Constitutional Law in 1948–1949

1950 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-46
Author(s):  
Robert J. Harris

There were no changes in the personnel of the Court while it was in session, but the deaths of Justices Frank Murphy and Wiley Rutledge during the summer adjournment marked the 1948 term as the last to be dominated by an overwhelmingly preponderant majority of judges appointed by Franklin D. Roosevelt. Justice Murphy's death occurred on July 19, 1949, soon after the adjournment of the Court on June 27. He took his seat on the Court on February 5, 1940, as the successor to Pierce Butler. Justice Rutledge died on September 10. He was the last of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's appointees to the Supreme Court. He was appointed on February 11, 1943, to succeed James F. Byrnes. The passing of these jurists may have been the most significant events as regards constitutional interpretation that occurred during 1948–1949.

2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 299-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Rabin ◽  
Yuval Shany

AbstractThis article addresses the constitutional discourse surrounding the status of economic and social rights in Israel. It examines the principal interpretive strategies adopted by the Supreme Court with regard to the 1992 basic laws (in particular, with respect to the right to human dignity) and criticizes the Court's reluctance to apply analogous strategies to incorporate economic and social rights into Israeli constitutional law. Potential explanations for this biased approach are also critically discussed. The ensuing outcome is a constitutional imbalance in Israeli law, which perpetuates the unjustified view that economic and social rights are inherently inferior to their civil and political counterparts, and puts in question Israel's compliance with its obligations under the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. At the same time, encouraging recent Supreme Court decisions, particularly the YATED and Marciano judgments, indicate growing acceptance on the part of the Court of the role of economic and social rights in Israeli constitutional law, and raise hopes for a belated judicial change of heart concerning the need to protect at least a ‘hard core’ of economic and social rights. Still, the article posits that the possibilities of promoting the constitutional status of economic and social rights through case-to-case litigation are limited and calls for the renewal of the legislation procedures of draft Basic Law: Social Rights in the Knesset.


Author(s):  
Lucas A. Powe

This book examines the impact of Supreme Court cases from Texas on the entire nation. It argues that the most important Supreme Court cases have originated in Texas, which help explain why it is Texas and not California that provides breadth and depth to constitutional adjudication. Texas litigants, lawyers, politicians, and judges all play important roles in the underlying interplay of law and politics at the local, state, and national levels. In all its facets, Texas offers a window to all constitutional law and the Supreme Court. The book shows that Texas's impact literally started at the beginning by precipitating a debate over national powers and then a war with Mexico, and that the fraught relationship between Texas, the nation, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court in the century and a half since Texas v. White has produced more constitutional law than any other state.


Author(s):  
Vakil Raeesa

This chapter explores how the jurisdiction of the Indian Supreme Court has evolved as an appellate court, a constitutional court, and a ‘final’ court. It begins by reviewing the four kinds of appeal that may be heard by the Supreme Court as specified in the Indian Constitution: civil, criminal, questions of constitutional interpretation, and appeals by special leave of the Court. It then considers the uncertainty and expansion in the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, with particular emphasis on the imbalance in jurisdictional reforms, the absence of guidelines for the exercise of discretion, and inconsistency in implementing constitutional provisions. It also discusses the Court’s advisory jurisdiction, adjudication of federal disputes, and jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution, along with its power to enforce justice and its claim to inherent powers. The chapter concludes by outlining some of the challenges faced by the Court today.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-151
Author(s):  
Chukwuka Onyeaku ◽  
Tonye Clinton Jaja

