Evaluation of a Method of Verbally Expressing Degree of Belief by Selecting Phrases from a List

1990 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert M. Hamm
Keyword(s):  
2014 ◽  
Vol 1070-1072 ◽  
pp. 1021-1028
Author(s):  
De Hua Cai ◽  
Xi Yang ◽  
Rui Chuang Wang ◽  
Cheng Zhi Ma ◽  
Jin Cheng ◽  
...  

Transformers health index calculation method based on cloud model and fuzzy evidential reasoning is proposed. According to the multi-level and multifactor of evaluation index information of power transformers, a layered evaluation index model is established. In order to deal with the ambiguity and uncertainty information of evaluation index, a normal cloud model is introduced, inferred the fuzzy degree of belief in the health state of evaluation index. Then use the fuzzy evidential reasoning method merge information of evaluation Index, inferred the degree of belief in the health state-level of transformer, calculated the health index of transformer. The results of an example analysis test its rationality and effectiveness.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-191
Author(s):  
Jonas Karge ◽  

How strongly an agent beliefs in a proposition can be represented by her degree of belief in that proposition. According to the orthodox Bayesian picture, an agent's degree of belief is best represented by a single probability function. On an alternative account, an agent’s beliefs are modeled based on a set of probability functions, called imprecise probabilities. Recently, however, imprecise probabilities have come under attack. Adam Elga claims that there is no adequate account of the way they can be manifested in decision-making. In response to Elga, more elaborate accounts of the imprecise framework have been developed. One of them is based on supervaluationism, originally, a semantic approach to vague predicates. Still, Seamus Bradley shows that some of those accounts that solve Elga’s problem, have a more severe defect: they undermine a central motivation for introducing imprecise probabilities in the first place. In this paper, I modify the supervaluationist approach in such a way that it accounts for both Elga’s and Bradley’s challenges to the imprecise framework.


2021 ◽  
pp. 125-142
Author(s):  
Andrew C. A. Elliott

Gambling is an ancient human activity. We indulge ourselves by allowing ourselves to experience the dangers and thrills of chance in a somewhat controlled way. The history of lotteries and related games is explored. The chances of drawing various poker hands are laid out. The role of probability in horse racing is described, and how the odds quoted are not strictly statements of probability, but terms on which business is to be done. Political prediction betting markets give us a further interpretation of probability as a way of expressing strength of opinion in a quantifiable, albeit flawed way. Wagers encourage boasters to put their money where their mouth is, and so to quantify their degree of belief.


1994 ◽  
Vol 267 (6) ◽  
pp. S113 ◽  
Author(s):  
R Jevning ◽  
R Anand ◽  
M Biedebach

Most physiological scientists have restricted understanding of probability as relative frequency in a large collection (for example, of atoms). Most appropriate for the relatively circumscribed problems of the physical sciences, this understanding of probability as a physical property has conveyed the widespread impression that the "proper" statistical "method" can eliminate uncertainty by determining the "correct" frequency or frequency distribution. However, many relatively recent developments in the theory of probability and decision making deny such exalted statistical ability. Proponents of Bayes's subjectivist theory, for example, assert that probability is "degree of belief," a more tentative idea than relative frequency or physical probability, even though degree of belief assessment may utilize frequency information. In the subjectivist view, probability and statistics are means of expressing a consistent opinion (a probability) to handle uncertainty but never means to eliminate it. In the physiological sciences the contrast between the two views is critical, because problems dealt with are generally more complex than those of physics, requiring judgments and decisions. We illustrate this in testing the efficacy of penicillin by showing how the physical probability method of "hypothesis testing" may contribute to the erroneous idea that science consists of "verified truths" or "conclusive evidence" and how this impression is avoided in subjectivist probability analysis.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. V. Mardia

Bayes' theorem is a vehicle for incorporating prior knowledge in updating the degree of belief in light of data. For example, the state of tomorrow's weather can be predicted using belief or likelihood of tomorrow's weather given today's weather data. We give a brief review of the recent advances in the area with emphasis on high-level Bayesian image analysis. It has been gradually recognised that knowledge-based algorithms based on Bayesian analysis are more widely applicable and reliable than ad hoc algorithms. Advantages include the use of explicit and realistic statistic models making it easier to understand the working behind such algorithms and allowing confidence statements to be made about conclusions. These systems are not necessarily as time consuming as might be expected. However, more care is required in using the knowledge effectively for a given specific problem; this is very much an art rather than a science.


2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. McKaughan

There are certain illocutionary acts (such as hypothesizing, conjecturing, speculating, guessing, and the like) that, contrary to John Searle’s (1969, 1975, 1979) speech act theory, cannot be correctly classified as assertives. Searle’s sincerity and essential conditions on assertives require, plausibly, that we believe our assertions and that we are committed to their truth. Yet it is a commonly accepted scientific practice to propose and investigate an hypothesis without believing it or being at all committed to its truth. Searle’s attempt to accommodate such conjectural acts by claiming that the degree of belief and of commitment expressed by some assertives “may approach or even reach zero” (1979: 13) is unsuccessful, since it evacuates his thesis that these are substantive necessary conditions on assertives of any force. The illocutionary acts in question are central to scientific activity and so cannot be plausibly ignored by a theory of speech acts. The problem is not limited simply to Searle’s theory, since even theories which depart markedly from Searle’s in other respects are often committed to similar characterizations of assertion.


2015 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 41-60
Author(s):  
Kepa Korta ◽  
Larraitz Zubeldia

Two kinds of meanings are usually associated to the Basque particle bide.1 On the one hand, it has been taken to point to the indirect nature of the speaker’s evidence for the truth of the proposition put forward. According to this view, it would be a sort of inferential particle. On the other hand, bide has been associated to the expression of a certain degree of belief or certainty on the truth of the proposition. This double dimension of bide resembles various aspects of the meaning and use of another Basque particle – omen. The morpho-syntactic behaviour of these two particles is practically identical, and their semantics and pragmatics invite a close comparison. Thus, starting from our conclusions regarding omen, we explore the similarities and differences between both particles. We find two main differences. First, bide encodes a doxastic dimension that is absent from the semantic meaning of omen. And, second, bide can be taken to be an illocutionary force indicator that does not contribute to the proposition expressed, while omen does contribute to the truth-conditions of the utterance.


Author(s):  
Norio Yamamoto

Corrosion condition is predicted based on the corrosion model. The corrosion model is necessary to be identified according to the corrosion data collected from the various vessels because corrosion phenomenon is stochastic. However, in order to predict corrosion condition of one specific vessel, such corrosion model is necessary to be modified to reflect the effect of specific corrosion environment of the subject vessel. In the study, procedure of updating corrosion model was investigated based on Bayesian inference on the parameters in the probabilistic corrosion model which utilizes the thickness measurements data. The developed procedure was demonstrated by the application of actual thickness measurements data of the vessel. Even though the amount of corrosion data was limited, the corrosion prediction model was well updated which could be verified by the concentration of posterior distribution which shows the degree of belief on the parameters in the probabilistic corrosion model. The estimated distributions of coating life and corrosion wastage were compared with the frequency distributions obtained by the corrosion data. The estimated distributions of coating life and corrosion wastage showed good agreement with the frequency distributions obtained by the corrosion data.


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