SUBJECT-SENSITIVE INVARIANTISM, HIGH-STAKES/LOW-STAKES CASES, AND PRESUPPOSITION SUSPENSION

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-254
Author(s):  
Michael Blome-tillmann
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Norm ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Subject Sensitive Invariantism ◽  
In Virtue Of

ABSTRACTIt is a familiar criticism of Subject-Sensitive Invariantism that the view makes incorrect predictions about cases in which the attributor of knowledge is in a high-stakes situation and the subject of the attribution in a low-stakes situation. In a recent paper in this journal, Brian Kim has argued that the mentioned type of case should be ignored, since the relevant knowledge ascriptions are inappropriate in virtue of violating an epistemic norm of presupposing. I show, pace Kim, that the mentioned utterances do not carry factivity presuppositions. To this end I discuss a phenomenon known as presupposition suspension, which is widely associated with the presuppositions of epistemic factives such as know that p or discover that p. I argue further that the problem of unknown presuppositions discussed by Kim can be circumvented by slightly amending the cases at hand. In particular, I demonstrate that factivity presuppositions are unobjectionable in problem cases in which the high-stakes ascriber knows the presuppositions at issue to be true.

Knowledge and Social Roles: A Virtue Approach

Episteme ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Wright
Keyword(s):  
Social Roles ◽  
Social Role ◽  
Knowledge Attribution ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Persistent Problem ◽  
Knowledge Attributions ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Subject Sensitive Invariantism

Attributor contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism both suggest ways in which our concept of knowledge depends on a context. Both offer approaches that incorporate traditionally non-epistemic elements into our standards for knowledge. But neither can account for the fact that the social role of a subject affects the standards that the subject must meet in order to warrant a knowledge attribution. I illustrate the dependence of the standards for knowledge on the social roles of the knower with three types of examples–focusing on knowledge attribution, action, and a mix of the two–and show why neither attributor contextualism nor subject-sensitive invariantism can explain them. I then suggest that subject-sensitive invariantism should be supplemented with insights from virtue epistemology so that it can explain the dependence of the standards of knowledge on social roles. This supplementation of subject-sensitive invariantism helps to solve a persistent problem facing that theory: the case of knowledge attributions made by those in high-stakes contexts about subjects in low-stakes contexts.

The Epistemic Norms of Action

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikkel Gerken
Keyword(s):  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Epistemic Norm ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Knowledge Norm ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Epistemological Principle ◽  
Knowledge Norms

Chapter 6 concerns the normative relationship between action and knowledge ascriptions. Arguments are provided against a Knowledge Norm of Action (KNAC) and in favor of the Warrant-Action norm (WA). According to WA, S must be adequately warranted in believing that p relative to her deliberative context to meet the epistemic requirements for acting on p. WA is developed by specifying the deliberative context and by arguing that its explanatory power exceeds that of knowledge norms. A general conclusion is that the knowledge norm is an important example of a folk epistemological principle that does not pass muster as an epistemological principle. More generally, Chapter 6 introduces the debates about epistemic normativity and develops a specific epistemic norm of action.

scholarly journals Does Spelling Still Matter—and If So, How Should It Be Taught? Perspectives from Contemporary and Historical Research

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven C. Pan ◽  
Timothy C. Rickard ◽  
Robert A. Bjork
Keyword(s):  
Approaches To Teaching ◽  
Traditional Methods ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Early 21St Century ◽  
Relevant Evidence ◽  
Spelling Instruction ◽  
English Speaking ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Traditional Approaches

AbstractA century ago, spelling skills were highly valued and widely taught in schools using traditional methods, such as weekly lists, drill exercises, and low- and high-stakes spelling tests. That approach was featured in best-selling textbooks such as the Horn-Ashbaugh Speller of 1920. In the early 21st century, however, skepticism as to the importance of spelling has grown, some schools have deemphasized or abandoned spelling instruction altogether, and there has been a proliferation of non-traditional approaches to teaching spelling. These trends invite a reevaluation of the role of spelling in modern English-speaking societies and whether the subject should be explicitly taught (and if so, what are research-supported methods for doing so). In this article, we examine the literature to address whether spelling skills are still important enough to be taught, summarize relevant evidence, and argue that a comparison of common approaches to spelling instruction in the early 20th century versus more recent approaches provides some valuable insights. We also discuss the value of explicit spelling instruction and highlight potentially effective ways to implement such instruction, including the use of spelling tests. Overall, our goals are to better characterize the role of spelling skills in today’s society and to identify several pedagogical approaches—some derived from traditional methods and others that are more recent—that hold promise for developing such skills in efficient and effective ways.

