific or otherwise, the ascription of legal meaning. Neuroscientific data, however accurate and reliable they may become in the future, cannot contribute to the assessment of criminal responsibility, unless they are contextualised and completed -or even confronted- with data collected on other levels of analysis, in particular on a psychological, anamnestic, sociological and economic level. Neurosciences, as sciences, can offer functioning and biological models of behaviours, while the assignment of responsibility is a normative issue. Although neuroscientific evidence can provide assistance in the evaluation of penal responsibility by introducing new determinisms in the behavioural analysis of offenders with mental disturbances, it does not dispense with the need to define the limits of responsibility and irresponsibility of the accused. This analysis, while it needs to take account of social, moral and political factors - in addition to elements contributed by experts - ultimately belongs to the legal sphere.


2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elaine Freer

Much academic literature explores the reliability of expert evidence in criminal proceedings in England and Wales. However, almost no attention has been paid to misconduct by experts giving evidence in criminal cases. Whilst rare, its serious impact on the administration of justice and public trust in it means that this area requires analysis. This article explores possible responses to expert witness misconduct occurring in the context of criminal proceedings in England and Wales, noting particularly the differences in responses available, depending firstly upon whether the expert is a registered professional, and secondly whether the expert has stepped outside of their expertise; did not have relevant expertise at all, or was dishonest. Professional disciplinary procedures focus on ‘fitness to practise’, and it is argued that this is sufficient where a registered professional has overstepped their expertise, but has not displayed mala fides. On the contrary, where someone gives evidence purporting to have expertise that they do not, or lies about their conduct as an expert in the case, criminal sanctions are available, appropriate, and should be used. These include contempt of court; perverting the course of justice; fraud by false representation, and perjury.


2020 ◽  
Vol 68 (5) ◽  
pp. 701-718
Author(s):  
Melinda Vandenbeld Giles

Given the precarity and mobility of neoliberalism, there has been increasing interest into constructs of ‘home’. In this article, the author defines ‘home’ as an active and relational process encompassing interactions between materiality and immateriality. Participant observation research conducted amongst shelter families in Toronto, Canada, living in motels can shed light on some of these larger global conversations about what ‘home’ is, and particularly, what it is not. These motels are utilized as part of the City of Toronto Shelter, Support and Housing Administration providing free shelter to impoverished families in need. Social workers, shelter managers and local faith group volunteers assert that the motels should be considered ‘home’ and the problem is that the women living in the motels with their children treat the physical space as transitory. In contrast, the women assert that the motel space is not a home and can never be made into one. The author argues that for these women, there are three critical elements missing in the motel: control over space, safety/security and privacy. The assertion that the motel space is not a home is a significant form of resistance to the regulatory bureaucratic structuring of daily life. However, despite this absence of home, the women feel strong identification as mothers and have formed systems of informal shared networks. This research helps to further illuminate not only our understandings of ‘home’, but also deepen and complicate normative associations equating ‘home’ with physical structure, domesticity and family.


1997 ◽  
Vol 31 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 612-644
Author(s):  
Kenneth Mann

In modern criminal procedure it is generally held that reliability of results and basic fairness in criminal trials require that a defendant have legal counsel. Prevention of miscarriage of justice is tied closely, in the minds of policy makers and judges, with vigorous representation by competent counsel. As against these presuppositions how should one understand a modern system of criminal procedure, such as that in Israel, that does not have a broad right of representation for suspects or defendants in criminal cases?It is by now axiomatic in England and the United States that nearly all defendants in criminal cases have a right to representation. This right encompasses not just the opportunity to bring one's privately retained counsel to court, but also an irrebuttable claim by indigents to have the counsel's bill paid by the state or other public entity. The right to counsel is a broad right, entailing a principle of equality in which representation by counsel is independent of the defendant's ability to pay. In Israel, in contrast, the right to representation in criminal cases is significantly narrower.


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