On the Artifactual—and Natural— Character of Legal Institutions

Author(s):  
Corrado Roversi

Are legal institutions artifacts? If artifacts are conceived as entities whose existence depends on human beings, then yes, legal institutions are, of course, artifacts. But an artifact theory of law makes a stronger claim, namely, that there is actually an explanatory gain to be had by investigating legal institutions as artifacts, or through the features of ordinary artifacts. This is the proposition explored in this chapter: that while this understanding of legal institutions makes it possible to find common ground between legal positivism and legal realism, it does not capture all of the insights offered by these two traditions. An artifact theory of law can therefore be necessary in explaining the law, but it will not suffice to that end. This chapter also posits that legal artifacts bear a relevant connection to certain conceptions of nature, thus vindicating one of the original insights behind natural law theory.

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-61
Author(s):  
Dian Latifiani ◽  
Raden Muhammad Arvy Ilyasa

Moral values in legal science are important. However, the flow of law sees a variety of moral values. This paper aims to see the position of moral values in the science of law. Legal positivism separates strictly between law and morals. According to him, there is no law other than the command of the authorities. Even extreme identifying the law (Recht) as the law (wet). Legal positivism activities are aimed at concrete problems, which are different when compared to natural law thinking which engages itself with the validation of man-made law. For adherents of natural law theory, an unjust law is not law. there is an absolute relationship between law and morality. the two cannot be separated, so the law must refer to moral principles.


Author(s):  
David Copp

Legal Teleology seeks to embrace and to ground the most plausible tenets of both legal positivism and natural law theory. It is compatible with the positivist view that law consists at root in a social practice of a certain kind. Yet it also can accommodate at least some claims about the relation between law and morality that are advocated by opponents of positivism. Most important, it argues that law is “robustly normative”—roughly, law is a source of genuine reasons. Standard forms of positivism cannot account for this thesis, but, arguably, the central doctrines of positivism are compatible with it. Legal Teleology is an account of the normativity of law that is supported by “pluralist-teleology,” a naturalist account of normativity that has been proposed elsewhere (Copp 2009). Legal Teleology sees the law as having a purpose, and it says that law is defective insofar as it does not further that purpose. It agrees that jurists can sometimes help law better to serve its purpose when they invoke moral principles in interpreting law. Legal Teleology represents a kind of intermarriage between legal positivism and natural law theory.


2017 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-27
Author(s):  
Dejan Stankovic

The contemporary natural law theory was grounded in the philosophical and the jurisprudential work of Australian legal and moral philosopher John Mitchell Finnis. He reaffirmed the natural law and also corrected some of false notions about it which were dominant through the history of legal philosophy. Finnis moral and legal philosophy could be understood by the specific theoretical figure - moral argument for law. This theoretical concept implies unity of two mutually connected moments which are necessary for a philosophical treatment of any socially relevant phenomena: methodological and epistemological as well as practical. The meeting point of these two philosophically relevant dimensions is theory of practical rationality exposed in the philosophy of John Mitchell Finnis. By grounding his concept of natural law on the theory of practical rationality, John Finnis historically contextualize it. He made some sort of specific anti metaphysical concept of natural law theory that is alternative to the classical natural law as well as to the legal positivism, which mainly exposed in the legal theories of Hans Kelsen and H.L.A Hart.


Author(s):  
Kenneth Pennington

One of the most notable characteristics of Western societies has been the development of individual and group rights in legal, theological, and philosophical thought of the first two millennia. It has often been noted that thinkers in Non-Western societies have not had the same preoccupation with rights. The very concept of rights is laden with numerous problems. Universality is the most basic and difficult. If human rights are only a product of Western ideas of justice, they cannot have universality. In an age that is dominated by conceptions of law embracing some form of legal positivism, many scholars recognize only individual rights that have been established by the constitutional jurisprudence of individual countries or their legal systems. Historically, the emergence of rights in European jurisprudence is intimately connected with the terms ius naturale and lex naturalis in Western jurisprudence and theological thought. Human beings may never agree on universal rules of a natural law, but they might agree on universal precepts that shape the penumbra of rights surrounding natural rights.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricardo Morais Pereira ◽  
Sônia Aparecida Siquelli