scholarly journals Epistemic evaluation and the need for ‘impure’ epistemic standards

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikola Anna Kompa
Keyword(s):  
Context Sensitivity ◽  
Epistemic Standard ◽  
Epistemic Evaluation ◽  
Knowledge Ascription ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Epistemic Standards

AbstractThat knowledge ascriptions exhibit some form of sensitivity to context is uncontroversial. How best to account for the context-sensitivity at issue, however, is the topic of heated debates. A certain version of nonindexical contextualism seems to be a promising option. Even so, it is incumbent upon any contextualist account to explain in what way and to what extent the epistemic standard operative in a particular context of epistemic evaluation is affected by non-epistemic factors (such as practical interests). In this paper, I investigate how non-epistemic factors come into play when knowledge is ascribed. I argue that knowledge ascriptions often serve the purpose of providing actionable information. This, in turn, requires that epistemic interests be balanced against non-epistemic interests. Moreover, it raises the question of whose interests matter, those of the ascriber, the addressee (of the knowledge ascription), or the subject of ascription. Eventually, an answer to the question is suggested.

Internal Relations and Analyticity: Wittgenstein and Quine

1996 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 591-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Hymers
Keyword(s):  
Plausible Candidate ◽  
Analytic Truth ◽  
Internal Relations ◽  
The Subject ◽  
In Virtue Of

Since Russell and Moore forsook idealism, it has often been assumed that only analytic truths can express internal relations — relations which, in Russell's words, are ‘grounded in the natures of the related terms.’ An object, a, is internally related to another object, b, if and only if a is related to b in virtue of a's possessing some property, P. So if a has the property of being a branch, then it is internally related to some tree, b, as part to whole. In turn, ‘A branch is a part of some tree’ is (at least a plausible candidate for) an analytic truth. It is true in virtue of the meanings of its terms, or because the concept of the predicate contains the concept of the subject.Quine's critique of analyticity has thus made the pragmatically minded wary of talk of internal relations.

Revisiting Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa

2020 ◽  
pp. 45-60
Author(s):  
Vincent Carretta
Keyword(s):  
Slave Trade ◽  
Olaudah Equiano ◽  
Middle Passage ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Political Propaganda ◽  
Transatlantic Slave Trade ◽  
Archival Documents ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Origin Story ◽  
Canonical Status

The backlash against challenging the origin story of Olaudah Equiano, author of the influential autobiography The Interesting Narrative of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African. Written by Himself, is the subject of this chapter by Vincent Carreta. Since first being published in 1789, the text has achieved canonical status as a rare first-hand account of an African-born person describing the horrors of the Middle Passage and slavery. Interesting Narrative was successfully appropriated political propaganda by abolitionists to help end the transatlantic slave trade and abolish slavery. After revealing archival documents calling Equiano’s birth in Africa into question, Caretta describes the firestorm of criticism he faced, including threats of assault, from some scholars. He suggests that the unwillingness of some scholars to confront the possibility that Equiano may have lied about his birthplace is too high stakes as it opens the door to questioning how much of Interesting Narrative is fiction and how much work that relies on the text may require reexamination.

The Metaphysics of Memory

Memory ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 32-56
Author(s):  
Jordi Fernández
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Functional Role ◽  
Narrative Theory ◽  
Causal Theory ◽  
Cognitive Economy ◽  
Proposal A ◽  
The Subject ◽  
In Virtue Of

Chapter 2 offers a proposal about the facts in virtue of which a mental state qualifies as a memory. According to this proposal, a mental state qualifies as a memory in virtue of the functional role that it plays within the cognitive economy of the subject. The chapter outlines two alternative proposals about the nature of memory. According to the causal theory of memory, a mental state is a memory in virtue of the fact that it has been caused by a perceptual experience of some fact. According to the narrative theory of memory, a mental state is a memory in virtue of the fact that the subject is using the mental state to construct a story of their life. It is argued that the functionalist proposal enjoys the virtues of each of the two theories, and it avoids the difficulties which threaten the two theories as well.

scholarly journals Maths Sparks engagement programme: investigating the impact on under-privileged pupils’ attitudes towards mathematics

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aoibhinn Ni Shuilleabhain ◽  
Anthony Cronin ◽  
Mark Prendergast
Keyword(s):  
Social Research ◽  
Time Frame ◽  
Mathematics Students ◽  
Undergraduate Mathematics ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Mathematical Concepts ◽  
Attitudes Towards Mathematics ◽  
Before And After ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Impact

