Briefly Noted

2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
pp. 966-967
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Majority Vote ◽  
Main Issue ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
American Democracy ◽  
Presidential Candidates ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Primary Responsibility ◽  
The Supreme Court

On June 2, 2021, the Intern-American Court of Human Rights was referred a case from the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights concerning Fabio Gadea Mantilla, a former candidate in the 2011 Nicaraguan presidential race. According to a press release from the OAS, it was contested that the country possessed the primary responsibility of securing and upholding Gadea Mantilla's right to become an electoral candidate, which it failed to accomplish. This is in reference to his past participation in 2011, where he was listed as a prime candidate for the presidency. In March of 2011, the presidential seat was occupied by Daniel Ortega, and despite the illegality of Ortega seeking re-election, he won by a majority vote of over 62%. This was addressed and argued before the Supreme Electoral Council by both Gadea Mantilla and other competing parties, which was dismissed, and the decision finalized. According to constitutional precedent, the Council has the last word on these matters and appeals are simply not possible. The main issue to be determined was whether executive power was being overextended, impeding on democratic processes as outlined in Article 147 of the Constitution, which limits presidential candidates to two terms. The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice failed to see any validity in referencing this, but the IACHR asserted its stance on this practice being a direct contradiction to foundational principles of inter-American democracy.

scholarly journals La ineludible tutela preventiva en materia de discapacidad / The unavoidable preventive guardianship regarding disability

2019 ◽  
pp. 172-187
Author(s):  
Valeria de las Mercedes Sola
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Buenos Aires ◽  
Majority Vote ◽  
Buenos Aires Province ◽  
Precautionary Measure ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Supreme Court

En el siguiente artículo se analiza la causa “O.P.E. y otra c/ Buenos Aires, Provincia de y otros s/ daños y prejudicios”, en la cual el día 11 de diciembre de 2018, la Corte Suprema de la Justicia de la Nación, si bien se declaró incompetente para entender en el caso en instancia originaria, hizo lugar –por mayoría de votos– a la medida cautelar innovativa consistente en la provisión de una silla de ruedas motorizada. Dicha medida fue solicitada en el marco de un reclamo de indemnización por daños y perjuicios derivados de una supuesta mala praxis donde se encontraba involucrada una persona con discapacidad.     The following article analyzes the cause “O.P.E. and another c / Buenos Aires, Province of and other s / damages and prejudices ”, in which on December 11, 2018 the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, although it declared itself incompetent to understand in the case in instance originally, it took place - by majority vote - to the innovative precautionary measure consisting of the provision of a motorized wheelchair. This measure was requested in the context of a claim for compensation for damages arising from an alleged malpractice where a person with disabilities was involved.  

Toward a Progressive Realisation of Socio-economic Rights in Ghana: A Socio-legal Analysis

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-113
Author(s):  
Nana Tawiah Okyir
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Social Movements ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
State Policy ◽  
National Development ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
Economic Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court

This article argues for the strengthening and entrenchment of socio-economic rights provisions in Ghana's jurisprudence. The purpose of this entrenchment is to engender judicial activism in promoting more creative pathways for enforcing socio-economic rights in Ghana. The article traces the development of socio-economic rights in Ghana's jurisprudence, especially the influence of the requirements of the international rights movement, particularly of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The article delves into the constitutional history of Ghana and its impact on the evolution of rights in the country. Of particular historical emphasis is the emergence of socio-economic rights under the Directive Principles of State Policy in the 1979 Constitution. However, the significance of the socio-economic rights only became profound with the return to democratic rule under the 1992 Constitution, again under a distinct chapter on Directive Principles of State Policy. However, unlike its counterpart, the chapter on the Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, which is directly enforceable, the Directive Principles of State Policy were not. It took the Supreme Court of Ghana a series of landmark decisions until finally, in 2008, it arrived at a presumption of justiciability in respect of all of the provisions in the 1992 Constitution. It is evident that prior to this, the Supreme Court was not willing to apply the same standards of adjudication and enforcement as it ordinarily applies in respect of rights under the chapter on Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms. Having surmounted the non-justiciability hurdle, what is left is for the courts to begin to vigorously pursue an agenda that puts socio-economic rights at the centre of Ghana's rights adjudication framework. The article draws on comparative experiences from India and South Africa to showcase the extent of judicial creativity in rights adjudication. In India, the courts have been able to work around provisions restricting the enforcement of Directive Principles by often connecting them to Fundamental Freedoms. In South Africa, there is no hierarchy between civil and political rights on the one hand and socio-economic rights on the other; for that reason, the courts give equal ventilation to both sets of rights. The article further analyses these examples in the light of ongoing constitutional reforms in Ghana. It argues that these reforms fall short of the activism required to propel socio-economic rights adjudication to the forefront in Ghana's jurisprudence. In this regard, the article proposes social movements as a viable tool for socio-economic rights advocacy by recounting its success in previous controversial issues in Ghana. The article also connects this to other important building blocks like building socio-economic rights into a national development blueprint. Overall, the article calls for an imaginative socio-economic rights enforcement approach that is predicated on legislation, judicial activism, social movements and a national development blueprint aimed at delivering a qualitative life for the Ghanaian.

Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel. Case No. HCJ 769/02

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 459-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
Orna Ben-Naftali ◽  
Keren Michaeli
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Direct Part ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
High Court ◽  
Additional Protocol ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Supreme Court

Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel. Case No. HCJ 769/02. At <http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf>.Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, December 13, 2006.In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel1 Targeted Killings) the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, examined the legality of Israel's “preventative targeted killings” of members of militant Palestinian organizations. The Court's unanimous conclusion reads:The result of the examination is not that such strikes are always permissible or that they are always forbidden. The approach of customary international law applying to armed conflicts of an international nature is that civilians are protected from attacks by the army. However, that protection does not exist regarding those civilians “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities” (§51(3) of [Additional Protocol I]). Harming such civilians, even if the result is death, is permitted, on the condition that there is no less harmful means, and on the condition that innocent civilians are not harmed. Harm to the latter must be proportional. (Para. 60)

Insult of Public Officials

2021 ◽  
pp. 388-409
Author(s):  
Christoph Bezemek
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Structural Differences

This chapter assesses public insult, looking at the closely related question of ‘fighting words’ and the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire. While Chaplinsky’s ‘fighting words’ exception has withered in the United States, it had found a home in Europe where insult laws are widely accepted both by the European Court of Human Rights and in domestic jurisdictions. However, the approach of the European Court is structurally different, turning not on a narrowly defined categorical exception but upon case-by-case proportionality analysis of a kind that the US Supreme Court would eschew. Considering the question of insult to public officials, the chapter focuses again on structural differences in doctrine. Expanding the focus to include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), it shows that each proceeds on a rather different conception of ‘public figure’.

The concept of human dignity in the case-law of the Supreme Court of Canada on Charter Equality Rights

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 118-137
Author(s):  
Tatiana Vasilieva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Equality Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Additional Burden ◽  
The Impact

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.

Judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada of February 28, 2020, on Nevsun v. Araya: a “quiet revolution” in the assessment of the status of corporations under public international law?

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-39
Author(s):  
Vera Rusinova ◽  
Olga Ganina
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
International Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
Public International Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
International Human

The article analyses the Judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada on the Nevsun v. Araya case, which deals with the severe violations of human rights, including slavery and forced labor with respect of the workers of Eritrean mines owned by a Canadian company “Nevsun”. By a 5 to 4 majority, the court concluded that litigants can seek compensation for the violations of international customs committed by a company. This decision is underpinned by the tenets that international customs form a part of Canadian common law, companies can bear responsibility for violations of International Human Rights Law, and under ubi jus ibi remedium principle plaintiffs have a right to receive compensation under national law. Being a commentary to this judgment the article focuses its analysis on an issue that is of a key character for Public International Law, namely on the tenet that international customs impose obligations to respect human rights on companies and they can be called for responsibility for these violations. This conclusion is revolutionary in the part in which it shifts the perception of the companies’ legal status under International Law. The court’s approach is critically assessed against its well-groundness and correspondence to the current stage of International law. In particular, the authors discuss, whether the legal stance on the Supreme Court of Canada, under which companies can bear responsibility for violations of International Human Rights Law is a justified necessity or a head start.

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