LOCALIZED IMPLEMENTATION: ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE IN CHINA

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-257
Author(s):  
Haitao Yin ◽  
Yunyi Hu ◽  
Xu Tian

AbstractChina's overcapacities in manufacturing industries, including pollution-intensive industries, served as an important motivation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The popular Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH) therefore expects that the initiative will lead to the relocation of polluting industries from China to the recipients. Focusing on the implementation by local governments, we argue that actual outcomes of the BRI depend on the way local states and businesses respond to the BRI in accordance with their preferences. Through investigating industries’ actual responses to the BRI, we found that pollution-intensive industries have not relocated but rather expanded exports to the BRI countries. This has two implications: on the one hand, it alleviates the overcapacity issue in China and helps sustain the economic performance of the industry; on the other hand, it results in more pollution within Chinese borders and aggravates the environmental challenges facing the country.

2019 ◽  
pp. 47-71
Author(s):  
Petr M. Mozias

China’s Belt and Road Initiative could be treated ambiguously. On the one hand, it is intended to transform the newly acquired economic potential of that country into its higher status in the world. China invites a lot of nations to build up gigantic transit corridors by joint efforts, and doing so it applies productively its capital and technologies. International transactions in RMB are also being expanded. But, on the other hand, the Belt and Road Initiative is also a necessity for China to cope with some evident problems of its current stage of development, such as industrial overcapacity, overdependence on imports of raw materials from a narrow circle of countries, and a subordinate status in global value chains. For Russia participation in the Belt and Road Initiative may be fruitful, since the very character of that project provides us with a space to manoeuvre. By now, Russian exports to China consist primarily of fuels and other commodities. More active industrial policy is needed to correct this situation . A flexible framework of the Belt and Road Initiative is more suitable for this objective to be achieved, rather than traditional forms of regional integration, such as a free trade zone.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (3) ◽  
pp. 138-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serhii Korablin

The article considers financial aspects of the implementation of the People's Republic of China's international initiative of "One Belt, One Way". China's impressive economic success over the last 30 years has shown how it grew into a major global exporter and investor, gaining the second-country status in terms of national GDP and imports. These changes took place against the backdrop of rapid economic growth and deep structural reforms, which were accompanied by increased output and exports of high value-added products. Under these conditions, the country naturally prefers to reorient the global economic system in such a way that it is more conducive to China's economic, financial and political interests. A key practical tool for implementing such a plan is the One Belt, One Way initiative, which is to ensure simultaneous access to (a) Western technologies, (b) global raw materials markets, (c) infrastructure capacities that should maximize the deliveries of Chinese produce to all corners of the world economy. However, such an ambitious plan requires an extraordinary amount of financial resources. Despite China's considerable international reserves (over $3 trillion), its volume is still insufficient to cope with such a task. Moreover, the country itself needs further assimilation of foreign investment and technology due to the relatively low level of capital intensity of its workforce. China will be able to solve this dilemma if it manages to create a system of "counter investment", that is, attraction and absorption of foreign investments from more technologically developed countries, which are denominated in the main reserve currencies, and simultaneously realize their own foreign investments in Yuan, offering their users deliveries of own products of slightly lower technological complexity than those received from foreign investors. This publication was prepared based on the presentation of "The Belt and Road Initiative - A New Shape of Globalization?" presented at the Institute of World Economics and Policy (IWEP) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in May 2019 as part of the International Economic and Economic Conference on "Economic and Trade Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative: Retrospect and Prospect".


Author(s):  
Victoria Batmanova ◽  
Ellada Tikhonovich ◽  
Tatyana Chigareva ◽  
Yuan Lyudai