This article analyzes the pedagogical ideas of legal education in Brazil, in a historical and political perspective, seeking to question how positivist thought has exerted and still exerts influence in the formation of Law professionals, since, at present, the egress profile has was shown with the characteristics of a technical professional, who was often incapable of exercising a reflection of his own practice. Conceived in the nineteenth century, the positivist school, whose precursor was the philosopher Augusto Comte, maintained that only the laws established by science should be accepted. In the juridical field, positivism was elaborated in detail by the Austrian jurist and philosopher Hans Kelsen in his work "Pure Theory of Law", which corroborated the influence of philosophical positivism in the legal field, by maintaining that only the law is able to fully realize the Right. For the rigid thought, the norm is sufficient, being the main source of the Law, prevailing over all the others. The methodology used in the research was of a qualitative nature, developed from a bibliographic analysis of the philosophical legal concepts that compose the formation of this professional. A documentary investigation was also made in the curricular guidelines pointed out by the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC). The final results of this research identified that legal positivism continues to influence the formation of the bachelor of Law. However, it is not the only factor that forges the current legal professional.ResumoO presente artigo analisa as ideias pedagógicas do ensino jurídico no Brasil, numa perspectiva histórica e política, buscando questionar como o pensamento positivista exerceu e ainda exerce influência na formação dos profissionais do Direito, uma vez que, atualmente, o perfil do egresso tem se mostrado com características de um profissional técnico, entretanto incapaz muitas vezes de exercer uma reflexão de sua própria prática. Concebida no século XIX, a escola positivista, que teve como precursor o filósofo Augusto Comte, sustentava que apenas as leis estabelecidas pela ciência deveriam ser aceitas. No campo jurídico, o positivismo foi detalhadamente trabalhado pelo jurista e filósofo austríaco Hans Kelsen em sua obra “A Teoria Pura do Direito”, que corroborou a influência do positivismo filosófico no campo jurídico, ao sustentar que apenas a lei é capaz de realizar plenamente o Direito. Para o rígido pensamento, a norma se basta, sendo a principal fonte do Direito, prevalecendo sobre todas as demais. A metodologia empregada na pesquisa foi de natureza qualitativa, desenvolvida a partir de uma análise bibliográfica dos conceitos filosóficos jurídicos que compõem a formação deste profissional. Também foi feita uma investigação documental nas diretrizes curriculares apontadas pelo Ministério da Educação e Cultura (MEC). Os resultados finais desta pesquisa identificaram que o positivismo jurídico continua influenciando a formação do bacharel do Direito. No entanto, não é o único fator que forja o atual profissional da área jurídica.Keywords: Positivism, Legal positivism, Curricular guidelines, Bachelor's degree in law.Palavras-chave: Positivismo, Positivismo jurídico, Diretrizes curriculares, Bacharelado em direito.ReferencesBITTAR, E. C. B. Curso de filosofia do direito. 4 ed. São Paulo: Atlas, 2005.BRASIL. Constituição (1988). Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil. Brasília, DF: Senado Federal: Centro Gráfico, 1988. 292 p.BRASIL. Resolução CNE/CES n. 9/2004. Brasília: CNE, 2004.COMPARATO, F. K.  Ética: direito, moral e religião no mundo moderno. 3 ed. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2016.COMTE, A. Comte (Os pensadores) Curso de filosofia positiva; Discurso sobre o espírito positivo; Discurso preliminar sobre o conjunto do positivismo; Catecismo positivista. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1978.DELBONO, B. F. Os Direitos difusos e coletivos como componentes obrigatórios na organização curricular das faculdades de direito do Brasil. 2007. Tese (Doutorado em Direito das Relações Sociais), Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2007.KELSEN, Hans. Teoria geral das normas. Tradução de Jose? Florentino Duarte. Porto Alegre: Fabris, 1986.KELSEN, Hans. Teoria Geral do Direito e do Estado. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1998a.KELSEN, Hans. Teoria pura do direito. Tradução: João Baptista Machado. 6 ed. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1998b. MENDONÇA, J. S. Curso de Filosofia do Direito: o homem e o Direito. 2 ed. São Paulo: Rideel, 2011.MOSSINI, D. E. S. Ensino jurídico: história, currículo e interdisciplinaridade. 2010. Tese (Doutorado em Educação). Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo – PUC-SP, São Paulo, 2010.MOTTA, C. D. B; BROLEZZI, A. C. A influência do positivismo na história da educação matemática no Brasil. Universidade de São Paulo, 2008. OLIVEIRA, A. G. de. Filosofia do Direito. São Paulo: Editora Saraiva, 2012.REALE, M. Lições preliminares de Direito. 27 ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2002.ROCHA, J. L. A educação matemática na visão de Augusto Comte. 2006. Tese de Doutorado em Educação. Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, 2006.ROCHA. L. S. Epistemologia e democracia. 2 ed. São Leopoldo: Unisinos, 2003.SAVIANI, D. A educação na Constituição Federal de 1988: avanços no texto e sua neutralização no contexto dos 25 anos de vigência. Revista Brasileira de Política e Administração da Educação, v. 29, n. 2, p. 207-221, maio/ago. 2013.SAVIANI, D. História das ideias pedagógicas no Brasil. Campinas: Autores Associados, 2007. SIMIONI, R. L. Curso de hermenêutica jurídica contemporânea: do positivismo clássico ao pós-positivismo jurídico. Curitiba: Juruá, 2014.SANCHES, R. C. F.; PEREIRA, N. C. F. O ensino dogmático do direito como elemento limitador à universalização do acesso à justiça. XVIII CONGRESSO NACIONAL DO CONPEDI. Anais...  São Paulo, 2009.WARAT, L. A. A pureza do poder: uma análise crítica de teoria jurídica. Florianópolis: Ed. da UFSC, 1983.WARAT, L. A. Introdução geral ao direito: a epistemologia jurídica da modernidade. Porto Alegre:  Safe, 2002.WARAT, L. A. Introdução geral ao direito: O direito não estudado pela teoria jurídica moderna. Porto Alegre: Safe, 1997.WARAT, L. A. Saber crítico e senso comum teórico dos juristas. In: Seqüência. UFSC, Florianópolis, SC, Brasil, ISSNe 2177-7055, 1982.WOLKMER, A. C. História do Direito no Brasil. 2 ed. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Forense, 2000. 


