A PUZZLE ABOUT EXPERTS, EVIDENTIAL SCREENING-OFF AND CONDITIONALIZATION

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ittay Nissan-Rozen

ABSTRACTI present a puzzle about the epistemic role beliefs about experts' beliefs play in a rational agent's system of beliefs. It is shown that accepting the claim that an expert's degree of belief in a proposition, A, screens off the evidential support another proposition, B, gives to A in case the expert knows and is certain about whether B is true, leads in some cases to highly unintuitive conclusions. I suggest a solution to the puzzle according to which evidential screening off is rejected, but show that the price of this solution is either giving up on the mere idea of deferring to expert's opinion or giving up on Bayesian conditionalization.

2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pei Wang

Formalization of Evidence: A Comparative StudyThis article analyzes and compares several approaches of formalizing the notion of evidence in the context of general-purpose reasoning system. In each of these approaches, the notion of evidence is defined, and the evidence-based degree of belief is represented by a binary value, a number (such as a probability), or two numbers (such as an interval). The binary approaches provide simple ways to represent conclusive evidence, but cannot properly handle inconclusive evidence. The one-number approaches naturally represent inconclusive evidence as a degree of belief, but lack the information needed to revise this degree. It is argued that for systems opening to new evidence, each belief should at least have two numbers attached to indicate its evidential support. A few such approaches are discussed, including the approach used in NARS, which is designed according to the considerations of general-purpose intelligent systems, and provides novel solutions to several traditional problems on evidence.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 785-806 ◽  
Author(s):  
WILLIAM ROCHE

AbstractIs evidential support transitive? The answer is negative when evidential support is understood as confirmation so that X evidentially supports Y if and only if p(Y | X) > p(Y). I call evidential support so understood “support” (for short) and set out three alternative ways of understanding evidential support: support-t (support plus a sufficiently high probability), support-t* (support plus a substantial degree of support), and support-tt* (support plus both a sufficiently high probability and a substantial degree of support). I also set out two screening-off conditions (under which support is transitive): SOC1 and SOC2. It has already been shown that support-t is non-transitive in the general case (where it is not required that SOC1 holds and it is not required that SOC2 holds), in the special case where SOC1 holds, and in the special case where SOC2 holds. I introduce two rather weak adequacy conditions on support measures and argue that on any support measure meeting those conditions it follows that neither support-t* nor support-tt* is transitive in the general case, in the special case where SOC1 holds, or in the special case where SOC2 holds. I then relate some of the results to Douven’s evidential support theory of conditionals along with a few rival theories.


2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (18) ◽  
pp. 59
Author(s):  
ERIK GOLDMAN
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 39
Author(s):  
Jan Czerniawski

Dowód twierdzenia Bella sprowadza się do wyprowadzenia którejś z nierówności Bella. W ich standardowych wyprowadzeniach jednak kluczową rolę odgrywa warunek faktoryzowalności łącznego prawdopodobieństwa warunkowego, który można uzyskać jako konsekwencję dwóch innych warunków, znanych jako parameter independence i outcome independence. Pierwszy z nich jest dość oczywistym wyrazem warunku lokalności, natomiast drugi budzi wątpliwości. Ponieważ jednak jest on uszczegółowieniem warunku screening off zasady wspólnej przyczyny, jego podważenie wymagałoby zakwestionowania również tego warunku. Gdyby się to powiodło, efektywny dowód twierdzenia Bella wymagałby wyprowadzenia nierówności Bella nie wykorzystującego żadnego uszczegółowienia warunku screening off. Przestawiona zostanie sugestia kierunku, w jakim powinny iść poszukiwania modelu naruszającego ten warunek.


Author(s):  
Clayton Littlejohn

On a standard way of thinking about the relationships between evidence, reasons, and epistemic justification, a subject’s evidence consists of her potential reasons for her beliefs, these reasons constitute the normative reasons that bear on whether to believe, and justification is taken to result from relations between a subject’s potential reasons for her beliefs and those beliefs. This chapter argues that this view makes a number of mistakes about the rational roles of reasons and evidence and explores some parallels between practical and theoretical reasons. Just as justified action is unobjectionable action, justified belief is unobjectionable belief. Just as you cannot object to someone deciding to do something simply on the grounds that their reasons for acting didn’t give them strong reason to act, you cannot object to someone believing something simply on the grounds that they didn’t believe for reasons that gave their beliefs strong evidential support.


1992 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 142-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elliott Sober

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (04) ◽  
pp. 368-372
Author(s):  
Seema Kale

AbstractVarying kinds of AV blocks can occur in the setting of myocardial ischaemia or due to degeneration of conduction system. Wenckebach AV block can present with typical Wenckebach periodicity or atypical periodicity. A variant of atypical Wenckebach periodicity may present like Mobitz II AV block. This is called Pseudo Mobitz II AV block. As we are aware that Mobitz II AV block is more dangerous and can suddenly convert into complete heart block, it is essential that we should try to differentiate between Mobitz and Pseudo Mobitz II blocks. Infact atypical Wenckebach cycles are quite common at both AV node and his Purkinje system.


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