Pecca Fortiter for the Sake of Morality?Making Sense of Wrong in Hegel’s System of Right

2014 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 204-227
Author(s):  
Alexander T. Englert
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
Phenomenology Of Spirit ◽  
Similar Role ◽  
Making Sense ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Human Condition

AbstractThe goal of this paper is to clarify the role ‘wrong’ plays in Hegel’s system of right, as both a form of freedom and the transition to morality. Two approaches will be examined to explore wrong in practical philosophical terms: First, one could take the transition to bedescriptivein nature. The transition describes wrong as a realized fact of the human condition that one inherits from the outset. Second, one could see it asprescriptive. Actual wrongdoing would be essential for the subject’s progression tobecoming moral. Though both are most likely the case, emphasis is given to the latter since it represents the actualization of potential. Furthermore, it will be suggested that wrong plays a similar role as that which alienation does in thePhenomenology of Spirit; both bridge the will as abstract personality with the moral point of view.

Kantian Autonomy and Contemporary Ideas of Autonomy

2021 ◽  
pp. 43-58
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Hill, Jr.
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Social Conditions ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Moral Commitment ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View ◽  
The Will ◽  
Crucial Part ◽  
Made In

Kant argued that autonomy of the will is a necessary presupposition of all morality. His idea of autonomy is abstract, foundational, normative, and a key to his defense of the rationality of moral commitment. In contemporary ethics philosophers often appeal to autonomy, more specifically, as a moral right to make one’s own decisions or as a psychological ideal of independence and rational self-control. Kantian and contemporary ideas of autonomy are not the same, but how are they related? Arguably, Kantian autonomy, when applied realistically to common human circumstances, tends to not only support but also limit the particular claims made in the name of autonomy. Kantian autonomy is a crucial part of the moral point of view from which specific principles can be assessed, not an ideal of living independently of others. Derivative principles must take into account ways in which various physical and social conditions inhibit the capacity for self-determination.

Poetry?

2021 ◽  
pp. 364-380
Author(s):  
Floris Bernard ◽  
Kristoffel Demoen
Keyword(s):  
Social Contexts ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Wide Sense ◽  
Spiritual Dimension ◽  
The Social ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View ◽  
The Difference

This chapter gives an overview of how Byzantines conceptualized “poetry.” It argues that from the Byzantine point of view, poetry only differs from prose in a very formal way, namely that it is written in verse. Both prose and poetry belonged to the category of logoi, the only label that was very frequently used, in contrast to the term “poetry,” which was reserved for the ancient poetry studied at schools. Many authors considered (and exploited) the difference between their own prose texts and poems as a primarily formal one. Nevertheless, poetry did have some functions that set it apart from prose, even if these features are for us less expected. The quality of “bound speech” gained a spiritual dimension, since verse was seen as a restrained form of discourse, also from a moral point of view. Finally, the chapter gives a brief overview of the social contexts for which (learned) poetry was the medium of choice: as an inscription, as paratext in a wide sense, as a piece of personal introspection, as invective, as summaries (often of a didactic nature), and as highly public ceremonial pieces.

A Dialogue on Compassion and Supererogation in Medicine

1995 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 415-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
David C. Thomasma ◽  
Thomasine Kushner
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View

According to Frankena, “the moral point of view is what Alison Wilde and Heather Badcock did not have.” Most of us, however, are not such extreme examples. We are capable of the moral point of view, but we fail to take the necessary time or make the required efforts. We resist pulling ourselves from other distractions to focus on the plight of others and what we might do to ameliorate their suffering. Perhaps compassion is rooted in understanding what it is that connects us with others rather than what separates us, and rests on developing sufficient awareness, to internalize what our actions, or lack of them, mean in the lives of others.

The Time Machine; or, the Fourth Dimension as Prophecy

PMLA ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 530-535
Author(s):  
Robert M. Philmus
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
Fourth Dimension ◽  
Time Machine ◽  
Essential Aspect ◽  
Active Audience ◽  
Logical Conclusion ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Human Condition

Most of the early science fantasies of H. G. Wells are, as he defines the term, prophetic: the myths that they develop to a logical conclusion represent a critique of some historical or essential aspect of the human condition. The Time Machine, his first scientific romance, explores the premises of prophetic fantasy at the same time that it embodies a myth of its own. In it Wells envisions the future devolution of man, already outlined in previous essays of his, as the ultimate consequence of what he perceived as a present attitude of complacent optimism, an attitude he dramatizes in the reaction of the Active audience to the Time Traveller's account of the world of 802,701 and beyond. Although the Time Traveller accepts this vision as literally true, his own theories about that world make it clear that its significance pertains to it only as a metaphoric projection of tendencies existing in the present. Thus the structure of The Time Machine reveals the Time Traveller's point of view, like that of his audience, to be limited: his final disappearance into the fantasied world of the future vindicates the rigorous integrity of Wells s prophecy.

Justice, Exploitation and the End of Morality

1987 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 117-134
Author(s):  
Alan Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Scientific Understanding ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Small Contribution ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View ◽  
Moral Assessment

This paper is a small contribution to two large subjects. The first large subject is that of exploitation—what it is for somebody to be exploited, in what ways people can be and are exploited, whether exploitation necessarily involves coercion, what Marx's understanding of exploitation was and whether it was adequate: all these are issues on which I merely touch, at best. My particular concern here is to answer the two questions, whether Marx thought capitalist exploitationunjustand how the answer to that question illuminates Marx's conception of morality in general. The second large subject is that of the nature of morality—whether there are specificallymoralvalues and specifically moral forms of evaluation and criticism, how these relate to our explanatory interests in the same phenomena, what it would be like to abandon the ‘moral point of view’, whether the growth of a scientific understanding of society and ourselves inevitably undermines our confidence in the existence of moral ‘truths’. These again are issues on which I only touch if I mention them at all, but the questions I try to answer are, what does Marx propose to put in the place of moral judgment, and what kind of assessment of the horrors of capitalism does he provide if not a moral assessment?

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document