Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court: A Study in Constitutional Interpretation. By Jacob W. Landynski (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. 286. $8.50.)

1967 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 803-803
Author(s):  
E. W. Miles
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Search And Seizure ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
The Supreme Court

American Perspectives on Self-Incrimination and the Compelled Production of Evidence

2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 218-242
Author(s):  
Mark Berger
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Constitution ◽  
Search And Seizure ◽  
Fifth Amendment ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Intimate Relation ◽  
Government Authority

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no person may be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. The Boyd decision in 1886 recognised an intimate relation between the privilege against self-incrimination and the restrictions on search and seizure in the Fourth Amendment and created a virtually impenetrable barrier to government demands that a suspect or defendant be compelled to produce evidence against himself. However, since that time the Supreme Court has progressively restricted the scope of Fifth Amendment protection in relation to the compelled production of evidence. This has been achieved by requiring all citizens to appear before grand juries; by denying Fifth Amendment protection to entities; by holding that the compelled production of evidence does not breach the Fifth Amendment unless the very act of production is self-incriminatory; and by denying the privilege in relation to required records. The Supreme Court's stance reflects a recognition of the complexity of contemporary law enforcement problems and may be seen as an attempt to balance the state's interest in the successful prosecution of crime against the citizen's interest in being free from state intrusion. The effect of the Supreme Court's reforms has been to broaden government authority to compel offenders to assist in their own prosecutions whilst limiting Fifth Amendment protection to incrimination through the accused's own testimony or its equivalent.

Part IV Separation of Powers, Ch.21 Jurisdiction

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vakil Raeesa
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Appellate Court ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
Indian Constitution ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Indian Supreme Court ◽  
Exercise Of Discretion

This chapter explores how the jurisdiction of the Indian Supreme Court has evolved as an appellate court, a constitutional court, and a ‘final’ court. It begins by reviewing the four kinds of appeal that may be heard by the Supreme Court as specified in the Indian Constitution: civil, criminal, questions of constitutional interpretation, and appeals by special leave of the Court. It then considers the uncertainty and expansion in the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, with particular emphasis on the imbalance in jurisdictional reforms, the absence of guidelines for the exercise of discretion, and inconsistency in implementing constitutional provisions. It also discusses the Court’s advisory jurisdiction, adjudication of federal disputes, and jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution, along with its power to enforce justice and its claim to inherent powers. The chapter concludes by outlining some of the challenges faced by the Court today.

Chieftaincy jurisdication and the muddle of constitutional interpretation in Ghana

1998 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. K. P. Kludze
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Bar Association ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The Supreme Court of Ghana, in The Ghana Bar Association v. The Attorney General, has unanimously decided that, even under the 1992 Constitution, High Court and the Court of Appeal have no jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters. Even if this decision itself is correct, it is nevertheless premised on highly questionable legal propositions and dicta which strike at the foundations of several otherwise settled principles and canons of construction.

scholarly journals Ce qui est abusif au sens de l'article 8 de la Charte canadienne lors de la recherche de preuves

2005 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 965-982
Author(s):  
Bernard Auger
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Search And Seizure ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Section 8 ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Liberal Approach ◽  
Compliance With The Law ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Right ◽  
Minimum Criteria

In determining whether legislation permitting search and seizure properly meets the requirements of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the courts have been obliged to balance the right of the individual to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure with the right of the state to ensure compliance with the law. In Hunter v. Southam, the Supreme Court of Canada established the minimum criteria of reasonable search and seizure for the purposes of section 8. The liberal approach adopted by the Supreme Court raises an important question : Should the same criteria apply to administrative statutes empowering bodies to conduct inquiries and inspections ? The author compares section 8 of the Charter with the American 4th Amendment, examining the requirement for search warrants in the light of Canadian cases. He then examines and discusses the case law concerning the applicability of section 8 to statutory provisions relating to the production of documents and the standard of reasonableness that should apply to these situations.

The Effect of a Finding That Legislation is Unconstitutional: The Approach of the Irish Supreme Court

2007 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 220-230
Author(s):  
Ailbhe O'Neill
Keyword(s):  
Ab Initio ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
Temporal Effect ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Effect ◽  
Problematic Aspect ◽  
The Way

A number of common law jurisdictions permit the judiciary to strike down legislation which is inconsistent with that legal system's constitution. The Irish Constitution makes specific provision for this in Article 34.3.2°. The power to declare legislation invalid gives rise to a number of interesting questions concerning the temporal effect of such decisions. In Ireland, the courts have consistently adopted an approach whereby incompatible legislation which postdates the 1937 Constitution is deemed to have been void ab initio. Incompatible legislation originally passed by the British Parliament before 1937 is deemed not to have survived in Irish law from the date of the adoption of the Constitution. This gives rise to interesting issues surrounding the effect of past legal determinations which were based on such legislation. This problematic aspect of constitutional interpretation was considered at length by the Irish Supreme Court in the case of A v The Governor of Arbour Hill Prison (the ‘ A case’) in July 2006. This article explains the approach taken by the Irish courts to this aspect of constitutional interpretation and analyses the way in which the problem of legal effect was approached by the Supreme Court in the A case.

Constitutional Law in 1948–1949

1950 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-46
Author(s):  
Robert J. Harris
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
Significant Events ◽  
The Supreme Court

There were no changes in the personnel of the Court while it was in session, but the deaths of Justices Frank Murphy and Wiley Rutledge during the summer adjournment marked the 1948 term as the last to be dominated by an overwhelmingly preponderant majority of judges appointed by Franklin D. Roosevelt. Justice Murphy's death occurred on July 19, 1949, soon after the adjournment of the Court on June 27. He took his seat on the Court on February 5, 1940, as the successor to Pierce Butler. Justice Rutledge died on September 10. He was the last of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's appointees to the Supreme Court. He was appointed on February 11, 1943, to succeed James F. Byrnes. The passing of these jurists may have been the most significant events as regards constitutional interpretation that occurred during 1948–1949.

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