Kidnaping by Government Order: A Follow-up

1990 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 712-716 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas F. Lowenfeld

In my full-length article U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad, I argued that government-sponsored abduction from foreign countries was not only distasteful, but contrary to international law and U.S. constitutional law. Though I acknowledged that the reported decisions here and abroad did not, on the whole, support my argument, I suggested that these decisions were out of step with contemporary international law and current American views of due process of law. I expressed skepticism about many of the defenses of the practice that had been raised by American officials and had too often, in my judgment, been accepted by American courts. In particular, I urged that no great faith be placed in assertions by the U.S. Government that abduction of persons who ended up in American custody were carried out solely by the police of the foreign country, that the United States had no knowledge of or participation in torture, or that the foreign country really consented to the operation, though it could not say so publicly.

Refuge ◽  
2002 ◽  
pp. 44-57
Author(s):  
Eleanor Acer

The U.S. detention system for asylum seekers is fundamentally flawed. These flaws reflect an underlying lack of fairness that is inconsistent with international law and with U.S. traditions of fairness. For instance, the initial determination to detain an asylum seeker is not the result of an individualized determination, but is instead mandatory. Subsequent parole decisions are entrusted to the INS, which is the detaining authority, rather than to an independent authority. In short, the system lacks the kinds of safeguards necessary to promote due process and to guard against unfair and arbitrary detention. Reform is possible. The detention system for asylum seekers can be improved so that it is consistent with the values of fairness that the United States strives to meet.


Author(s):  
Thomas Matys

The article discusses how corporations in the U.S., mostly economic, have managed over the last 200 years to claim human rights elaborated in the U.S. Constitution for themselves (e. g. the right due process of law, or free political speech). A multitude of court rulings offer a wealth of empirical material. In the United States an evergrowing critical movement has attempted to criticize and scandalize such corporate rights. An analysis derived from sociology and Political Economy can show that gaining such corporate rights, can be referred to as an increasing privatization of political power and as a historical institutionalization of the - nowadays globally applicable - corporate form.


1990 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 444-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas F. Lowenfeld

In the October 1989 issue of this Journal, I wrote a brief essay concerning the U.S. Constitution and law enforcement abroad. I called attention to the case of Fawaz Yunis, a Lebanese national who was arrested on the high seas by U.S. officers and brought to the United States for trial on charges of aircraft hijacking and hostage taking. Within the space constraints of the Journal’s issue commemorating two centuries of the Constitution, I was able to discuss only one of the questions illustrated by the Yunis case—the question of jurisdiction over crimes committed by aliens abroad. My conclusion, in brief, was that a general reliance on passive personality as the basis for jurisdiction—i.e., the U.S. nationality of victims of the offense—was of doubtful validity under the Constitution, but that jurisdiction based on legislation enacted in implementation of international conventions widely adhered to probably was constitutional. The Yunis case raises two other issues that I believe are of continuing interest: (1) to what extent do the constitutional and statutory restraints on U.S. law enforcement officers apply abroad? and (2) does the so-called Ker-Frisbie rule, according to which a court in the United States may try a person brought before it for a crime over which it has jurisdiction—regardless of how the accused came to be before the court—remain valid and persuasive in the last decade of the 20th century? I want to explore these questions here, bearing in mind that the two questions are related to each other, as well as to the question of jurisdiction to prescribe discussed in the earlier article. Before embarking on the analysis, I want to set forth again in somewhat greater length the saga of Fawaz Yunis, as well as that of two other persons recently seized abroad by authority of the United States for trial in the United States.


Author(s):  
Karen Knop

The two starting points for this chapter are that fields of law are inventions, and that fields matter as analytical frames. All legal systems deal with foreign relations issues, but few have a field of “foreign relations law.” As the best-stocked cabinet of issues and ideas, U.S. foreign relations law would be likely to generate the field elsewhere in the process of comparison. But some scholars, particularly outside the United States, see the nationalist or sovereigntist strains of the U.S. field, and perhaps even just its use as a template, as demoting international law. The chapter begins by asking whether this apprehension can be alleviated by using international law or an existing comparative law field to inventory the foreign relations issues to be compared. Finding neither sufficient, it turns to the U.S. field as an initial frame and sketches three types of anxieties that the U.S. experience has raised or might raise for international law. The chapter concludes by suggesting how Campbell McLachlan’s allocative conception of foreign relations law might be adapted so as to turn such anxieties about international law into opportunities.


1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-517
Author(s):  
Marian Nash (Leich)

On March 3,1997, President William J. Clinton transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification as a treaty the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Hong Kong for the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders, signed at Hong Kong on December 20,1996. In his letter of transmittal, President Clinton pointed out that, upon its entry into force, the Agreement would “enhance cooperation between the law enforcement communities of the United States and Hong Kong, and … provide a framework and basic protections for extraditions after the reversion of Hong Kong to the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China on July 1, 1997.” The President continued: Given the absence of an extradition treaty with the People’s Republic of China, this Treaty would provide the means to continue an extradition relationship with Hong Kong after reversion and avoid a gap in law enforcement. It will thereby make a significant contribution to international law enforcement efforts.The provisions of this Agreement follow generally the form and content of extradition treaties recently concluded by the United States. In addition, the Agreement contains several provisions specially designed in light of the particular status of Hong Kong. The Agreement’s basic protections for fugitives are also made expressly applicable to fugitives surrendered by the two parties before the new treaty enters into force.


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