Portraits of women of the law: re-envisioning gender, law and the legal professions in law schools

Legal Studies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-431
Author(s):  
Nikki Godden-Rasul

AbstractThis paper explores law school portraits of women in law as a way to challenge the over-representation of men in law. Portraiture is a long-standing means by which professions celebrate worthy individuals and reproduce institutional values. In relation to law and the legal professions, portraits are predominantly of men and link law with masculine attributes, contributing to the visual and actual marginalisation of women in law's past and present. The paper begins by setting out why portraits of women exhibited in UK law schools are an important way to challenge gender inequalities in law. It then provides a snapshot of the gender dimensions of university and law school portraiture in the UK, before analysing the Inspirational Women of the Law exhibition at Newcastle Law School as a method of disrupting the dominant gendered visual order in law, and bringing into focus women in legal history.

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-245
Author(s):  
Jay Sterling Silver

At the end of Brian Tamanaha’s instant classic, Failing Law Schools, tracing the economic forces behind exorbitant law school tuition and graduate debt and unemployment, he lays out his plan to help resolve the crisis. He would eliminate tenure, dispense with the final year of law school, rely heavily on adjuncts and apprenticeships, and loosen the ABA accreditation standards mandating “one-size-fitsall” law schools to allow the marketplace to fashion more affordable models of legal education. Some schools would remain in the traditional, three-year mode, with faculty conducting research. Others would morph into, or spring up spontaneously as, the “law school parallel . . . of vocational colleges.” Very candidly, Tamanaha explained that the “two-year law schools . . . would be dumping grounds for the middle class and the poor . . . . Few children of the rich will end up in these law schools.” He calls the plan “‘differentiated’ legal education.” Others, including Paul Campos, founder of the Inside the Law School Scam web blog and author of Don’t Go To Law School (Unless), and the ABA Task Force (“Task Force”) on the Future of Legal Education, have endorsed Tamanaha’s prescription.


1894 ◽  
Vol 40 (168) ◽  
pp. 61-62

If the Dutch judicial authorities ever seriously proposed to hypnotize De Jong, in order to extract from him a clue, which they believed him to be able to give, as to the whereabouts of his alleged victims, the proposal was very promptly extinguished by public and professional criticism both in Holland and in this country. Even the inquisitorial jurisprudence of the continent surely cannot sanction so flagrant an injustice as to convert a prisoner into his own accuser and judge by the aid of hypnotic suggestion. For this and none other would be the result of the hypnotization of persons accused of crime. We are not unmindful of the subtle distinction which the Dutch law is said to draw between the use of statements made by hypnotized subjects as a medium for further inquiry and the acceptance of such statements as legal proofs; the former, we are told by some authorities (although their opinion is disputed), the law of Holland permits, the latter it prohibits. In point of fact, however, this distinction is worthless. Once let an acute juge d'instruction compel a prisoner to supply him with “clues,” and he will soon both turn them into legal evidence (how far such evidence is reliable we shall consider immediately), and let the jury understand that the case for the prosecution is corroborated by the testimony of the prisoner himself. If the hypnotization of prisoners should ever again become a practical question on the continent, we trust that the fact to which we have here called attention will be kept in view, and that a form of inquisition, which is morally as unjustifiable as the rack, will not be introduced under the cover of a distinction without a difference. The case against the hypnotization of prisoners becomes all the stronger when we consider how unreliable the testimony of hypnotic subjects has been proved to be. It is unnecessary to sum up the evidence on this point in any detail. Every student of hypnotic science is familiar with the story of how Lombroso endeavoured to obtain from a criminal, convicted on the clearest evidence, a confession of his guilt, only to find that the convict repeated the same tissue of falsehoods which he had told at his trial; and this case is corroborated by the incident recorded by Moll, of a subject who resisted suggestions to confess the commission of some crime so strenuously as to induce a violent attack of tetanus. It is true that, on the other side, we have the instance of the hypnotists who were obliged to waken a patient lest he should make them the repositories of inconvenient secrets; but there is apparently nothing to show that these incipient confessions were true, and in any event an isolated case of this kind cannot out-weigh the evidence in support of the contrary conclusion. It is not only because of its repulsiveness and probable uselessness that we rejoice that the proposal to hypnotize Do Jong was abandoned. There can be no doubt that if such an experiment had been tried it would have repelled both the public and the medical and legal professions from giving to the phenomena of hypnotism that respectful consideration to which they are justly entitled. How injuriously the prospects of hypnotic science in this country were affected by what transpired at the Eyraud and Gompard trial, no intelligent observer of contemporary medico-legal history needs to be told. We should have regarded a second contretemps of the same kind with deep regret. In a variety of forms the problem of hypnotism will soon be upon us. We may close our eyes to its approach. Pur si muove. How shall we determine the civil capacity and the criminal responsibility of hypnotized subjects? When is hypnotic influence “undue?” How shall we best protect the patient from the hypnotist, and the hypnotist from possible false charges on the part of the patient? With these and other questions of the same description we shall have ere long to deal. We earnestly hope that no untoward incidents in the meantime will deter the educated public from studying hypnotic phenomena in a spirit of calm and dispassionate inquiry. It would, indeed, be a misfortune if, when the problem of hypnotism comes up for solution, its intrinsic difficulties should be intensified by our want of familiarity with its terms.