The article examines the growing role of China in global investments. During 15 years of economic development of the country, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) became the second country in the world acting as a recipient of investments and the second (third) investor sending its funds abroad. After the maximum volume of foreign direct investments (FDI) from the PRC in 2016, 2017 was marked by the drop of FDI. This is connected with China’s control over FDI withdrawal from the country, increasing protectionism from other countries and the aggravating situation for Chinese investors in foreign markets. The drop of investments is connected with a number of reasons. On the one hand, the government of China has strengthened the control over the capital drain from the country in the form of investments. Another reason is the growth of trade protectionism. The complicating external conditions for Chinese investors in connection with the policy of the USA are also worth paying attention to. The 19th National Congress of China mentioned “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) strategy as the main plan for organizing the investment process in the nearest future. Today the effort concentration process (investments into infrastructure, interaction with the countries along the new economic silk belt) is observed. Russia and its regions are included into the Northern corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative and can leverage the advantages of the cooperation with China. China has already invested funds into perspective projects in Russian regions and in the nearest future they are expected to grow within the Belt and Road Initiative.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-206
Author(s):  
Masami Ishida

The government of China promotes the development of expressways and high-speed expressways in Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and tries to connect the major cities of the subregion and Kunming under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). First, this article reviews the development schemes in the subregion including GMS economic cooperation and the BRI. Next, it introduces the development of the transport infrastructure, including expressways and high-speed railways, connecting Kunming and Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Thailand, Myanmar and Vietnam. Thereafter, it compares the total costs of the projects and how other GMS countries negotiate with China. Seeing the sections of the expressways and railways in Yunnan Province, the shares of some sections occupied by bridges and tunnels are higher than 20 per cent due to the mountainous land feature of Yunnan Province. On the other hand, the railway in Lao PDR passes through the mountainous areas, and they adopted higher specification as same as in Yunnan Province. Consequently, the debt-default risk of Lao PDR has increased. On the other hand, Thailand repeated tough negotiations with China and made efforts not to increase the total cost. The negotiations of Lao PDR and Thailand with China are illustrated in this article. JEL Codes: O18, R10, R41, R58


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-31
Author(s):  
Sigit Candrawiranatakusuma ◽  
Jefferson Winata Bachtiar

Despite an acrimonious history, being involved in the second and third Indochina War, in the past few years, Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR) seems to have deepened its relations with China. The improvement of friendly bilateral ties between Beijing and Vientiane can be observed by the evidence of China as the largest foreign investor in the country. On one hand, Lao PDR’s struggle to improve its economic its landlocked geography and the need for infrastructure assistance naturally makes the country lean more towards China. On the other hand, Beijing needs Lao PDR’s geographical advantages to complete the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project. The objective of this paper is to analyze the evolving relationship between China and Lao PDR within the context of the BRI. This paper concludes that both parties have developed a complex interdependent relationship with China attempting to establish a solid geo-economics system while trying to assert its position in a structural power system. The act of assertion is supported by its foreign policy that is predicted to be utilized to cajole Southeast Asia countries to be part of a community of common destiny under the leadership of Beijing.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-182
Author(s):  
Enrique Martínez Galán ◽  
Francisco José Leandro

AbstractThe debate about the benefits and the risks brought both to People’s Republic of China and to the other participant countries by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been gaining momentum in the academic and in the political landscapes. We argue that the BRI is the main pillar of the new financial institutionalism proposed by China to redefine the current global financial architecture and that, consequently, the initiative needs to be considered in that context. This paper (i) reviews the timeline that led to this Chinese-led new financial institutionalism, (ii) proposes two theoretical frameworks to define the concept of multilateral financial statecraft and of new financial institutionalism led by China, and (iii) enumerates the main differences and similarities observed between this new financial institutionalism and the one dominated by the Bretton Woods-related institutions that gradually emerged after World War II, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Marshall Plan, and the Asian Development Bank.


2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald A. Brand

In June, 2017, the Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court became the first Chinese court to recognize a U.S. judgment in the case of Liu Li v. Tao Li & Tong Wu. The Liu case is a significant development in Chinese private international law, but represents more than a single decision in a single case. It is one piece of a developing puzzle in which the law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in China is a part of a larger set of developments. These developments are inextricably tied to the “One Belt and One Road,” or “Belt and Road” Initiative first announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping on a visit to Kazakhstan in 2013. This article traces the development of the Liu case, from the first judgment in California to the decision to recognize and enforce that judgment in Wuhan, China. It then provides the context within which the decision on recognition and enforcement was made, and the way the decision fits within President Xi’s “Belt and Road” Initiative and the pronouncements of the Chinese People’s Supreme Court which have encouraged the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments as part of that Initiative.


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