Abstract In this paper we explore the attitudes of under-privileged secondary school pupils in Ireland towards mathematics and investigate the impact of attending a 4-week engagement programme on these attitudes. The pupils involved in this research attended schools recognized by the Department of Education & Skills as socio-economically deprived. Pupils attending these schools, known as Delivering Equality of Opportunity in Schools (DEIS), are 40% less likely than their counterparts in non-DEIS schools to pursue mathematics at a higher level in state examinations (Smyth, E., Mccoy, S. & Kingston, G., 2015, Learning From the Evaluation of DEIS. Dublin: Economic and Social Research Institute). However, little research has reported on these pupils’ experiences of and attitudes towards mathematics at senior secondary level. An engagement programme entitled ‘Maths Sparks’ was purposefully designed for secondary pupils from DEIS schools, with the aim of positively influencing their attitudes towards and confidence in mathematics. The programme consisted of weekly out-of-school workshops exploring extra-curricular mathematics topics, designed and delivered by undergraduate mathematics students. Questionnaires were utilized to evaluate pupils’ attitudes towards mathematics before and after their participation in the programme. Despite its relatively short time frame, qualitative and quantitative analysis suggests an increase in participating pupils’ attitudes towards, enjoyment of and self-confidence in mathematics due to their participation in the programme. Findings also suggest that while these pupils liked the subject of mathematics, their experience of learning the subject in school was not always positive and was sometimes hindered by the absence of higher-level mathematics as an option in school. The high-stakes examination content and teachers’ beliefs in the ability of their students also sometimes negatively impacted learners’ intentions to pursue mathematics at a higher level. Findings suggest that longitudinal mathematics engagement programmes, which focus on problem solving, involve extra-curricular mathematical concepts and are presented by undergraduate mathematics students, may provide a valuable way of positively impacting pupils’ intentions to pursue the subject.

scholarly journals The puzzle of transparency and how to solve it

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (7) ◽  
pp. 916-935
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Barz
Keyword(s):  
Two Stage ◽  
Stage Process ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
In Virtue Of

AbstractAccording to the transparency approach, achievement of self-knowledge is a two-stage process: first, the subject arrives at the judgment ‘p’; second, the subject proceeds to the judgment ‘I believe thatp.’ The puzzle of transparency is to understand why the transition from the first to the second judgment is rationally permissible. After revisiting the debate between Byrne and Boyle on this matter, I present a novel solution according to which the transition is rationally permissible in virtue of a justifying argument that begins from a premise referring to the mental utterance that is emitted in the course of judging ‘p.’

The Nature of Ususfructus

1946 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-170
Author(s):  
Kopel Kagan
Keyword(s):  
Great Difficulty ◽  
Roman Law ◽  
Present Position ◽  
Modern Times ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right ◽  
Opening Statements ◽  
In Virtue Of

No satisfactory definition of Dominium in Roman Law has yet been achieved. Amongst English writers Austin many years ago found great difficulty in this question while in modern times Professor Buckland has written ‘it is thus difficult to define Dominium precisely.’ Again, Poste, dealing with Gaius' discussion of dominium, says that his opening statements are ‘deplorably confused.’ These examples are enough to indicate the condition, of uncertainty which prevails. In my submission this uncertainty exists mainly because the conception of ususfructus has never yet been explained adequately. Of Possessio it has been said ‘the definition of Possessio to give the results outlined is a matter of great difficulty. No perfectly correct solution may be possible,’ and this statement is generally accepted as a correct assessment of the present position in juristic literature. But here, too, in my opinion, the reason is again connected with usufruct, for the possessio of the usufructuary has not yet been adequately determined. Gaius (2.93) tells us ‘usufructuarius vero usucapere non potest; primuum quod non possidet, sed habet ius utendi et fruendi.’ Ulpian holds that he had possessio in fact (‘Naturaliter videtur possidere is qui usum fructum habet’ D.41.2.12). On this subject Roby says ‘the fructuary was not strictly a possessor and therefore if he was deprived from enjoying he had not a claim to the original interdict de vi but in virtue of his quasi-possessio a special interdict was granted him.’ Austin saw difficulty in the whole problem of possessio. He wrote ‘by Savigny in his treatise on possessio it is remarked that the possessio of a right of usufruct … resembles the possessio of a thing, by the proprietor, or by an adverse possessor exercising rights of property over the thing. And that a disturbance of the one possession resembles the disturbance of the other. Now this must happen for the reason I have already stated:—namely, that the right of usufruct or user, like that of property, is indefinite in point of user. For what is possession (meaning legal possession not mere physical handling of the subject) but the exercise of a right ?’

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