Author(s):  
Trish Karen Mundy

This paper discusses the partial findings from a research study involving a narrative analysis of in-depth interviews with twelve final year law students. The research explored student attitudes to, and perceptions of, legal practice in rural, regional and remote (RRR) communities – that is, their ’imagined experience’. The research findings suggests that, at least in the context of the non-regional law school, the rural/regional is both absent and ‘other’, revealing the ‘urban-centric’ nature of legal education and its failure to adequately expose students to rural and regional practice contexts that can help to positively shape their ‘imagined’ experience. This paper argues that all law schools must take up the challenge of rural inclusiveness by integrating a sense of ‘place-consciousness’ into the law curriculum.


Author(s):  
Michael Lobban

This article looks at the different approaches which have been taken in the study of legal history in England and America by both historians in law and history faculties. The pioneer English legal historian was F.W. Maitland, who felt that the skills of the lawyer were needed to understand the legal materials which were the source of much medieval social and economic history. Maitland, who had no wish to use history to explain current doctrine, inspired a generation of medieval historians to look at legal questions. The study of legal history in English law schools was in turn revolutionized by S. F. C Milsom, who felt that the key to legal history was not to apply the skills of the present lawyer to the law of the past, but to attempt to get into the minds of previous generations of lawyers. Following Milson, doctrinal legal history flourished in England. In the United States, a different tradition dominated law schools. Here, the pioneer was J. Willard Hurst, who turned attention away from narrow doctrinal history, to a broader contextual study of law, looking at the operation of law in society. The article discusses the kind of historiography which developed in America after Hurst, before turning to what discuss what role doctrinal legal history can continue to play, both to inform historical and legal debates.


Legal Studies ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil MacCormick

The occasion of the publication of a survey of jurisprudence teaching in the law schools of the United Kingdom is a good occasion for reflecting upon the point of jurisprudence teaching in a law school. There are indeed other good occasions for such reflection, and in fact this paper was initially prepared for such an other occasion. By the invitation of the Editor, it now appears in this Journal in revised form as an outrider to Barnett and Yach's survey ofjurisprudence teaching in the United Kingdom.One cannot but compliment the authors on the thoroughness of their survey work and on the richness of detail of their report. This comment will not seek to rival that richness.


1934 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-139

In 1932, representatives of the legal practitioners, the judges, the law schools and the legal and diplomatic departments of the governments, founded the Australian and New Zealand Society of International Law, with the object of fostering in Australia the study of public and private international law, particularly the study of those topics which affect, or are likely to affect, Australia or New Zealand. The First Annual Conference was held at the Sydney University Law School from Thursday, August 17, until Saturday, August 19, 1933.


Author(s):  
Heather Shipley

AbstractTrinity Western University’s Community Covenant has been the subject of public and legal attention with specific reference to a proposed law school. At the heart of much of the contention about the law school, opponents have expressed concern about the provisions in the Covenant that restrict the rights of LGBTQI+ students—their identities and relationships. While much of the focus has been on the potential harm for LGBTQI+ students, and the expectation that law schools uphold Charter values—the voices of queer students and allies have largely been sidelined. This article offers space for LGBTQI+ students, staff and allies to discuss their lived experiences of sexual diversity and the harm facing the queer community at Trinity Western University. As they state, the Covenant is only a part of the issue; the culture it supports is what needs to change.


2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 535-578
Author(s):  
Bruce A. Kimball

Between 1915 and 1925, Harvard University conducted the first national public fund-raising campaign in higher education in the United States. At the same time, Harvard Law School attempted the first such effort in legal education. The law school organized its effort independently, in conjunction with its centennial in 1917. The university campaign succeeded magnificently by all accounts; the law school failed miserably. Though perfectly positioned for this new venture, Harvard Law School raised scarcely a quarter of its goal from merely 2 percent of its alumni. This essay presents the first account of this campaign and argues that its failure was rooted in longstanding cultural and professional objections that many of the school's alumni shared: law students and law schools neither need nor deserve benefactions, and such gifts worsen the overcrowding of the bar. Due to these objections, lethargy, apathy, and pessimism suffused the campaign. These factors weakened the leadership of the alumni association, the dean, and the president, leading to inept management, wasted time, and an unlikely strategy that was pursued ineffectively. All this doomed the campaign, particularly given the tragic interruptions of the dean's suicide and World War I, along with competition from the well-run campaigns for the University and for disaster relief due to the war.


1998 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 80-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Berkowitz

This paper examines the market for certification of ability, specifically in the law profession. Economists have long discussed the problems of measurement and signaling in the imperfect market for labor, but there has been relatively little systematic work on the economic value of these signals. Using empirical evidence comparing Law School Admission Test scores to starting salaries, both across law schools and across individuals in one law school, I discuss the economic value of one point on the LSAT. I find that the marginal value of one point on the LSAT, without controlling for school quality, is over $2,600 in the first year alone, with the value increasing each year. However, when controlling for school quality, one point on the LSAT is worth only a small fraction of that amount. I conclude that the LSAT, while an important determinant of future success, exerts little weight beyond the law school application.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document