As a matter of tradition and necessity, teachers of constitutional law within Nigeria (and elsewhere) are often compelled to refer to case law to provide illustrations of principles of constitutional law as enshrined in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). However, in some instances, where the said constitution does not provide explicit provisions, teachers of constitutional law are compelled to cite foreign case law as persuasive precedents. Still there are instances wherein there are neither foreign case law nor indigenous case law as precedents. In such situations, teachers of constitutional law are compelled to examine existing case law and relevant legislation until there is a pronouncement from either the Supreme Court or an alteration of the constitution by the National Assembly. One such situation is the subject of the analysis in this article: the situation whereby a president provides assent to bills after the expiration of the tenure of the National Assembly. As legislative tradition, the last session of each Chambers of the Nigeria’s National Assembly culminating each legislative term is usually a valedictory Session. Accordingly, Thursday, 6 June 2019 witnessed the last Session of the eighth National Assembly. As the president transmitted a Proclamation letter terminating the term of the eighth National Assembly inaugurated on 9 June 2015, it becomes paramount to examine the legal and constitutional implications of bills passed by the eighth National Assembly between 2016 and 2018 and up to 5 June 2019, which were assented to by the president after the tenure of the Assembly and office of the president. Thus, this article examines the constitutionality or otherwise of assenting to bills passed by the National Assembly and assented to by the president after the expiration of tenure of their offices. The article argues that the provisions of the 1999 Constitution had been violated when the president signed into law bills passed by the eighth National Assembly after the tenure of office of the president and the eighth National Assembly. It concludes that bills rejected by the president will require another legislative process of being passed into law again by the same Assembly or subsequent one before it can be assented to by the president. Failure to follow this constitutional process will render the assent unconstitutional.


Author(s):  
Adam Shinar ◽  
Barak Medina ◽  
Gila Stopler

Abstract Israeli constitutionalism has long interested comparative constitutional law scholars, whether due to its geopolitical status, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, its internal divisions, or its unique constitutional evolution. Unlike many other countries that have ratified constitutions after the Second World War, Israel was established as a parliamentary democracy, with an explicit intention to ratify a constitution at a later stage. This did not happen. Instead, it underwent a “constitutional revolution” announced by its Supreme Court. Fitting a revolution, much of comparative constitutional law scholarship has focused on this pivotal moment. The articles in this symposium depart from the scholarship focused on that moment. They seek to critically understand what has become of Israeli constitutionalism in the past decade. In this introduction, we highlight several transformations and features which we believe are essential if one is to understand the extant constitutional order in Israel. These should be understood as background conditions against which Israeli constitutionalism is operating. They include the strengthening of judicial review alongside rising political resistance to the Court’s power; populism in political discourse targeting rule of law institutions; the erosion of individual rights alongside the strengthening of nationalist elements; and increasing divisions inside Israeli society. These challenge the idea of a successful constitutional revolution in terms of its inherent promise to better protect individual rights and safeguard the rule of law. In describing these features, we seek to situate the Supreme Court, judicial review, and the legal-constitutional order generally, in the larger sphere of Israeli society and politics.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 1258-1282
Author(s):  
Rehan Abeyratne

Abstract This article, a contribution to a symposium on dominion constitutionalism, looks at sovereignty in Ceylon’s Dominion period (1948–1972). While the Ceylon Constitution has been the subject of in-depth historical and sociopolitical study, it has received less attention from legal scholars. This article hopes to fill that gap. It analyzes Ceylon Supreme Court and Privy Council judgments from this era on both rights-based and structural questions of constitutional law. In each area, sovereignty-related concerns influenced the judicial approach and case outcomes. On fundamental rights, both the Supreme Court and the Privy Council adopted a cautious approach, declining to invalidate legislation that had discriminatory effects on minority communities. This reluctance to entrench fundamental rights resulted, at least in part, from judges’ undue deference to the Ceylon Parliament, which was wrongly looked upon like its all-powerful British progenitor. On constitutional structure, the Ceylon Supreme Court deferred to Parliament even when legislation encroached into the judicial realm. The Privy Council, though, was not so passive. It upheld a separate, inviolable judicial power that Parliament could not legislate away. But by asserting itself as a check on legislative power, the Council—as a foreign judicial body intervening in Ceylonese affairs—stoked concerns that Ceylon was less than fully sovereign, which ultimately ended Dominion status.


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