scholarly journals NOMINALISTIC ORDINALS, RECURSION ON HIGHER TYPES, AND FINITISM

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-124
Author(s):  
MARIA HÄMEEN-ANTTILA
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Peano Arithmetic ◽  
Transfinite Induction ◽  
Main Difficulty ◽  
Historical Account ◽  
David Hilbert ◽  
Higher Types ◽  
Transfinite Recursion ◽  
The Continuum

AbstractIn 1936, Gerhard Gentzen published a proof of consistency for Peano Arithmetic using transfinite induction up to ε0, which was considered a finitistically acceptable procedure by both Gentzen and Paul Bernays. Gentzen’s method of arithmetising ordinals and thus avoiding the Platonistic metaphysics of set theory traces back to the 1920s, when Bernays and David Hilbert used the method for an attempted proof of the Continuum Hypothesis. The idea that recursion on higher types could be used to simulate the limit-building in transfinite recursion seems to originate from Bernays. The main difficulty, which was already discovered in Gabriel Sudan’s nearly forgotten paper of 1927, was that measuring transfinite ordinals requires stronger methods than representing them. This paper presents a historical account of the idea of nominalistic ordinals in the context of the Hilbert Programme as well as Gentzen and Bernays’ finitary interpretation of transfinite induction.

TRANSFINITE NUMBERS IN PARACONSISTENT SET THEORY

2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
ZACH WEBER
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Paraconsistent Logic ◽  
Peano Arithmetic ◽  
Large Cardinals ◽  
Cardinal Numbers ◽  
Naive Set Theory ◽  
Cantor’S Theorem ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice ◽  
The Continuum

This paper begins an axiomatic development of naive set theory—the consequences of a full comprehension principle—in a paraconsistent logic. Results divide into two sorts. There is classical recapture, where the main theorems of ordinal and Peano arithmetic are proved, showing that naive set theory can provide a foundation for standard mathematics. Then there are major extensions, including proofs of the famous paradoxes and the axiom of choice (in the form of the well-ordering principle). At the end I indicate how later developments of cardinal numbers will lead to Cantor’s theorem, the existence of large cardinals, and a counterexample to the continuum hypothesis.

Set theoretic properties of Loeb measure

1990 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 1022-1036 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnold W. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Measure Zero ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Zero Set ◽  
Zero Sets ◽  
Martin’S Axiom ◽  
Basic Set ◽  
Nonstandard Models ◽  
The Continuum

AbstractIn this paper we ask the question: to what extent do basic set theoretic properties of Loeb measure depend on the nonstandard universe and on properties of the model of set theory in which it lies? We show that, assuming Martin's axiom and κ-saturation, the smallest cover by Loeb measure zero sets must have cardinality less than κ. In contrast to this we show that the additivity of Loeb measure cannot be greater than ω1. Define cof(H) as the smallest cardinality of a family of Loeb measure zero sets which cover every other Loeb measure zero set. We show that card(⌊log2(H)⌋) ≤ cof (H) ≤ card(2H), where card is the external cardinality. We answer a question of Paris and Mills concerning cuts in nonstandard models of number theory. We also present a pair of nonstandard universes M ≼ N and hyperfinite integer H ∈ M such that H is not enlarged by N, 2H contains new elements, but every new subset of H has Loeb measure zero. We show that it is consistent that there exists a Sierpiński set in the reals but no Loeb-Sierpiński set in any nonstandard universe. We also show that it is consistent with the failure of the continuum hypothesis that Loeb-Sierpiński sets can exist in some nonstandard universes and even in an ultrapower of a standard universe.

Forcing for the impredicative theory of classes

1972 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rolando Chuaqui
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Reflection Principle ◽  
Inaccessible Cardinal ◽  
Consistency Proof ◽  
Suitable Form ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Class Construction ◽  
The Continuum

The purpose of this work is to formulate a general theory of forcing with classes and to solve some of the consistency and independence problems for the impredicative theory of classes, that is, the set theory that uses the full schema of class construction, including formulas with quantification over proper classes. This theory is in principle due to A. Morse [9]. The version I am using is based on axioms by A. Tarski and is essentially the same as that presented in [6, pp. 250–281] and [10, pp. 2–11]. For a detailed exposition the reader is referred there. This theory will be referred to as .The reflection principle (see [8]), valid for other forms of set theory, is not provable in . Some form of the reflection principle is essential for the proofs in the original version of forcing introduced by Cohen [2] and the version introduced by Mostowski [10]. The same seems to be true for the Boolean valued models methods due to Scott and Solovay [12]. The only suitable form of forcing for found in the literature is the version that appears in Shoenfield [14]. I believe Vopěnka's methods [15] would also be applicable. The definition of forcing given in the present paper is basically derived from Shoenfield's definition. Shoenfield, however, worked in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory.I do not know of any proof of the consistency of the continuum hypothesis with assuming only that is consistent. However, if one assumes the existence of an inaccessible cardinal, it is easy to extend Gödel's consistency proof [4] of the axiom of constructibility to .

