Genocide as a Fact of Common Knowledge

2007 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 885-898 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nina HB Jørgensen

AbstractJudicial notice has become a widely used tool in the practice of international criminal tribunals but its use has always been constrained by the fair trial rights of the accused. This article considers the possible impact on those rights of the decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Appeals Chamber to take judicial notice of the genocide in Rwanda as a notorious fact against the backdrop of the legal requirements for judicial notice as a fact of common knowledge and as an adjudicated fact. The question whether it would have been more appropriate to notice the Rwandan genocide as an adjudicated fact is addressed in the context of the implications for other instances of genocide, for example Srebrenica.

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
Kevin Jon Heller

Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse, & Nzirorera. Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73(C). Decision on Prosecutor's Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice. At <http://www.ictr.org>.International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Appeals Chamber, June 16, 2006.In an interlocutory appeal in Prosecutor v. Karemera, the appeals chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) held that the commission of genocide against the Tutsis in 1994 is a “fact of common knowledge” of which trial chambers must take judicial notice (Appeals Decision, paras. 35, 38). The decision represents a significant reversal in ICTR practice: although some trial chambers have been willing to take notice of “widespread and systematic attacks” against Tutsis in Rwanda, they have uniformly insisted that the question of whether the attacks amounted to genocide is so fundamental that formal proof is required.As noted in the indictment, Edouard Karemera and Jospeh Nzirorera were minister-level officials in the Rwanda’ interim government (Indictment, paras. 1, 3) and served, along with Mathieu Ngirumpatse, as the national executive leadership of the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND) (id., para. 9). They are charged with, inter alia, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, genocide, and—alternatively—complicity in genocide (id.). The prosecution alleges that they created, recruited, and organized the Interahamwe, the vicious youth wing of the MRND; provided members of the Interahamwe with weapons and military training; and helped formulate and implement policies of the interim government of April 8, 1994, that were intended to incite, encourage, and abet killings of Tutsis (id., para. 14).


2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (4) ◽  
pp. 759-773 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daryl A. Mundis

Since the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, both International Tribunals have grown tremendously in terms of resources. Despite this growth, the International Tribunals have rendered judgments in only fifteen cases and conducted inordinately long trials—a fault for which, perhaps more than any other, they can be justly criticized. The Secretary- General of the United Nations recently appointed an expert group to review the efficiency of the operation of the International Tribunals and make recommendations for improvement. Following the release of the group's report, the General Assembly requested that the Secretary-General obtain comments from the International Tribunals on the experts’ recommendations. The ICTYjudges, for their part, considered these recommendations in a report to the United Nations setting forth a long-term strategy for improving the operation of the Tribunal.


2020 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 235-247
Author(s):  
Paul Bassett

One of the most controversial aspects of the International Criminal Tribunals (ICTs) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) concerns the right to self-representation. Many defendants have sought to use the trial as a stage on which to challenge the legitimacy of the court and to play to the crowd in their own home states. As a result, the various ICTs have sought to place limitations on the accused’s right to selfrepresentation. The recent amendment to the Statute of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal (SICT) is an example of this. This evolution raises questions concerning the effect such limitations may have on the overall fair trial rights of the accused. This article argues that there is a need to establish a guaranteed right of self-representation, provided the accused adheres to an objective set of conditions placed on the right. Such conditions should be confined to those strictly necessary to ensure the integrity of the court. Such a move would allow the court to gain some much needed legitimacy while at the same time deny defendants the ability to turn the court into a political stage.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (34) ◽  
pp. 251
Author(s):  
Romina Beqiri

Given the spread terror and the abuses perpetrated in the Balkan region, many victims and witnesses of atrocities were deterred from testifying. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY or Tribunal) facilitated the appearance of witnesses and protected them in case of intimidation including by taking measures against those who would violate the confidentiality of the proceedings. This article aims to introduce some of the witness protective measures before the Tribunal, and particularly threats and risks they have faced in the context of the cases dealt with by the Tribunal. It reflects also upon groundbreaking measures of protection decided by the Tribunal and the challenges it has faced over the last two decades. It finally discusses the impact of such challenges on the right to a fair trial and how they were addressed.


2005 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 827-840
Author(s):  
John Philpot

On November 8,1994, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted Resolution 955 creating an ad hoc international criminal tribunal to judge individuals responsible for violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994. In its form and structure, the Tribunal does not respect basic legal requirements required of a tribunal set up in international law. Us mandate - limited in time, in scope of potential indictment, and in jurisdiction to violations of international humanitarian law - mil prevent any light from being shed on the real issue raised by the Rwandan conflict, namely that of armed military intervention in Rwanda from Uganda. It will likely lead to the reinforcement of a one-sided view of the crisis in Rwanda and legitimate further unilateral interventionist policies in Africa and elsewhere. The Tribunal will institutionalize the de facto impunity for the members and supporters of the present government of Rwanda who undoubtedly committed many serious crimes between October 1, 1990 and the present.


Author(s):  
Carsten Stahn

The chapter sets the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) legacies into a broader context of international criminal justice. It presents different approaches towards the many legacies of the ICTY. The chapter engages with the several phases that the Tribunal has passed, discussing their positive and negative points. It then examines the normative legacy of the ICTY, arguing that, although some gaps exist, the overall record of the ICTY is marked with several normative innovations. The chapter then visits the procedural legacy of the ICTY, in the sense of how the Tribunal made justice heard and seen. Lastly, the chapter discusses the institutional culture of the ICTY and its legacy to other international criminal tribunals. With this analysis, the chapter claims that the ICTY legacies are living beings, which will continue to be transformed throughout the history of international criminal justice.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 209-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larissa van den Herik

This contribution engages with Sara Kendall’s and Sarah Nouwen’s article on the legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and their call for an ethos of institutional modesty. I much support the nuanced approach that underlies their call and I see it as a prerequisite to properly and adequately appreciate the ICTR’s past existence and operation. I would even be open to moving one step further in the direction of an ethos of sobriety. Rather than seizing the momentum to celebrate accomplishments and highlight milestones, legacy-talk and legacy-construction of international criminal tribunals should entail a form of reckoning. Indeed, as suggested by Kendall and Nouwen, the “justices not done” and the “justices pending” must be part and parcel of the ICTR’s legacy-constructions so as to offer a fair balance and to capture the ICTR’s overall performance, explicitly accounting for results as well as omissions.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 227-233
Author(s):  
Kirsten Campbell

What are the legacies for gender justice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)? Darryl Robinson and Gillian MacNeil in this symposium describe the modernization of the law on sexual violence as a key legacy of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals. However, this characterization does not capture the wider challenges that gender based crimes have raised for the Tribunals, including other legacies of gendered hierarchiesand inequalities.How, then, is it possible to move past these issues to build international criminal justice so that it transforms, rather than reproduces, gendered injustices?


2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (74) ◽  
pp. 63-93
Author(s):  
Philipp Schulz

Abstract By referring to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as a case study, this paper seeks to explore the impact of outreach activities by international criminal tribunals. Building upon primary field research findings, including twenty-seven in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with 108 respondents, this paper applies a theory-driven investigation of the impact of outreach activities by the ICTR. Contrary to the theoretical argument, on a national level throughout society over time, outreach activities by the ICTR did neither increase awareness and understanding, nor shape positive perceptions towards the Tribunal and its expected contribution to reconciliation. Furthermore, a comparison of groups of outreach participants and control groups shows that outreach did increase the level of knowledge among beneficiaries of such activities. An increased understanding, however, cannot be correlated with more positive perceptions towards the Tribunal or its role in promoting reconciliation.


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