2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 219-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Jay Stone

Scott Shapiro offers an elaboration and defense of “legal positivism,” in whichthe official acceptance of a planfigures as the central explanatory notion. Rich in both ambition and insight,Legalitycasts an edifying new light on the structure of positive law and its officialdom. As a defense of positivism, however, it exhibits the odd feature that its main claims will prove quite acceptable to the natural lawyer. Perhaps this betokens – what many have begun to suspect anyway – that our usual tests for classifying legal theories (as positivist or not) are, in the present state of discussion, no longer credible. In any case, my hope in the following remarks is to suggest how certain ambiguities inLegalitymight easily be resolved in favor of PlanningNatural Law. The Planning Theory of Law, in other words, is not proprietary to positivism.


Author(s):  
Annabel S. Brett

This chapter looks at Francisco de Vitoria and his Dominican colleagues at the Spanish School of Salamanca in the middle of the sixteenth century. They are famous for their reconstitution and redeployment of Thomas Aquinas's theory of natural law to address the new problems of the sixteenth century, problems that beset Spain along with the rest of Europe: the power of the crown both within its own commonwealth and in relation to other commonwealths, and these powers both within Europe and overseas. For the School's most celebrated member, Francisco de Vitoria, natural law is the law of reason by which all human beings are naturally governed—the law of humanity as such—and, for him as for Aquinas, it ultimately determines the legitimacy of any subsequent human institutions and laws. The chapter also considers Domingo de Soto's The deliberation in the cause of the poor, which was published in 1545.


2019 ◽  
pp. 174-203
Author(s):  
Lenn E. Goodman

Natural law links moral and legal theory with natural theology and science. It is critical to thinking about God’s sovereignty and human freedom. Tracing the roots of the natural law idea, I defend the approach against conventionalism and legal positivism. For they leave human norms ungrounded. Chapter 7 opens by disarming Hume’s elenchus about ‘is’ and ‘ought’. I do not deny the reality of a naturalistic fallacy, but I do argue that facts make rightful claims on us and that the unity of reality and value central to Jewish thinking and to the philosophical great tradition does not confuse facts with values but does appreciate the preciousness of being—of life and personhood most pointedly. Once again here transcendence consorts with immanence. For we find God’s law writ subtly in nature, not least when we discover what it means to perfect ourselves as loving and creative human beings.


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