Saturation of homogeneous resplendent models

1986 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 222-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia F. Knight
Keyword(s):  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Homogeneous Model ◽  
Peano Arithmetic ◽  
Saturated Model ◽  
Relation Symbol ◽  
First Order ◽  
Recursively Saturated ◽  
Recursively Saturated Model ◽  
Saturated Structure ◽  
The Continuum

The complete diagram of a structure , denoted by Dc(), is the set of all sentences true in the structure (, a)a∈. A structure is said to be resplendent if for every sentence θ involving a new relation symbol R in addition to symbols occurring in Dc(), if θ is consistent with Dc(), then there is a relation P on such that (see[1]).Baldwin asked whether a homogeneous recursively saturated structure is necessarily resplendent. Here it is shown that this need not be the case. It is shown that if is an uncountable homogeneous resplendent model of an unstable theory, then must be saturated. The proof is related to the proof in [5] that an uncountable homogeneous recursively saturated model of first order Peano arithmetic must be saturated. The example for Baldwin's question is an uncountable homogeneous model for a particular unstable theory, such that is recursively saturated and omits some type. (The continuum hypothesis is needed to show the existence of such a model in power ℵ1.)The proof of the main result requires two lemmas.

Letter Games: a metamathematical taster

2016 ◽  
Vol 100 (549) ◽  
pp. 442-449
Author(s):  
A. C. Paseau
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Incompleteness Theorem ◽  
Mathematical Study ◽  
Mathematical System ◽  
Kurt Gödel ◽  
Standard Set ◽  
The Continuum ◽  
Simplified Form

Metamathematics is the mathematical study of mathematics itself. Two of its most famous theorems were proved by Kurt Gödel in 1931. In a simplified form, Gödel's first incompleteness theorem states that no reasonable mathematical system can prove all the truths of mathematics. Gödel's second incompleteness theorem (also simplified) in turn states that no reasonable mathematical system can prove its own consistency. Another famous undecidability theorem is that the Continuum Hypothesis is neither provable nor refutable in standard set theory. Many of us logicians were first attracted to the field as students because we had heard something of these results. All research mathematicians know something of them too, and have at least a rough sense of why ‘we can't prove everything we want to prove’.

Power-like models of set theory

2001 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 1766-1782 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Enayat
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Mahlo Cardinal ◽  
Uncountable Cardinal ◽  
Consistent Extension ◽  
Elementary Submodel ◽  
Finite Language ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Models Of Set Theory ◽  
The Continuum

Abstract.A model = (M. E, …) of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZF is said to be 0-like. where E interprets ∈ and θ is an uncountable cardinal, if ∣M∣ = θ but ∣{b ∈ M: bEa}∣ < 0 for each a ∈ M, An immediate corollary of the classical theorem of Keisler and Morley on elementary end extensions of models of set theory is that every consistent extension of ZF has an ℵ1-like model. Coupled with Chang's two cardinal theorem this implies that if θ is a regular cardinal 0 such that 2<0 = 0 then every consistent extension of ZF also has a 0+-like model. In particular, in the presence of the continuum hypothesis every consistent extension of ZF has an ℵ2-like model. Here we prove:Theorem A. If 0 has the tree property then the following are equivalent for any completion T of ZFC:(i) T has a 0-like model.(ii) Ф ⊆ T. where Ф is the recursive set of axioms {∃κ (κ is n-Mahlo and “Vκis a Σn-elementary submodel of the universe”): n ∈ ω}.(iii) T has a λ-like model for every uncountable cardinal λ.Theorem B. The following are equiconsistent over ZFC:(i) “There exists an ω-Mahlo cardinal”.(ii) “For every finite language , all ℵ2-like models of ZFC() satisfy the schemeФ().

scholarly journals A reductionist reading of Husserl’s phenomenology by Mach’s descriptivism and phenomenalism

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasil Penchev
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Final Analysis ◽  
Peano Arithmetic ◽  
Transfinite Induction

