scholarly journals Reflective Access, Closure, and Epistemological Disjunctivism

Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Giada Fratantonio
Keyword(s):  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Access Problem ◽  
Metaphysical Interpretation ◽  
Epistemic Interpretation

Abstract In this paper, I consider the so-called Access Problem for Duncan Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism (2012). After reconstructing Pritchard's own response to the Access Problem, I argue that in order to assess whether Pritchard's response is a satisfying one, we first need an account of the notion of ‘Reflective Access’ that underpins Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism. I provide three interpretations of the notion of Reflective Access: a metaphysical interpretation, a folk interpretation, and an epistemic interpretation. I argue that none of these three interpretations comes without problems. I conclude that, until we have a clear and unproblematic account of Reflective Access, the Access Problem remains a challenge for Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism.

Reflective Knowledge

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chienkuo Mi ◽  
Shane Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Extended Cognition ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Reflective Knowledge ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Recent Account

In this paper, we defend the claim that reflective knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge. We begin by examining a recent account of extended knowledge provided by Palermos and Pritchard (2013). We note a weakness with that account and a challenge facing theorists of extended knowledge. The challenge that we identify is to articulate the extended cognition condition necessary for extended knowledge in such a way as to avoid counterexample from the revamped Careless Math Student and Truetemp cases. We consider but reject Pritchard’s (2012b) epistemological disjunctivism as providing a model for doing so. Instead, we set out an account of reflection informed by Confucianism and dual-process theory. We make the case that reflective knowledge offers a way of overcoming the challenge identified. We show why such knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge, while building on Sosa’s (2012) account of meta-competence.

‘Appearing Equal’ at Phaedo 74 B 4 – C 6: an Epistemic Interpretation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Tuozzo
Keyword(s):  
Leibniz’S Law ◽  
Colour Perception ◽  
Epistemic Interpretation

The argument at Phaedo 74 B 4‐C 6 that the equal itself is ‘something different from’ sets of physical equals depends on Leibniz's Law: there is a property that perceptible equals have that the equal itself does not have. What I call the ‘epistemic interpretation’ holds that the property is an epistemic one: having appeared unequal. The ‘ontological interpretation’ holds that the property is not epistemic, but simply the property of being unequal (that is: physical equals suffer the compresence of opposites, while the equal itself does not). The most natural reading of the text favours the epistemic interpretation; scholarly support for the ontological interpretation is based on the widely held view that on the epistemic interpretation the argument is manifestly invalid. But this view implicitly relies on an impoverished sense of ‘appearing’ as equivalent to ‘being thought’. Drawing on an analogy with colour perception, I elaborate an experiential sense of ‘appearing’ which makes Plato's argument on the epistemic interpretation philosophically defensible.

scholarly journals The Bundle Theory Approach to Relational Quantum Mechanics

2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Oldofredi
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Bundle Theory ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Relational Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Essential Idea ◽  
Mereological Fusion ◽  
Metaphysical Interpretation ◽  
Aristotelian Tradition

AbstractThe present essay provides a new metaphysical interpretation of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) in terms of mereological bundle theory. The essential idea is to claim that a physical system in RQM can be defined as a mereological fusion of properties whose values may vary for different observers. Abandoning the Aristotelian tradition centered on the notion of substance, I claim that RQM embraces an ontology of properties that finds its roots in the heritage of David Hume. To this regard, defining what kind of concrete physical objects populate the world according to RQM, I argue that this theoretical framework can be made compatible with (i) a property-oriented ontology, in which the notion of object can be easily defined, and (ii) moderate structural realism, a philosophical position where relations and relata are both fundamental. Finally, I conclude that under this reading relational quantum mechanics should be included among the full-fledged realist interpretations of quantum theory.

scholarly journals US health care. I: The access problem.

BMJ ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 305 (6857) ◽  
pp. 817-819 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Dixon
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Access Problem

On the 'Evidential' Nature of the 'Epistemic' Use of the German Modals müssen and sollen

2000 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 131-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tanja Mortelmans
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Interpretation ◽  
The Difference

Abstract. The difference with respect to the kind of evidence evoked by the so-called 'epistemic' uses of the German modals müssen and sollen is argued to affect the epistemic contribution of both verbs in a crucial way. With quotative sollen, a genuine subjective-epistemic moment (which should not automatically be associated with an expression of scepticism, i.e. a low commitment on the part of the speaker) remains marginal at best, whereas inferential müssen easily invites speaker-oriented interpretations to the extent that the speaker can be taken to be rather strongly committed to the factuality of the proposition. The latter 'epistemic' interpretation, however, can but need not occur.

Stranded Runners

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-152
Author(s):  
Christopher T. Buford ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Epistemological Disjunctivism

Those who endorse a knowledge-first program in epistemology claim that rather than attempting to understand knowledge in terms of more fundamental notions or relations such as belief and justification, we should instead understand knowledge as being in some sense prior to such concepts and/or relations. If we suppose that this is the correct approach to theorizing about knowledge, we are left with a residual question about the nature of those concepts or relations, such as justification, that were thought to be first but are now second. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa has recently proposed that we understand justification in terms of potential knowledge. Ichikawa combines his view of knowledge and justification with what initially seems to be a natural complement, epistemological disjunctivism. While Ichikawa focuses on hallucination, I shift the focus to illusion. I argue that the combination of justification as potential knowledge and epistemological disjunctivism entails that perceptual beliefs that arise from illusions are not justified.

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