Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers

Author(s):  
David J. Samuels ◽  
Matthew S. Shugart
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Michael Ahmed

This paper re-evaluates the significance of Sir Curtis Seretse, a black character from the 1960s television series Department S (ITV 1969-70) which has largely been ignored. While earlier critical and academic discourse of Department S has primarily centred on the flamboyant Jason King, the importance of Seretse’s character has been overlooked. Seretse, as the head of Department S, is in a position of authority and power over the other (white) characters of the show. Furthermore, he represents a highly educated character that converses on equal terms with Prime Ministers and Presidents, a unique representation of a black character on British television at that time. Seretse’s appearance on prime time television, at a period when black performers in the media were invariably confined to little more than token characters, is therefore worthy of further attention. This paper examines how Seretse represents a different type of black character not previously seen on British television, when compared to the representations of racial problems on other television crime dramas.


This chapter compares the leadership capital of two long-serving UK prime ministers: Tony Blair and Margaret Thatcher, treble election winners who held office for a decade. Mapping their capital over time reveals two very different patterns. Thatcher began with low levels of capital, building to a mid-term high and final fragile dominance, though her capital fell between elections. Blair possessed very high levels from the outset that gradually declined in a more conventional pattern. Both benefited from electoral dominance and a divided opposition, Thatcher’s strength lay in her policy vision while Blair’s stemmed from his popularity and communication skills. The LCI reveals that both prime ministers were successful without being popular, sustained in office by the electoral system. Towards the end of their tenures, both leaders’ continued dominance masked fragility, ousted when unrest in their parties and policy unpopularity eroded their capital.


Author(s):  
Patrick Weller

Prime ministers are the key campaigners for their governments, not just in electoral campaigns, but every day and in every place. Media management has become a continuing and significant part of the prime ministers’ activities; it is a daily, indeed an hourly, pressure. Speeches have to be planned. The pressure has changed the tone and priorities of governing. It has dangers as well as benefits. Media demands have become more immediate, more continuous, and more intrusive. Prime ministers must respond. The same technical changes allow prime ministers to interact with their voters in a way that bypasses journalists and other intermediaries. They are writ large in campaigns. They are never out of mind or out of sight. Re-election is always a consideration for tactics and strategy. The public leader, the ‘rhetorical prime minister’, is shaped by the demands of the media and organized by the technological capacity.


Author(s):  
Patrick Weller

Prime ministers dominate, but still lose office. Why? This chapter explores the conundrum that infests debates on the prime ministers’ power and influence. It examines the ambiguous and uncertain institutional environment with its scope for initiatives and choices. It rejects normative notions of what prime ministers should do and illustrates that accusations of excessive power and ambition have been thrown at prime ministers from the very beginning. It identifies the strategy of the book: to compare institutional arrangements in four Westminster systems—Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand—to see how prime ministers have chosen to define their role. It proposes tests for assessing prime ministers and for judging their performance and options.


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-285
Author(s):  
Alan Mackintosh

AbstractUntil the beginning of the nineteenth century, registering and regulating the training of any medical practitioners in Britain had rarely been attempted, unlike in many other European countries. During the Revolutionary War with France, fevers swept through British armies, leading to numerous fatalities and crushing military defeats, especially in the disastrous expedition to St Domingo. The problem, as forcibly advocated by Robert Jackson, the leading expert on military fevers, seemed to be poor medical care due to both lack of compulsory medical training and the unsuitability of whatever training was available for army medical practitioners. With the simultaneous rapid advance of French military and civilian medical training and the threat of a French invasion, regulating British medical training and excluding the unqualified became a military necessity, and suddenly medical reform was receiving widespread attention. Emphasising the benefits to the Britain’s fighting ability, the reform effort, led by Edward Harrison, a very provincial Lincolnshire physician, under the patronage of Sir Joseph Banks, the President of the Royal Society, gained the support of leading politicians, including three Prime Ministers. For a short time, comprehensive medical reform seemed inevitable: but the opposition of the medical corporations, especially the London College of Physicians, could not be circumvented, and although Harrison persisted in his efforts for 6 years, no legislation was achieved. Nevertheless, within months, the Association of Apothecaries continued the process by pressing for a more limited reform, culminating in the 1815 Apothecaries Act. The long march towards the full regulation of doctors in Britain was started by the perceived military needs of the country during the war with France.


2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baris Kesgin

Scholars and policymakers have long used the shorthand of hawks and doves to characterize leader personalities that correspond to a particular political inclination, whereby hawks are considered right-wing and more aggressive in foreign policy, and doves are left-wing and more peaceful. This article posits that a sound discussion of who hawks and doves in foreign policy are requires an engagement with research on political leadership. It promises a less superficial understanding of the dichotomy of hawks and doves, and uses leadership trait analysis to explore hawkish and dovish leaders’ qualities. The article profiles Israel’s prime ministers since the end of the Cold War, where in a high security environment, these words are most often used to describe its domestic and foreign matters and its cooperative and conflictual actions. This article’s findings encourage an unpacking of these commonly used shorthand labels with political leadership approaches. They are also useful to highlight, most notably, the significance of complexity and distrust in understanding hawkish and dovish leaders. Hawks think simpler and are more doubtful of others than doves, this article finds. Future research, the article suggests, will benefit from looking deeper than simple, dichotomous use of this analogy, and exploring ways to operationalize individual-level measurements of hawks and doves in foreign policy.


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