<div>Husserl’s phenomenology is what is used, and then the conception of “bracketing reality” is modelled to generalize Peano arithmetic in its relation to set theory in the foundation of mathematics. The obtained model is equivalent to the generalization of Peano arithmetic by means of replacing the axiom of induction with that of transfinite induction.</div><div><br></div><div>A comparison to Mach’s doctrine is used to be revealed the fundamental and philosophical reductionism of Husserl’s phenomenology leading to a kind of Pythagoreanism in the final analysis</div>

scholarly journals All science as rigorous science: the principle of constructive mathematizability of any theory

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasil Dinev Penchev
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Liberal Arts ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Mathematical Structure ◽  
Peano Arithmetic ◽  
Formal Proof ◽  
Transfinite Induction ◽  
Information Interpretation ◽  
Future Work

A principle, according to which any scientific theory can be mathematized, is investigated. Social science, liberal arts, history, and philosophy are meant first of all. That kind of theory is presupposed to be a consistent text, which can be exhaustedly represented by a certain mathematical structure constructively. In thus used, the term “theory” includes all hypotheses as yet unconfirmed as already rejected. The investigation of the sketch of a possible proof of the principle demonstrates that it should be accepted rather a metamathematical axiom about the relation of mathematics and reality.The main statement is formulated as follows: Any scientific theory admits isomorphism to some mathematical structure in a way constructive (that is not as a proof of “pure existence” in a mathematical sense).Its investigation needs philosophical means. Husserl’s phenomenology is what is used, and then the conception of “bracketing reality” is modelled to generalize Peano arithmetic in its relation to set theory in the foundation of mathematics. The obtained model is equivalent to the generalization of Peano arithmetic by means of replacing the axiom of induction with that of transfinite induction.The sketch of the proof is organized in five steps: (1) a generalization of epoché; (2) involving transfinite induction in the transition between Peano arithmetic and set theory; (3) discussing the finiteness of Peano arithmetic; (4) applying transfinite induction to Peano arithmetic; (5) discussing an arithmetical model of reality.Accepting or rejecting the principle, two kinds of mathematics appear differing from each other by its relation to reality. Accepting the principle, mathematics has to include reality within itself in a kind of Pythagoreanism. These two kinds are called in paper correspondingly Hilbert mathematics and Gödel mathematics. The sketch of the proof of the principle demonstrates that the generalization of Peano arithmetic as above can be interpreted as a model of Hilbert mathematics into Gödel mathematics therefore showing that the former is not less consistent than the latter, and the principle is an independent axiom.The present paper follows a pathway grounded on Husserl’s phenomenology and “bracketing reality” to achieve the generalized arithmetic necessary for the principle to be founded in alternative ontology, in which there is no reality external to mathematics: reality is included within mathematics. That latter mathematics is able to self-found itself and can be called Hilbert mathematics in honour of Hilbert’s program for self-founding mathematics on the base of arithmetic.The principle of universal mathematizability is consistent to Hilbert mathematics, but not to Gödel mathematics. Consequently, its validity or rejection would resolve the problem which mathematics refers to our being; and vice versa: the choice between them for different reasons would confirm or refuse the principle as to the being.An information interpretation of Hilbert mathematics is involved. It is a kind of ontology of information. The Schrödinger equation in quantum mechanics is involved to illustrate that ontology. Thus the problem which of the two mathematics is more relevant to our being (rather than reality for reality is external only to Gödel mathematics) is discussed again in a new wayA few directions for future work can be: a rigorous formal proof of the principle as an independent axiom; the further development of information ontology consistent to both kinds of mathematics, but much more natural for Hilbert mathematics; the development of the information interpretation of quantum mechanics as a mathematical one for information ontology and thus Hilbert mathematics; the description of consciousness in terms of information ontology.

The Roles of Set Theories in Mathematics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin McLarty
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Gauge Theories ◽  
Elementary Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Large Cardinals ◽  
The Continuum

What mathematicians know and use about sets varies across branches of mathematics but rarely includes such fundamental aspects of Zermelo–Fraenkel (ZF) set theory as the iterative hierarchy. All mathematicians know and use the axioms of the Elementary Theory of the Category of Sets (ETCS), though few know ETCS or any set theory by name. The chapter depicts the iterative hierarchy of ZF and constructibility as gauge theories. Since gauge theories are prominently used in physics, so these are used in work on the continuum hypothesis, large cardinals, and provability in arithmetic. But mathematicians outside logic avoid these gauges and work with structures only up to isomorphism, as does ETCS.

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