Law and Legal Institutions of Asia

2009 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Legal Institutions

The Evolution of a Nation

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Berkowitz ◽  
Karen B. Clay
Keyword(s):  
Political Competition ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Colonial History ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Water Transportation ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Access To Water ◽  
Late Twentieth

Although political and legal institutions are essential to any nation's economic development, the forces that have shaped these institutions are poorly understood. Drawing on rich evidence about the development of the American states from the mid-nineteenth to the late twentieth century, this book documents the mechanisms through which geographical and historical conditions—such as climate, access to water transportation, and early legal systems—impacted political and judicial institutions and economic growth. The book shows how a state's geography and climate influenced whether elites based their wealth in agriculture or trade. States with more occupationally diverse elites in 1860 had greater levels of political competition in their legislature from 1866 to 2000. The book also examines the effects of early legal systems. Because of their colonial history, thirteen states had an operational civil-law legal system prior to statehood. All of these states except Louisiana would later adopt common law. By the late eighteenth century, the two legal systems differed in their balances of power. In civil-law systems, judiciaries were subordinate to legislatures, whereas in common-law systems, the two were more equal. Former civil-law states and common-law states exhibit persistent differences in the structure of their courts, the retention of judges, and judicial budgets. Moreover, changes in court structures, retention procedures, and budgets occur under very different conditions in civil-law and common-law states. This book illustrates how initial geographical and historical conditions can determine the evolution of political and legal institutions and long-run growth.

Legal Institutions and the Structure of Informal Networks

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ethan Bueno de Mesquita ◽  
Matthew Caleb Stephenson
Keyword(s):  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Informal Networks

Common Law Constitutionalism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
William E. Nelson
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Profession ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Law System ◽  
The Common ◽  
Common Law System

This chapter shows how common law pleading, the use of common law vocabulary, and substantive common law rules lay at the foundation of every colony’s law by the middle of the eighteenth century. There is some explanation of how this common law system functioned in practice. The chapter then discusses why colonials looked upon the common law as a repository of liberty. It also discusses in detail the development of the legal profession individually in each of the thirteen colonies. Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion of the role of legislation. It shows that, although legislation had played an important role in the development of law and legal institutions in the seventeenth century, eighteenth-century Americans were suspicious of legislation, with the result that the output of pre-Revolutionary legislatures was minimal.

Against Capital Punishment

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin S. Yost
Keyword(s):  
Death Penalty ◽  
Capital Punishment ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Remedial Measures ◽  
Procedural Injustice ◽  
Central Claim

Against Capital Punishment offers an innovative proceduralist argument against the death penalty. Worries about procedural injustice animate many popular and scholarly objections to capital punishment. Philosophers and legal theorists are attracted to procedural abolitionism because it sidesteps controversies over whether murderers deserve death, holding out a promise of gaining rational purchase among death penalty retentionists. Following in this path, the book remains agnostic on the substantive immorality of execution; in fact, it takes pains to reconstruct the best arguments for capital punishment and presumes the appropriateness of execution in limited cases. At the same time, the book contends that the possibility of irrevocable mistakes precludes the just administration of the death penalty. The heart of Against Capital Punishment is a philosophical defense of the well-known irrevocability argument, which analyzes the argument’s premises, establishes their validity, and vindicates them against objections. The central claim is that execution violates the principle of remedy, which requires legal institutions to remedy their mistakes and to compensate those who suffer from wrongful sanctions. The death penalty is repellent to the principle of remedy by dint of its irrevocability. The incompatibility of remedy and execution is the crux of the irrevocability argument: because the wrongly executed cannot enjoy the obligatory remedial measures, execution is impermissible. Against Capital Punishment also reveals itself to be free from two serious defects plaguing other versions of proceduralism: the retributivist challenge and the problem of controversial consequences.

On the Artifactual—and Natural— Character of Legal Institutions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Corrado Roversi
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Legal Realism ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
The Law ◽  
Theory Of Law

Are legal institutions artifacts? If artifacts are conceived as entities whose existence depends on human beings, then yes, legal institutions are, of course, artifacts. But an artifact theory of law makes a stronger claim, namely, that there is actually an explanatory gain to be had by investigating legal institutions as artifacts, or through the features of ordinary artifacts. This is the proposition explored in this chapter: that while this understanding of legal institutions makes it possible to find common ground between legal positivism and legal realism, it does not capture all of the insights offered by these two traditions. An artifact theory of law can therefore be necessary in explaining the law, but it will not suffice to that end. This chapter also posits that legal artifacts bear a relevant connection to certain conceptions of nature, thus vindicating one of the original insights behind natural law theory.

Mandatory and Default Rules in Fiduciary Law

2019 ◽  
pp. 434-448
Author(s):  
Daniel Clarry
Keyword(s):  
Modern Trend ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Core Element ◽  
Constituent Element ◽  
Mandatory Rules ◽  
Default Rules ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter discusses the nature and operation of mandatory and default rules in fiduciary law, arguing that loyalty is a core element of every fiduciary legal institution. Loyalty is the hallmark of fiduciary law, as it requires persons in other-regarding positions of power to perform functions selflessly, rather than selfishly. However, there are many circumstances in which a person undertakes and exercises other-regarding powers, underscoring the fact that a broad range of persons may be the subject of fiduciary law. This chapter first provides an overview of key concepts and context, focusing on the distinction between mandatory rules and default rules as well as sources of such rules in fiduciary law. It then considers fiduciary loyalty, citing examples that illustrate how a baseline of fiduciary accountability is implied by the essential nature of fiduciary legal institutions, along with the mandatory or default quality of the duties of care and good faith. The main thesis of this chapter is that loyalty is a basic constituent element of all fiduciary legal institutions. Whether fiduciary principles are mandatory involves a consideration and determination of whether the relationship or institution is inherently fiduciary as matter of law and legal classification. It also highlights the modern trend toward codification and clear legislative demarcation of mandatory and default rules in fiduciary law.

Kantian Perspectives on Private Law

2020 ◽  
pp. 68-84
Author(s):  
Arthur Ripstein
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Private Law ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Naive Theory ◽  
Private Rights ◽  
Kantian View ◽  
Moral Structure ◽  
The Right ◽  
In Virtue Of

This chapter articulates the Kantian approach to private law. It begins by explaining the aims and ambitions of Kantian legal philosophy more generally and, in particular, introducing the Kantian idea that a particular form of thought is appropriate to a particular domain of inquiry or conduct. The chapter situates the Kantian view within a broad natural law tradition. For the part of that tradition that Immanuel Kant develops, the moral structure of natural law is animated by a conception of personal interaction that is so familiar as to be almost invisible. Despite its centrality to both morality and law, in the absence of legal institutions, this natural law is inadequate to its own principles. It requires legal institutions to render it fully determinate in its application consistent with everyone’s independence. It also requires public institutions of adjudication. The chapter further looks at Kant’s “division” of private rights, distinguishing first between the innate right that everyone has simply in virtue of being human and acquired rights that require an affirmative act to establish them. It then goes through the Kantian division of the titles of private right, situating them in relation to the distinction between persons and things. Finally, the chapter articulates the Kantian account of what might be called the naïve theory of remedies—that is, that the remedy is an imperfect continuation of the right that was violated.

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